in all our thoughts, and to bear upon our minds an habitual and constant regard to him; if it be actually true, as I shall now attempt to prove, that all the common events of life are referred to him, and that nothing can happen to us, or to any other being, but by his appointment. That there is a God who created the world and presides in it, is plain from the harmony, order and beauty of nature; that this Supreme Being is powerful, wise and good, appears from the amazing grandeur and exquisite contrivance of the several parts of the universe, and from the conspiring tendency of all particular beings to the welfare and perfection of the whole. At present I shall not enlarge upon the proofs of this principle; but, taking for granted the existence and perfections of God, and his direction of the greater parts and revolutions of the world, I would endeavour to shew that, as certainly as these principles are true, so certainly the Divine care reaches to the most minute affairs, and to those events which seem to be of less consequence. This will appear to be highly probable, if it be considered, that the world is not a collection of loose and separate beings, but one connected plan and regular system, all whose parts, both great and small, are joined in the strictest union to the whole and to one another. The vegetable creation sustains the animal, and both depend upon the earth and other elements. This globe, with whatever belongs to it, is connected with the sun, and with its fellow-wanderers the planets. Now, in a system whose parts have so extensive an influence, and such infinite mutual ties and relations, is it possible that the general concern should be tolerably conducted and provided for, if no regard be had to the least things in it? For these being neglected, and suffered to run at random, may bring disorder and confusion upon the greatest. If this earth of ours be worthy of the Divine notice and concern, is it not chiefly for the sake of its living inhabitants, which would inevitably perish, were not the plants and trees produced to support them? And if the Divine care extends to the formation of plants and trees, must it not also be employed in the revolution of the seasons, and the influence of the heavenly bodies; the state of the air, the surface of the earth, and the due provision of the necessary juices? Thus the care of one thing includes in it the care of a thousand. An attention to what is of greater importance, supposes also an attention to what is of less; nor could the whole, or the more considerable parts, of nature, be governed and preserved, while particular beings, and what concerns them, were overlooked and neglected. If but one of the movements in the vast machine were suffered to stand still, if one small spring did but cease to act, or acted in an undue or irregular manner, the whole would presently be thrown into disorder, and might justly be said to want guidance and direction. We must either, then, deny a Providence altogether, or acknowledge that this Providence is universal. In like manner, the changes which happen in the world are not a number of independent events, of which one, or a few, might be neglected without prejudice to the rest; but are connected together, so as to form one immense and beautiful scheme, which, if the least part were undirected, the whole would be disturbed and broken. Every thing springs from a mixture of various causes, of different importance and efficacy; and every particular being, however inconsiderable, contributes its share to a multitude of effects, and often to such as are readily acknowledged to be of great importance. What is now present is the offspring of the past in a long ascending series, and will be the parent of what is future, in an indefinite descending succession; and that which is present in one place may affect and be affected by a vast number of other things in different places. Now, in this complicated scene of causes and effects, what bounds can we assign to the Divine Providence? Or where is the precise point, concerning which we may with any reason pronounce, that just hitherto it goes, and no farther? Those who are assured that it has its limits, must certainly know where they are. Let such describe these limits exactly, and we then shall yield up the point. Does God concern himself about mankind? If not, it is not worth our while to dispute whether there be any Providence at all or not, interesting itself about other be ings, for what is that to us? But if mankind be the object of the Divine care, so are the particular nations of the earth, and so, too, are the individuals that compose them: for the human race is nothing but a number of individuals; and, therefore, to say that every one is neglected, is the same as to say that the whole are so. Taking it for granted, therefore, that the Supreme mind vouchsafes to direct the affairs of you and me, what circumstances of our being are disposed by him? What shall we say as to our place, our duration, our company, and the part we are to act? Are all, or some only, of these appointed by God? If only some, which are they? and why they more than the rest? Nay rather, since all the events of life are so strangely interwoven with each other, how is it possible that one part of them should be ordered, and all the rest be undetermined? Each of us, therefore, and all his affairs, is comprehended in that compass which Providence takes in. But this could not be, unless the affairs of other beings, to whom we are related, were also contained in the divine order. It were easy to carry this point farther, and to trace down Providence from the stars of heaven to the most inconsiderable affairs of this lower world. But what has been said may suffice to shew, that if we be once fairly brought to acknowledge a Providence at all, we can never find where to stop, till we have allowed that this Providence extends to all beings, the lowest as well as the highest. Perhaps it may be said, there may be limits to the Divine Providence, though on account of the weakness of our faculties we may not discern and cannot distinctly apprehend them: and therefore these arguments are calculated rather to perplex than satisfy the mind. I grant it; and for that very end this reasoning was here applied, that if any were prejudiced in favour of the contrary opinion, they might see that it also has its difficulties. For when he who has been positive in an opposite belief, can once be made to doubt and hesitate, he is come half way to conviction, and placed in the best situation for discerning the force of more di rect and conclusive reasoning. Such as, in the present case, the following appears to be. The same reasons which we have to believe that Providence is concerned in the great affairs and revolutions of the universe, evince with equal certainty that the Divine influence extends also to the most minute things. For why do we imagine that God governs the sun, moon and stars, but because of their beauty, order, regular motion and beneficial effects? And are use, beauty, order, seen only in the heavenly bodies? Are they not as clearly discerned in all the parts of nature, in every being with which we are acquainted? The sea is beautiful, the streams and rivers are also beautiful. Beauty is diffused over the face of the whole earth. It is found in the barren deserts and wilds of nature, as well as in the cultivated plains. It appears on the rugged rocks and bleak mountains, in the stately forest and shady grove. It lives through all life, both animal and vegetable. It appears in a high degree in those beings which are endowed with sense and mind: and in the highest in such as are blest with reason and moral sentiments. But in some measure it is communicated to the least and ineanest of nature's works. Every tree, plant and flower, every beast, bird, fish and insect, partake of it. Symmetry, order, a nice adjustment of parts to each other, and of the whole inward and outward structure to its circumstances and mode of life, obtain in every creature. And as grace and beauty are every where shed abroad, so every being is of some use and service, and contributes in its place to the general good. The elements furnish the materials, and are made to assist in the formation and growth of vegetables and animals, which no sooner die than their bodies tend to dissolution, and hasten to prepare for other services. Plants and trees at once adorn the earth, and support the various tribes of living creatures, which enjoy life themselves, and administer to the welfare and preservation of each other. The very lowest class of them is not useless, and could not be wanted without some harm to the general system. Now since order and use are aimed at and effected, as in the more magnificent, so also in the least and most inconsiderable parts of nature, have we not as good reason to acknowledge the hand of God in the one as in the other? Wherever beauty appears, and the general wel fare is consulted, there God is present, there he acts. But these ends are every where pursued, in all the regions of nature, in all kinds and degrees of life, in earth and air and sea, and in the make and disposal of each particular being. If God, at the same time that he directs and manages the universe in general, yet takes no care of minute affairs and particular beings, it must be either because he cannot, or because he will not. That he cannot, we shall scarcely affirm: for which is easier, to create worlds, and keep them in rapid and regular motion, or to form and dispose of a single plant or animal? You acknowledge that he is able to effect the former; he must therefore be equal to the latter, which requires no greater expense of power. Nor need we be concerned lest the Deity should be perplexed by attending to such a vast multiplicity of creatures and events, or lest he should neglect some of them, because he cannot, or not without difficulty, oversee them all. This would be to make man the standard of God, and to measure an infinite mind by our limited and imperfect powers. And yet even our minds, narrow as they are, can with ease comprehend many things at the same time. We, who are confined to so small a part of space, can view at once a large prospect, and take in all its varieties of hills and plains, woods and rivers, to a considerable distance. And can we imagine that the Divine mind, which is every where present, is not able to see all things every where and at once? We can, in an instant, observe the affairs of different persons, societies and nations and is it likely that he, from whom these minds of ours are derived, and who infinitely exceeds all his creatures in every kind of perfection, cannot with ease comprehend the affairs of the whole universe, and attend at once to all beings, nations and worlds? It is plain, VOL. XVIII. : 3 U then, that the power and wisdom of God are equal to the direction of the most minute affairs, however nume rous. If, therefore, he do not dispose and govern them, it must be because he will not. But that he will direct all, even the minute and inconsiderable affairs, may easily be shewn, if we will only admit this principle, that he will always do what is best. And what can induce him to act otherwise? Not sloth or cowardice: for sloth proceeds from some uneasiness in acting; and cowardice from a sense of weakness and a fear of danger. But the Divine nature acts without difficulty, and is not obnoxious to any fear; every object yields to its will, and immediately assumes that very nature, place and form, which he would have it. "He speaks, and it is done; he commands, and it is established." Neither can he, like man, be drawn aside from doing what is best, by selfish views of any kind: for what interest can the universal mind possibly have, inconsistent with, or even different from, the interest and good of the whole? But here it is needless to enlarge; since we are now reasoning with those who acknowledge that God is perfectly good; and a Being perfectly good will continually do what is best. And now to complete the argument. If God will do what is best, he will concern himself in those affairs which may seem to us of the least consequence. For can it be best, that, while great things and events are directed, smaller affairs should be left at random? Were it not better that all things, small as well as great, should be appointed and ordered by the Supreme Wisdom? Let us consider what is the case in matters directed by human art or prudence. Ask the mechanist, whether his clock or watch will be more perfect, if all the parts of it are made and adjusted in the exactest manner, or if none but the principal movements are accurately wrought, and justly disposed. So it is in the government of the Universe, which "being as closely united into one system, and composed of parts as intimately connected as the most curious and complicated machine, the whole of it cannot be administered in the best manner, unless the Divine Providence extend to all beings and events, however trivial and inconsiderable they may some of them appear to us. Our reasoning, on the whole, stands thus. The Divine Being can direct the most minute affairs and events: he will do what is best: but it is best, that all affairs, as well the less as the more important, should be directed; and therefore he both can and will, that is, he actually does, appoint and determine the smallest things and most inconsiderable events. Upon the whole, then, we conclude, that from God all things proceed, and by him all things are governed. Nothing is left out of the scheme of his providence. Whatever we meet with in the world, whatever company or accommodations we find, whatever we do or suffer, makes a part of the divine order. God grant that, as all things proceed from him, we may refer all things to him; and receive both the blessings and afflictions of life with becoming piety and veneration; remembering whence they come, and for what end they were designed. CESTRIENSIS POSTHUMUS. Bristol, June, 1823. AGREE with the views of your SIR, free will and philosophical necessity;" but I may be allowed to state that the views which I wish to lay before you are in my own case derived from a full and I trust practical belief of the latter doctrine. I do not, however, conceive that such a belief is by any means necessary to their reception. "He who advocates the plainest and most intelligible hypothesis, is best co-operating with the Deity in teaching mankind their va rious duties and their future expectations." Such I believe to be the tendency of the opinions which I entertain. They appear to me calculated beyond any others, to illustrate the condition and circumstances of man, and the moral government of God. That the Supreme Being, the Creator of the universe, is infinite in power and in knowledge, will be generally admitted; and it follows that he must, from the beginning, "have known and consequently willed, every event which should take place in his creation throughout eternity. Respecting the system on which he regulates its concerns, there are various opinions. It is maintained by some that he did at the first impress upon the universe certain laws, by which all its motions and changes, natural and moral, are continually regulated, and then left it to pursue its course, I correspondent Mr. Luckcock, in his independently of his own immediate remarks on a Particular Providence, (pp. 286-292,) so far as they respect the tendency of that doctrine to confine our ideas of the moral government of the Deity, and the pernicious consequences it is calculated to produce on the dispositions and conduct of those who entertain it. But I cannot accord in his observations relating to the universality of the Divine administration; and it is in the hope of placing this subject in a juster light, that I am induced to intrude the following remarks upon your notice. In so doing let me not be thought to undervalue the spirit of practical utility and benevolent intention which distinguish Mr. L.'s communication. I am not more desirous than your correspondent, of "entering the boundless and thorny field of controversy, respecting fate, predestination, controul. Others suppose that the more important concerns of the world are under the Divine direction, but that the general current of events is left to form its own channel, receiving at times such impulses as suit the views of Almighty Wisdom. There are those again who believe that every part of the creation is under the constant direction of the Deity, by whom the whole is maintained and regulated, and whose influence is felt alike throughout every instant of time, and every corner of the universe. What Mr. L.'s view is, I cannot exactly discover, but the last he decidedly opposes. Yet it is this which alone appears to me consistent with what we know of the Almighty, and with what we observe around us. Mankind too generally found their conceptions of the Divine nature, upon what knowledge they possess respecting their own, forgetting that it is impossible to establish any analogy between that which is frail and finite, and that which is perfect and infinite. In pursuing subjects of this kind, it is necessary, as a first step, to divest the mind of every idea of that limitation and uncertainty which must attend all human operations. Infinity adinits of no limitations and of no degrees, I would here remark that the illustration of the two watches, which your correspondent employs, is not fairly applicable to the subject. We consider the one a more perfect piece of mechanism than the other, because the attention of the artist is not directed from any other pursuit to attend to it. But this does not apply to the operations of the Almighty. Could we conceive that infinite space, with all the creatures it contains, were infinitely multiplied, still an infinite Being would be equally adequate to its support and guidance. In the formation of the universe, the Deity must have had a certain design; and to accomplish this, he must necessarily have employed those means and those alone, which would best produce it. It is absurd to suppose that Infinite Wisdom would create beings without any object, or that Infinite Power would form such as did not in every respect answer their intended end. It follows, therefore, that every creature, and in like manner every event, contributes in its requisite share to the purposes of the Supreme Mind. To a Being of unlimited knowledge and power, all events, whether past or future, must be equally presentequally easy to effect-the grandest and the most trivial to human comprehension alike requiring the exertion only of the Almighty will. Every portion of his creation, animate and inanimate, must be known to him, and occupy an equal share of his attention. So far from shrinking from "the unavoidable conclusions which must be admitted, before we can conceive that the whole human race is under such minute superintendence," I readily close in with them, requiring only that the same principles should be extended to every creature, to every event within the range of time and space. Your correspondent asks, "what adequate idea can possibly be formed of such minute and incessant attention being necessary to uphold the harmony and good order of the whole? The human mind is bewildered on the very threshold of the conjecture." And well it may be. But here he falls into the error which I have pointed out, conceiving of the Divine nature by the limited standard of his own. Is it not presumptuous to pronounce that such are not the design and operations of Omniscience? Surely it is most honourable to the Deity to extend and not to narrow the sphere of his energy. Mr. L. justly observes, "What is the difference in the estimation of perfect wisdom, between the highest state of human refinement, and its most humiliating imbecility? They can be no other than equal in his parental regard." And where then are we to draw the line between the lowest of our own species, and all the successive gradations of created beings? Why should not the life of every sparrow be the object of the care and solicitude of its Maker? Why should not every worm of our gardens, and every gnat of the interminable desert, enjoy the regard of infinite benevolence? According to the foregoing views, the doctrine of a particular Providence falls naturally to the ground. For as every event must have its proper end in the purposes of the Deity, none can possibly occur, without being requisite as a link in the great chain. However extraordinary therefore to human comprehension certain ordinations of Providence may appear, it is evident that they could not in reality have been otherwise. Such events, nevertheless, though certain and necessary in themselves, are to us perfectly contingent; and to a well-disposed mind, this view will excite as much gratitude for unexpected mercies, as that which represents them as peculiar interpositions of divine favour. I know not, Sir, whether I shall have made my ideas as intelligible as I could desire. If what I have written should contribute to produce in any one a clearer and more uniform |