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open air, and the first in England which bore the title of A CAMP-MEETING, was held upon Mow, on Sunday, May 31st, 1807. It commenced about six o'clock in the morning, and continued without intermission till about half-past eight in the evening, It began with one preaching stand only: but three more were afterwards erected. The preachings were intermingled with pious exercises; such as singing, prayer, exhortations, speaking experience, relating anecdotes,

&c.

"During a great part of the day, the scene was interesting: a company wrestling in prayer; four preachers delivering the word of life; thousands listening; tears flowing; sinners trembling; saints rejoicing. Such

was the first of the English Camp Meetings.

"A day's praying upon Mow be gan first to be talked of in the year 1801. The thought rose simply from a zeal for praying which had sprung up in that neighbourhood. From the year 1802 to 1807, various accounts of the American Camp-Meetings were published. These accounts strengthened the cause, and fanned the flame: and in the mean time LORENZO Dow, a native of America, preached in England, and gave some account of these meetings. He drew some attention to the subject, but never had a thought of attempting a Camp-Meeting in England; and when he left England, he had no thought of such a thing taking place.

"In 1807, by a peculiar direction of Providence, a Camp-Meeting took place as above; and two more were published in the same year. These were strangely opposed, and as wonderfully supported, and Camp-Meetings gained an establishment."

A COLLECTOR.

Essay on the Principles of Criminal

Law.

Ta moment when joy and hope

repairing and improving what time has dislocated, or earlier wisdom had left incomplete, in the great political and social institutions of this country, it may be permitted to any individual, however humble, to offer with suitable diffidence and temperance, his counsel upon the occasion.

It is proposed in the present essay very briefly to discuss the principles of criminal law, or punitive justice; a discussion that might seem altogether superfluous to those who advert only to the copious exposition of those principles which has been made by writers of the most eminent talents in this and other nations. But as the practice of no people, perhaps, has accorded with correct theory in this matter, and as consequently it has been difficult to inquirers at all times to view the subject through a clear medium, an attempt to bring out the chief points to be regarded in this melancholy department of jurisprudence may not be improper or useless. Now, as it is obvious that we cannot expect to draw safe conclusions from false premises, nor to form good systems without establishing and adhering to solid fundamental principles, it appears most important in the inquiry before us to determine what are the proper purposes or ends of criminal laws. These purposes we will begin with stating in the following order:

1. To protect society from injurious and vicious practices, denominated by Blackstone" public wrongs."

2. To reclaim and reforin offenders. 3. To deter the criminal and others from a repetition of the offence.

4. To make reparation, wherever it is practicable, to the party injured.

Simply to state the first-mentioned purpose is sufficient, as the only controversy would be respecting the means of attaining that end, and these means are to be investigated under the following heads.

It might be presumed, that in Christian communities the purpose next mentioned would at once be admitted

And apprehension are alternately to be the most important. In paren

excited by the contemplation of a Legislature engaged in the work of

Mow is a large mountain running between Staffordshire and Cheshire; and about five miles distant from the Staffordshire Potteries.

tal government, punishment is termed correction, whether it be or be not adapted to that end. In the government of a state, we say that justice is administered towards those who are accused of offences; and justice implies what is equal and right, or tend

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ing to rectify what is wrong. "In moderate governments," says Montesquieu, a good legislator is less bent upon punishing than preventing crimes; he is more attentive to inspire good morals than to inflict penalties." It is true, that when we speak of the amendment of an offender, we suppose that an offence has been committed, and to prevent offences, it may be reasonably urged, should be our leading desire and aim. Offences, however, will come under the best system of policy. Their enormity may be greatly restrained, and their number diminished, but notwithstanding the force of religion and of law they will exist in every society. Good institutions for religious and moral instruction, wise means for diffusing a virtuous spirit through a nation, are the most effectual preventatives of crime. But our present business is with criminals, and with the laws relating to persons actually in that class. We may contend, then, that the most efficient means of lessening the num ber and enormity of crimes will be found in judicious plans for reclaiming offenders at the commencement, or at an early stage, of their career. With reflecting persons it surely cannot be difficult to establish the truth of this position. To apply correctives before the mind has been hardened by a long course of criminality must, it seems, offer a better chance of success than to attempt to restrain obdurate of fenders by severity of punishment. The criminal not deeply practised in vice would, in very many, if not in most, cases be reclaimed by being placed in an appropriate situation, and supplied with suitable instruction and aid. He might be led and encouraged, but even he would rarely be forced and terrified into amendment. And as to criminals more advanced in their sad course, we may, without hesitation, say, that so long as any reasonable hope of their reformation could be entertained, it would be right, and conducive to the best interests of society, to make their punishment a reclaiming process.

But if these be truths, and if in speculation they might receive general and ready assent, it is evident that they have not been much attended to by practical politicians and legislators. That which we have mentioned third

in order, among the ends of criminal justice, appears solely or principally to have occupied their attention. Every one will concur in the principle that laws must be enacted and measures adopted for this end, of deterring from crime; though a wide difference of sentiment may exist respecting the application of that principle-respecting the measures and the laws best suited for the purpose. Legislators appear commonly to have considered that the prevention of crime could only be effected by the severity of penal enactments. Hence the cruel laws to be found in the codes of many civilized nations, ancient and modern; and hence among us the great number of offences against which the penalty of death is denounced. Montesquieu was of a different opinion. He says, "Experience shews, that in countries remarkable for the lenity of their laws, the spirit of the inhabitants is as much affected by slight penalties, as in other countries by severer punishments. Imagination grows accustomed to the severe as well as the milder punishment. Robberies on the highway were grown common in some countries; in order to remedy this evil they invented the punishment of breaking on the wheel, the terror of which put a stop for a while to this mischievous practice. But soon after robberies on the highways became as common as ever. If we inquire into the cause of all human corruptions, we shall find that they proceed from the impunity of criminals, and not from the moderation of punishments." Beccaria, another writer of deservedly high name, thus declares his sentiments : "Crimes are more effectually prevented by the certainty than the severity of punishment. The certainty of a small punishment will make a stronger impression than the fear of one more severe, if attended with the hope of escaping. If punishments be very severe, men are naturally led to the perpetration of other crimes to avoid the punishment due to the first. In proportion as punishments become more cruel, the minds of men, as a fluid rises to the same height with that which surrounds it, grow hardened and insensible, and the force of the passions still continuing, in the space of 100 years the wheel terrifies no more than formerly the prison.

That a punishment produce the effect required, it is sufficient that the evil it occasions should exceed the good expected from crime, including in the calculation the certainty of the punishment, and the privation of the expected advantage. All severity beyond this is superfluous, and therefore tyrannical." And are not Beccaria and Montesquieu right? Surely their arguments are no less supported by experience than by enlightened theory. In framing penal laws, the force of human passions, urged and strengthened by various circumstances, seems to have been forgotten. But, in fact, few persons after proceeding some time in a vicious course can be induced by terror to draw back. If they have subsisted by plunder or dishonesty, they become more and more unfitted for obtaining subsistence by honest means, and those means soon became barred against them; unless they could avail themselves of the poor-laws. Actuated by long-indulged vice; not restrained by religious or moral principle; encouraged by vicious companions; and stimulated by want, real or factitious; will they think of the severity of punishment, with which they are threatened, further than to elude, if possible, the denunciation of the law, and perhaps to prefer the offence, if it will answer their purpose, to which the lighter, rather than that to which the heavier, penalty is attached? If robbery and fraud, in every shape, were made capital crimes, the practised offender, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, would despise the penalty, or avert his eyes from the view of it. This we may hold to be an incontrovertible truth. And the first inference to be drawn from it is, the importance of a corrective process early applied to offenders. The next inference is, that if severity will not deter from crime, neither can it be justly applied in a mere penal way, as if to avenge society. Admitting that there is a class of offenders who, to human view, are incorrigible, or nearly so, and, therefore, that it is expedient to disable them from continuing to injure the community, it does not follow that we can be justified in consigning them to the executioner, and hurrying them unprepared to the bar of Divine justice. From various motives, however, the penalty of death has numerous

and powerful advocates, and many of these will plausibly argue, that if it be allowable to punish murder with death, other crimes that may lead in their consequences to murder, or that in their nature are almost equally injurious, deserve an equal punishment. And others cling to the notion, that the mere denunciation of such a penalty must excite the highest degree of terror, and so most effectually deter from crime. A distinguished se nator is reported to have maintained, in a recent debate, that no penalty could be so terrible as the punishment of death, and that the fear of death was the greatest of moral restraints. This at the utmost is mere opinion. And though a contrary opinion is not capable of being established by_demonstration, it is supported by Beccaria and other enlightened men, and reason and fact appear to be decidedly in its favour. Men who voluntarily embrace the military profession can have no very strong habitual fear of death. The force of attachment to life must surely be greater or less according to the principles, habits, condition and prospects of a man. At all events, the punishment of death will not effectually deter men from committing crimes, as is evinced every day, and even among criminals not the most abandoned. The question, whether society have a right to take away the life of an offending member will not be here examined; but it deserves the most solemn consideration on the part of legislators; for if it may be properly determined in the affirmative, there are at least objections and difficulties which ought to make us very cautious and forbearing in the exercise of the supposed right. Every truly wise and good man will admit that the punishinent of death should never be inflicted, unless it answer a salutary and ade-, quately important purpose. It seems, then, that before this highest of penalties is denounced, we ought to be well assured, that by this, and this alone, certain crimes can be prevented or restrained. Not many will seriously contend that this is the case with respect to scores of offences (such as breaking down the head of a fish-pond, destroying trees or hopvines, demanding money by anony mous letters, soldiers or mariners

wandering without a testimonial, &c. &c.) made capital in our statute book. But it will be argued, that there are several crimes, besides murder, for which the punishment of death is suitable and just. We will briefly consider two of the foremost in this class of crimes; forgery and rape. That men are not very effectually restrained from the crime of forgery, by the certain loss of life upon detection and conviction, is proved beyond doubt by a superabundance of lamentable facts. Then, is the punishment of death peculiarly called for by the atrocity of the offence? Surely not. This crime may, indeed, by an easy mode occasion very extensive mischief, and therefore demands penalties of appropriate rigour. But might not these be found in perpetual or long imprisonment, and hard labour, and hard fare, by which the criminal would rather be put to make amends, than, strictly speaking, to atone for his offence? Public justice, methinks, would by these means be fully satisfied, and policy no less consulted. As to the other crime that has been mentioned, the duty and importance of protecting female chastity from brutal violation admit of no dispute. Our laws in relation to female chastity, in general, may, indeed, be considered as rather curious, punishing rape with death, and making adultery the subject of a civil action! But, apart from such considerations, we may justly, very justly, doubt whether rape ought to be punished with death; although, like forgery, requiring to be restrained with a strong hand, on account of the violence of that passion which might lead to the crime, and its injurious effects when perpetrated. The difficulty of procuring sufficient evidence, and the danger of unjust conviction, in this case, form alone no slight argument against making the offence capital. Surely, no person ought ever to suffer death on the testimony of one witness. Indeed, there are two considerations, which of themselves ought to make the punishment of death exceedingly rare in penal statutes. One is, that even under the most pure administration of justice, some persons will occasionally be convicted of crimes of which they are innocent, through perjury in witnesses, misconstruction of circumstantial evi

dence, or other causes. Now, the innocence of such persons may be, and sometimes actually is, afterwards established, and if their lives were spared, they might be reinstated in their proper place in society, and some compensation might be made to them for their unjust sufferings. But if they had undergone the punishment of death, all means of repairing the dreadful mistake would for ever be removed. The most earnest advocates for capital punishments might feel a tremor at the contemplation of a case of this kind. But the other consideration, to which I would refer, ought to have still more weight. Christians believe in a future state of existence, where the wicked will endure punishment, compared to which the most severe of human penalties are beyond expression light. Yet we send the criminal, at no distant period after conviction, and sometimes within fortv-eight hours, to this unseen world. Ministers of religion, undoubtedly, attend him, and prescribe repentance, and administer religious rites, and discourse of salvation through the Redeemer of sinners. But can we hope that repentance often takes place within the utmost period now allowed between sentence and execution, and especially within the forty-eight hours afforded, where the crime has been of the deepest dye? Let us not be deceived, nor blindly commit irreparable and awful injury where we profess only to award justice.

The punishment of death has been particularly adverted to as being the highest penalty known to our laws, and as involving the most important consequences. But our argument lies against all undue severity, as cruel, impolitic and unjust. Montesquieu observes, that "in all, or almost all the governments of Europe, penalties have increased or diminished in proportion as those governments favoured or discouraged liberty." If he could view the case as it now exists in this country, he would probably remark, that the liberty largely diffused through our political system had combated the obliquity of our criminal law, and amidst much disorder and mischief had mitigated its severity, and nearly paralized its force. It has been most truly said, that the efficiency of punishments greatly depends upon their cer

tainty. The prerogative of mercy is, indeed, one of the brightest jewels in the crown of a prince; and as every crown is set with thorns as well as jewels, we ought not wantonly to despoil the sovereign of any of the latter. But to make this prerogative most valuable, it should be brought into exercise only on extraordinary occasions. That its use should be confined to a narrow field, seems essential to the public good, which includes the advantage of the head as well as of the members. The lenity of the state in its criminal laws should render needless the frequent exercise of mercy by the executive power. To mitigate the severity of punishment, and to shorten its duration, upon evidence of contrition and reform in the convict, or upon the discovery of wellattested and important circumstances affecting the justice of the conviction, seems to be the proper sphere of this prerogative; and it is doubtful whether, if the criminal code of a country, were in all respects just and lenient, it ought ever to extend to commuting punishments, or to pardon without good cause assigned. The letter and spirit of the law should correspond, and both should agree with reason and religion; and then it would be for the public welfare that the law pronounced should be invariably executed, saving only the right of the Sovereign to shew mercy in the cases above mentioned. And to insure a just decision, it is equally important that the court should be clear of all obstructions to the prisoner and the prosecutor. The judge should, as now, be the prisoner's counsel, if he had no other, to point out where the evidence was defective, and to state fairly the force of any just plea in his favour. And on the other hand, no technical or clerical flaw in the indictment, or other defect in mere form, should be fatal to the proceedings, but the error should be corrected on the spot. The prosecutor should likewise, upon conviction, always be allowed the full amount of his fair costs and charges, fees to counsel excepted.Enough of discouragement would then remain against frivolous and vindictive prosecutions. We should equally desire that the innocent should not suffer; that the guilty should not escape with impunity; and that punishment

should not be unduly severe, but suited and proportioned to the offence, as far as could be effected by a judicious classification of crimes, and a wise. system of penalties.

We have mentioned 4thly, that another end of criminal law should be to make reparation, wherever it is practicable, to the party injured. This principle, we know, would be opposed by many whose judgment deserves regard. They would contend, that although crime includes a private injury, yet in the greater crimes "the private wrong is swallowed up in the public." In murder and a few other crimes, compensation is admitted to be impossible. But can any sufficient reason be assigned for rejecting the general principle of satisfaction to the party injured in cases of robbery, fraud and other attacks upon property? The Legislator of the Jews ordained that the thief should restore double, or four or five-fold in certain circumstances, to the party robbed : and shall we say that this precedent deserves no attention, because in its full extent it is among us impracticable? Under the laws of hue and cry, and in case of riots, the party whose property has been stolen or destroyed, may recover the amount of his loss from the district where the offence is committed. But no notice is taken of the offender in this view. It may be said that by adopting the principle in question, a wide door would be opened to imposition on the part of prosecutors; and that prosecutions night even take place for the purpose of private gain. But, surely, such impositions might be prevented in all cases of alleged loss of property, by making it a part of the duty of a jury to investigate the matter, and to certify the amount of the loss in their verdict. And when imposition is prevented, the idea of prosecuting for the sake of gain could never be entertained. Indeed, the difficulty of supplying prisoners with employment, from which a profit might be drawn, would probably be urged as an insuperable objection to laws requiring reparation in kind. By mere difficulties, however, not amounting to impossibilities, no ardent friend of his species would be deterred from measures of great public importance and apparent advantage. The difficulty

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