upon that of other people. For as Bonaventura has said rightly enough," It is possible and very easy to surrender one's own property, when one may enjoy possession in

common.

But one point remains to be considered, namely, the obedience of a regular, by which in fact they imagine that they excel all other mortals, and even themselves. Thus Thomas,† Man can do nothing greater for God, than for His sake to subject his own will to a higher will. In subjection to this vow they place the very summit of perfection itself; and on this account the Jesuits, that they may be supposed to surpass other Monks, promise a general and blind obedience to their Superior and to the Roman Pontiff. But I see nothing in this obedience to rules more perfect than in the obedience to which other Christians are bound. For to obey, as we are bound, civil rulers, spiritual pastors, parents, and in fine all whom God has placed over us, is much more perfect and difficult, than to obey one Abbot, according to a prescribed rule; and that too in matters for the greatest part of no importance, and in trifling externals, to the performance of which the will-worship innate in human minds excites us. But as regards that blind Jesuitic obedience, we not only deny it to be perfect, but affirm that it is impious and unlawful. For God would not have us make the will of any man the rule of our will and life; this privilege he reserves for himself and his word, as David shews at large in Ps. cxix.

Since then it is clear from what has been said, that there is nothing in the three-fold vow of Monks, which can go beyond the perfection of the Divine law enjoined upon all Christians, it savours both of folly and pride to attribute a state of perfection to Monachism alone, as though it were the very key-nail of the beam.

11. Our last argument is this :-If there is nothing in the ordinary life of believers, which is inconsistent with a state of Christian perfection, or forbids them to aim at the perfection possible and competent to pilgrims; it is consequently both a mistake, and unjust to exclude them from that state of perfection which is conceded readily to those 2. 2. quæst. 186. art. 5.

In 2. sent. dist. 44. quæst. ult.

who lead a Monastic life. For if there were any thing in the common life of Christians which clashes with a state of perfection, without doubt it would be what is opposed to the three Monastic vows, in which they say this state of perfection consists. Now these three are, the liberty of marrying, of retaining property in external things, and lastly, the liberty of not observing the rule (for instance) of Benedict, Augustine, Dominic, Francis, or any others. But a state of perfection suitable to pilgrims does not clash-nay it is compatible-with the maintenance of freedom in these three points. For with this freedom (as we have before. proved) Patriarchs, Apostles, Bishops, yea, the best and most holy Monks, have retained a state of Christian perfection, not any way inferior to that which Dominicans, Fran ciscans, or Loyolists attained. Nay even the Monks themselves, whether they like or not, are compelled to admit, that there is nothing in these rules opposed to Evangelical perfection. For if you enquire of them, as regards matrimony, whether Bishops, to whom the Oriental Church, and the Apostle himself has allowed matrimony, are, in conse. quence of this liberty, debarred from a state of perfection, they dare not maintain it, nay, they ingenuously confess, that these are in a state of greater perfection, than the Monks are with their celibacy. So Cajetan says, in Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 186, art. 5. The vow of chastity does not come under the description of a state of absolute perfection; but under the description of a state of perfection in relation to religious Orders. For the Episcopal state is a state of perfection, and a more perfect state than that of persons who have bound themselves under such religious vows, and yet it does not require the vow of celibacy. Secondly, as to worldly riches and secular concerns, if you enquire whether those who retain the one, or engage in the other, are debarred on that account from a state of perfection, they dare not affirm even that. The highest perfection may co-exist with great wealth, says Thomas, 2. 2. quæst. 185, art. 6. To be rich is not an impediment excluding from the state. of Bishops, says Cajetan, in Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 186, art. 3. To carry on secular business for the sake of wealth, is not lawful either to Monks or Clergy; but for the sake of charity, they may, by permission from their superior, engage

with due moderation in secular concerns, by ministering and directing. From which it is plain, if some Christians possess wealth, and carry on secular affairs piously, and with a view to the Divine glory, (to which all are bound by a necessary command) they are just as little excluded from a state of perfection, by possessing or being engaged about such things, as Bishops themselves.

Lastly, if the question be about the obedience of regulars, they cannot deny that Christians were in an equal and greater state of perfection before these rules were forced upon them by a vow, than Monks now are after various rules have been invented and intruded. For the rule of the Divine word gives far better direction for a state of perfection, than the rule of a Francis, or a Dominic; and the occupations which devolve upon Christians, from their common and special vocation, conduce much more to the acquiring a state of perfection, than the worthless traditions prescribed in a rule by these petty masters.

In conclusion; it is acknowledged that Monks attain to a higher state of perfection when, being released from this obedience to rules, they are promoted to be Bishops. But if the three vows were the choicest instruments for obtaining perfection, it would be absurd to set Bishops free from using them, who are especially bound to aim at a higher perfection, even to the last breath of life. Freedom then from these Monastic vows does not shut out a man from attaining a state of perfection.

And thus we have abundantly confirmed the second particular of our proposition; we proceed then to the last.

CHAPTER XLII.

THE LAST MEMBER OF THE PROPOSITION DEMONSTRATED.

WE are arrived now in the last place at the third member of our proposition, in which we shall oppose the proud fiction of supererogation.

Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 187. art. 2.

Now the Papists, in order to obtain an opening for their doctrine of supererogation, teach that in his Law God has enjoined some works more easy, and of an inferior importance, to be performed by all who would gain eternal life; and has left other works more difficult, and of greater importance, to which a larger reward is promised and deserving of special glory, as subjects for Counsels: these are called by them Evangelical Counsels.* Hence they who fulfil the law, and superadd works of this kind, do, according to their doctrine, go beyond the righteousness of the Divine law, and perform duties that are not owing to God; and therefore whilst they render to God more than they are bound to render, they supererogate. We on the contrary deny that any works can be better or more acceptable to God, than those to the observance of which men are bound by the Divine law; which we have already proved by argu ments not a few. We deny also (what is a consequence of this) that any mortals can exceed the righteousness of the Divine law, by any works whatsoever that are not owed, and which the law of God does not require; in one word, we deny that any one, by any good work, can render to God more than he is bound to do, or (as they commonly express it) can supererogate.

But before we actually engage [in a refutation of this notion] I premise these few remarks; that the law of God positively and strictly obliges to the internal works of loving God and our neighbour, of honouring our parents, of restraining our lusts, and all other things. The same law of God moreover obliges to the performance of all those external works in general, by which this love of God and of our neighbour may be put in exercise and manifested. In fine, although it does not definitely prescribe particular external acts to particular individuals, with all the attendant circumstances; yet it engages to the performing of such acts, individually considered, with such accompaniments, as a spirit of prudence and Christian charity shall suggest to be done. For instance: that law of God which commands us to love our neighbour, and help him by acts of kindness, does not expressly bind me down to perform some particular

See Note, p. 554; and Rivet. Catholicus Orthodoxus, tract. iv. quæst. xl. § 3.

work of beneficence, neither that I should give to some one man in preference to another; but when the rule of prudence and charity shews my mind, that one course of action should be followed rather than another-that I should relieve some one individual rather than another-what had without consideration of circumstances been left to free choice, now becomes a matter of command. For-in these external works, in which the circumstances are not particularisedto do any thing from the mere impulse of a man's will, or to prefer and select one line of action in preference to another, is not a work of supererogation transcending the righteousness of the law; but a work of human discretion. done in subservience to the righteousness of the law, and in its own nature indifferent, but pleasing and acceptable to God, only when taken in connection with some duty enjoined, whom he serves by thus practising it or evidencing it.

These remarks premised, it will readily appear what opinion is to be passed concerning Papistic works of supererogation; which do not in the least excel or surpass the perfection of the internal act, to which they are bound by the law; but merely offer to God, some external work, or circumstances of an external work, which is not definitely prescribed in the law itself. In these things, therefore, men are not rendering more to God than they are bound to do by the law; but since various external means conduce to the due discharge of the law, that is selected which seems to them eligible in preference to others. But let us proceed to argument.

1. The first argument is derived from the very nature of supererogation. Now the mere word includes these two things: one, that he who is supposed to supererogate, fulfils the whole law, not even omitting the least point; the other, that he goes beyond and transcends the law, by perforining deeds not only not due and not in any way enjoined, (which any one can do) but by performing deeds better, more perfect, more acceptable to God, than those are which are commanded in the law.* But now as to the first: it is certain that no mortal man can fulfil the law itself,-a

• Vide Bellarm. de Monach. lib. 2. cap. 7.