certain from the Scriptures, that God never remits guilt whilst its foundation remains, because the judgment of God is according to truth; Rom. ii. 2. But this is a manifest begging of the question; for the point under consideration is Whether God, for Christ's sake, remits the guilt of original sin, to those who still have the remains of this sin dwelling in them? And the proof which he subjoins from Rom ii. is quite foreign to the point. For the judgment of God may be according to truth, and yet he can absolve inan infected by sin from its guilt. For God does not judge the regenerate to be altogether free from sin; neither does he judge concupiscence cleaving to them not to deserve punishment: but he sees them to be infected with the sin of concupiscence; he sees this sin to be in its own nature worthy of punishment, and he judges that, although they are sinners, yet for the sake of the Mediator, into whom they are engrafted, they are to be acquitted, and freed from all condemnation. In this judgment of God, nothing either false or unjust is to be found. Thirdly, Bellarmine contends that the illative particle therefore, itself shews that this conclusion depends upon the foregoing words. There, however, he observes, the Apostle had not said, that God freely forgives the guilt of concupiscence; but had intimated that the motions of concupiscence are not sin, because the regenerate man says, It is no more I that do it, &c. But I answer, that neither from the preceding words, nor from the illative particle, nor from these words—It is not I that do it—can anything else be deduced, than that every regenerate man is no longer regarded in the old Adam, but is reputed a new person in Christ. As therefore the actions which spring from the flesh, are declared not to be actions of the regenerate person; so also the inward guilt, which cleaves to the sin dwelling in their flesh, is with much more justice removed from their person. For there is nothing to prevent the non-imputation to the person of that which adheres to the nature, when the person is taken out of its natural stock and engrafted into a new one. Thus far of the testimonies brought by Bellarmine from the Scriptures; he subjoins to these some arguments, which we shall also now proceed to sift. CHAPTER IX. BELLARMINE'S ARGUMENTS SIFTED. 1. BAPTISM frees from all sin; but it does not free from concupiscence: therefore concupiscence is not sin. I answer :-Baptism frees the person from the guilt of all sins; but it does not immediately free the nature from the operation, or indwelling of original sin. This is the uniform opinion of Augustine, who teaches that concupiscence is original sin causing death in the unbaptised; but that it remains in the baptised, though its guilt is put away.* Concupiscence in baptised infants is discharged from its guilt, it is left to be combated with; but binds unbaptised children under guilt, and drags them to condemnation as children of wrath, even though they die in infancy. Augustine, therefore, plainly lays it down, that concupiscence is original sin and damnable in its nature, although the grace of baptism does away its guilt. And this is the reason why he is unwilling sometimes to call this concupiscence remaining in the regenerate sin, because he takes sin for the guilty thing, which is to be punished by the Divine appointment. But concupiscence remaining after baptism is not to be punished, because its guilt has been expiated in baptism, although in its own nature it deserved punishment. To this that saying of Augustine against Julian refers ;† A baptised person is free from all sin, not from all evil; which is thus more plainly expressed, He is free from the guilt of all evil, but not of all evil itself. When, therefore, Augustine says, that the baptised person is free from all sin, he means nothing else than that he is free from all that culpable evil, which constitutes the person guilty. If the Jesuits denied that concupiscence remaining in the regenerate was sin in this sense, they would virtually agree with us, and we should not contend with them about the word. But when they deny it De Peccat. merit. et remiss. Lib. 2. cap. 2. † Contra Julian. Lib. 6. chap. 5; see also chap. 6. to be sin, they do not consider the remission obtained in baptism, but the nature of concupiscence itself, which they maintain as not being properly sin, even in unbelievers. The Schoolmen adopt the opinion of Augustine. Lombard, (Lib. 2, distinct. 32) says, Since original sin is the vice of concupiscence, we must inquire how it is put away in baptism, when even after baptism that concupiscence remains which was before. He then soon after explains it in this manner: Original sin is put away in a twofold sense in baptism; first, in that by the grace of baptism, the vice of concupiscence is weakened; and secondly, in that the guilt is remitted. Other Schoolmen also teach, after the Master of the Sentences, that original sin is removed in respect of its guilt, but remains in respect to the act: and the Gloss on Rom. iv.* upon the words, Blessed are they whose unrighteousness is forgiven, &c.-As it may happen that some sins, although actually committed pass away as respects the act, and the guilt remains; so on the contrary it may happen, that original sin may remain in act, and the guilt be removed. Whence Hugo de St. Victor,† in reply to the question, How is original sin blotted out? answersIt is totally remitted in respect to its guilt, and weakened as to its power or disposition. The answer, therefore, of our writers, remains firm, Baptism frees the regenerate from all sin as to the guilt, yet not from all as to the act. 2. Again, Concupiscence, it is affirmed, is the effect and punishment of original sin; therefore, it is not original sin itself. For although one and the same thing can be both the sin and the punishment of the sin; yet this without doubt must be understood by comparison in different respects. I answer,-Under the term original sin two things are usually denoted; the voluntary transgression of Adam imputed to all his posterity, and the hereditary corruption entailed upon his posterity. If reference be made to the voluntary transgression of Adam, then whatever corruption hath seized human nature can rightly be called the punishment or effect of original sin, taken in the first sense; or if reference be made to hereditary contagion, then inordinate concupiscence is a part or branch of original sin, and by consequence original sin. For although the Jesuits maintain that concupiscence and ignorance have in themselves the nature of punishment only equally with death; yet in this point they are abandoned by almost all theologians. We have before cited the opinion of Lombard, who clearly lays it down that the vice of concupiscence is original sin; to which I add the opinion of Hugo de St. Victor, who in his definition of original sin uses these words, in direct contradiction of what Bellarmine says:* If it be asked what original sin is in us; that corruption or vice is meant, which we derive from our birth, namely, ignorance in the mind, concupiscence in the flesh. And Augustine himself has declared to the same effect, that concupiscence is sin, the punishment of sin, and the cause of sin.† 3. If man were not born of Adam, and yet possessed the concupiscence which he now has, it could not be properly called sin in him; concupiscence, therefore, is not of itself, and in its own nature sin. For Augustine, (in his treatise against Julian, (Book 3, chap. 12.) concedes to Julian that man would not be a sinner, or guilty, on account of concupiscence, if he had not been born with it from Adam, but created by the devil. But that which of its own nature is sin, is always sin; and whencesoever it springs, whether from man or from the devil, it always renders guilty. Concupiscence therefore is not properly sin. I answer:-The nature of sin is always to be traced to ávouía-or the violation of the rule instituted by God.‡ Original sin, therefore, is deemed that which in man is contrary to the primeval law, or inbred righteousness, which God impressed upon human nature. Actual sin is that which flows from this original, and opposes the law of righteousness, originally inscribed in the heart of man, and afterwards delivered in the Decalogue. But creatures which have not the law of righteousness, either impressed upon their nature, or • De Sacram. Fid. Lib. 1, part 7, chap. 28. In Julian. Lib. 5, chap. 3. Vide Gregor. de Valent. de Peccat. Orig. chap. 5, p. prescribed by God, do not sin, either by possessing those inclinations which constitute man guilty, or by performing those actions which are accounted actual sins in men. For instance, we do not say that a wolf or a goat is contaminated by inherent sin, although in one there is a natural propensity to blood and slaughter; in the other to lust: nor do we say that they commit actual sin, when the former with great fury rends his prey, and the latter, under the excitement of desire, satisfies its lust. And the reason why they are not reckoned guilty is primarily this, because these inclinations of theirs, and their actions, do not oppose any law either impressed or enjoined upon them. These things being laid down, let us now come to the point. First, then, I affirm, that that supposition of the heretic Julian, which Bellarmine also adopts, is utterly impossible; for it is as impossible that the devil should be the Creator of any man, as that he should be God: for Creation is the proper and peculiar work of Almighty God. To look for arguments from such fancies is indeed ridiculous.* Secondly, I acknowledge that Augustine rightly decides against the Manichæans, who fancied that an evil nature is created from an evil principle; that men are not guilty of sin, if they are such now as they were made from the beginning by their Creator. If then man were created by an evil demon (which reason and religion shew to be impossible) accompanied by the inordinate and unbridled concupiscence which he now possesses, he would not, on that account, be guilty of sin. For with what right could God convict as a subject of his and guilty of sin, a being whom he had not created, whom he had not either fashioned or bound to any rule, and who remains such as his Creator willed him to be? Whatever, according to their fashion, takes place in this creation of the devil, which Bellarmine fancies to himself, certain it is, that concupiscence of this kind, unbridled in a creation of God, formed without such defect, is sin. Thirdly, if this reason of Bellarmine had any force, nothing at all would be sin in its own nature. For, if man were created by the devil with habitual proneness to murder, to lust, And yet Bellarmine, who derives many arguments from such sources, is very acute," and a great "Master" (in his way) according to the Rev. J. H. Newman.-See his Lectures on Justification, ut supra. |