many are certainly, in point of difcipline, as well as bodily qualifications, unfit for actual service; and a large proportion even of those who are returned as effective, will not be found fo upon trial. It is too common, I fear, to keep every member on the effective lift, who has once exercised with the corps in battalion upon an inspection or general mufter; though, perhaps, he never was perfect even in his manual exereife, and has forgot the little he once learned of it. Thefe undifciplined effectives too, are, it is probable, increafing very rapidly, in almoft every corps not receiving pay, though their nominal force remains undiminished. • Without enlarging on this fubject, I will hazard an opinion that there are not 50,000 volunteers in the whole island, now ready to take the field, and fit to act against an enemy; yet, were there fix times as many, it might be difficult to draw together two armies of that amount, in time to make a first and second ftand, for the existence of their country. Suppofing a battle to be loft, and London in the hands of the invaders, the fubfequent junction of volunteers, who are scattered over the whole face of the island, would be no easy work. With a most active and energetic enemy in the centre, the communications between the eaft and the weft, the north and the south, of the island, would not be long open. The hope therefore of further refiftance, would depend, not merely on our having enough of effective volunteers, to form a powerful referve, but on their being fufficiently numerous, to make head in different parts of the country at the fame moment, and fight their way in large bodies to a general rendezvous, though oppofed by powerful detachments. If it be objected, that these calculations are founded on an affumption that we should be taken by surprise; I anfwer, that our notice of an approaching invafion would probably be extremely fhort, and quite infufficient for the purpose of embodying our volunteers throughout the ifland, prior to the actual defcent. The means of fuddenly embarking a large army at Boulogne, are continually at the enemy's command. The only requifite for invafion, therefore, which, unless he truths to the flotilla alone, he must provide by new expedients, is a convoying fleet: and this, as has been already fhown, he may very poffibly obtain by a preconcerted junction of different fquadrons off that or fome neighbouring port. But the only probable means of fo obtaining a temporary fuperiority in the channel, are fo far from being inconfiftent with fecrecy, that they neceffarily imply that quality; nor would the opportunity, when found, admit of any delay. It feems not unlikely, therefore, that the fame day would bring us advice that the blockade of Bou. logne was raised by a ftrong hoftile fleet, and that the troops were beginning to embark: nor is it impoffible, that the flotilla might be already on our coaft, before the danger could be announced by Government, at any great diftance from London. What then is to be done in order to prepare effectually against the danger of fuch a furprife, with our prefent means of interior defence? A 4 Are Are the volunteers to be called from their homes, and marched into diftant parts of the kingdom, there to be formed into armies, on every alarm? The repetition of fuch coftly and vexatious means of preparation, would foon exhauft both the purfe and the patience of the country. Befides, as the danger muft always be imminent as long as a large army is encamped within fight of our coals, and the moft fpecious indications of an immediate intention to embark, 'could be easily made, the enemy, if he found he could reduce us to fuch coftly defenfive expedients, would take care we should have alarms enough to harafs our volunteers prior to an actual attempt. It is plain, then, that forces which are to be affembled from many different diftricts of the kingdom, at the expense of every branch of civil induftry, as well as of domestic comfort, inuft probably be, for the most part, unembodied when the enemy is on his way to our fhores. p. 130-133. In this situation, is it possible for a moment to doubt, that our danger is great, and that our preparation is inadequate? or, is it conceivable that men should still be found, who can fancy that they act a laudable and spirited part, in discrediting the danger, and obstructing the necessary preparation? or in raising a senseless cry of disaffection or cowardice against all who have courage to look our situation in the face, and patriotism, to wish that it should be rendered more secure? It seems to be the great object of those who assume the direction of the public sentiment, to hold out the enemy as something very hateful, but by no means very formidable; and thus to inflame our animosity, without exciting our apprehensions. Now this, we conceive, is exactly the reverse? of the policy which ought to be pursued. Our animosity is already more violent than is either reasonable or becoming; and our apprehensions are proved, by the imperfection of our preparation, to be far less active than they ought to be. To talk with contempt of the greatest military power that the world ever saw, is either base affectation, or mere drivelling, or insanity; and yet this is the popular tone among those who seem most inclined to drive us on to the encounter. Provided we are angry enough, and sufficiently convinced that we have to do with a despicable opponent, they seem to think it but of little consequence how we are prepared in other respects for the contest. Our want of discipline and numbers-of generals-of strong places, or plans of operation, are all overlooked; and instead of remedying them, it seems to be the prevailing policy to discountenance all who would press them on our notice, and to make up all deficiencies by more abuse of the enemy, and more high-flown compliments to our own confidence and prowess. In consequence of all this, a general feeling is propagated in the country, that no extraordinary exertions can be necessary to repel these presumptuous invaders; and it is but too familiar and obvious a truth, that no thing but a conviction of absolute necessity will ever lead us to those exertions without which we cannot be in safety. That necessity, we think, is now come. We must be an armed nation, before we can be safe from the hostility of a nation much more numerous in arms: and, that we are not already an armed nation, is owing mainly to the pains which have been taken to disguise from us this necessity, to feed us with the vain idea that no foe will dare to assail us, and that we have nothing to do but to retort their menaces by unmanly abuse and impotent reviling. Those who agree with us, and with the author before us, as to the miferies which this nation, beyond all others, would have to fuffer from fubjugation, will feel enough of anger and indignation at those by whom they are threatened with fuch a calamity. There can be no need, therefore, to inflame our animofity by any other confiderations. Frenchmen, as Frenchmen, were never very popular in this country; but infulting and invading Frenchmen, could never have met but with one reception. Is it not an infult, then, to the loyalty of our people, as well as to their fpirit, to fuppofe that they need the excitement of paffionate invectives, or that they will fight better, and more willingly, if they are kept in the dark as to the danger of the encounter? All this is the worse, too, because we are verily perfuaded that the vulgar railing, in which we indulge ourselves towards the enemy, is very nearly as much mifplaced and unjuftifiable as the accufations which they fo induftrioufly circulate as to us. The French are indifputably a gallant, a focial, and an ingenious people; and, except that they are at war with us, and have beaten our allies, and are purfuing measures that endanger our fecurity, it does not occur to us that they are more deferving of moral reprobation than most other nations. Their manners are fomewhat more licentious, perhaps, than ours; and they are more boastful and infolent than we are said to have been in former times; but, compared with any other Continental people, we cannot help thinking they would appear to confiderable advantage; and that they would probably be reckoned, by an impartial tribunal, fully as amiable and refpectable as our good allies the Portuguefe or Neapolitans-the Coffacs or Laplanders. As to their leader, it must be admitted that he has fome flaws in his character that do not perfectly become a hero. He is more irafcible and vindictive, it feems, than fome other heroes have been; but his infatiable ambition, with his difregard of the lives and comforts of others, are very much in the common heroical style. We do not know that he is worse than the common run of conquerors or arbitrary princes; and are inclined to place him, as to general character, not far from the level of the great Frederic, or the illuftrious Catharine. Odarine. Thofe diftinguished perfons had vices enough, both puone and private; and were rather given to interfere with their negodours, from other motives than thofe of pure propy. Will talk of them, however, not only with patience, but with admiration, and manifeft a liberal indulgence to ther fing, while we invoke all the lightnings of heaven on the head of their more formid ble fucceffor. Now this, we must far, is very partal and chilểuh, and altogether unworthy of the character of the nation, and the conteft in which we are engaged. Its not pernicous edect, is in relaxing the vigilant anxiety of our preparation; but it deierves alio to be reprobated, as throwing unneceflity oblicles in the way of that pacification to which we yatimately look forward, and in indifpofing us to copy from the enemy thole things which may be neceflary for our prefervation. In considering how we are to oppose that torrent of success, which his hitherto overborne all the bulwarks that have been erected to restrain it, it is neither useless nor unnatural to inqure to what that success has been owing. We may thus be enabled either to discover the vulnerable point of the enemy, or to borrow for ourselves a like invulnerability; to anticipate the decay of what as yet seems to have been constantly growing in strength; or to adopt such arrangements as may raise us to a corresponding degree of force and reputation. We may talk now of the immense accession of territory and population which France has recently received; of the military discipline that is established over all that vast empire; and of the enor mous armies which have been trained to victory in the incessant and extended wars of fifteen years. These, no doubt, are formidable items in the account current of her greatness; but they are rather the fruits of her success, than the causes of it. France, under her old government, was more populous, and more unanimous, and possessed more disciplined soldiers, than in the first of her revoIntionary contests; yet, in that distracted and tumultuous state, she overthrew the finest armies in Europe, and established her dominion over provinces which her monarchs had vainly coveted for several generations before. It is to the revolution itself then, and its effects on the interior structure of society, that we are inclined to ascribe the greatness and the successes of France. By that great concussion, the whole talents of the nation were wet at liberty, and rose, by their natural bucyancy, to the higher toons of the state, The ruin and confusion which it produced, did not prevent this effect from taking place; and whatever the strom my have lot in point of internal comfort or happiness, there can be no doubt that it has gained inconceivably in point of force and activity as a state. This is an advantage which all new governments governments possess, to counterbalance the many disadvantages to which they are obviously liable. They are generally insecure, and often oppressive; but they are almost always administered with ability, and are strong and efficient in all their measures of public policy. The fact is now pretty generally admitted: and the theory does not lye very deep. No man can win a place, who does not deserve to occupy it; but he may succeed to it, without any such qualification. A man cannot make a fortune, without money-getting talents; but he may inherit it, without any other dispositions than those of squandering and improvidence. The case is precisely the same as to public functions and political power. In regular and established governments, they are often given, and must often be given, to rank, and to wealth, and to personal influence, without any great regard to superior fitness or ability. In the first formation of society, or in its second formation, in the event of a radical revolution, no such thing is practicable. Places are not given them, but taken; they are not inherited, but won and rank and wealth, and adventitious influence being annihilated, the only competition is as to personal qualifications; and the only test of their existence is their actual operation and display. All extensive governments, when considered with relation to their functionaries and administrators, are necessarily of the nature of aristocracies; but all aristocracies, at their first formation, are necessarily composed of the strong and the subtle-of those who are powerful or active. Imbecility can by no possibility have a place in them; negligence or incapacity operate a spontaneous exclusion. The race is then always to the swift, and the battle to the strong. That it is otherwise afterwards, is apparent; and though the reasons, why it is so, are not very remote nor abstruse, it may be instructive to trace their operation a little more carefully and minutely, than we have often patience to do in these broad and general speculations. All civilized governments may be divided into free and arbitrary or, more accurately for our present purpose, into the government of England and the other European governments. All these, we suppose, were suitably administered in the beginning. The most famous warrior would be king; the next in prowess and reputation would be earls and generals: he who could write best would be chancellor; and he who had the greatest gift of prayer, would be court chaplain or archbishop. The same principle would regulate all the inferior conditions: the first captains, we have no doubt, were taller and more expert than the serjeants; and they than the soldiers in the ranks. The acquisition of wealth, and the establishment of hereditary right, made a great change |