vidence.

In adverting to tot a Providence, general and particular, (for generals are made up of particulars,) it may be observed first, that it is impossible in this case to prove a negative. The omnipresence and omniscience of the Deity being universally acknowledged, his superintending providence appears to be a necessary consequence; other wise, you must suppose universal presence conjoined with infinite inac tivity, which notion seems a species of refined epicureanism. It is true that we know nothing of the manner of the Divine Omnipresence, but we prove the fact by the same arguments from which we prove his being. When philosophers represent the Deity as the soul of the world, as filling universal space, or as comprehending all things within himself, it is evident that these are very imperfect illustrations of a subject, to which no human language is adequate, because they are ideas borrowed from the qualities or properties of matter, which are not applicable to the Supreme Being, and whose peculiar and distinguishing characteristic it is, that he is an infinite Spirit. Perhaps the symbol of the ancient Egyptians in their hieroglyphics is, in this view, the best adapted to our present apprehensions. They represented the figure of an eye with a sceptre, as in a conspicuous part of the heavens, to denote the universal dominion and providence of the Almighty. As the eye of a man upon an extensive plain, and much more upon an eminence, can clearly discern a prodigious space, to every point of which he may be said to be in some

measure present; as the eye or ken of an angel may be easily conceived to extend much farther in its operation, and to take in a more prodigious scope, so the eye of the Almighty (speaking after the manner of men) pervades universal nature. It is im mediately and intimately present in every point of space, and throughout every moment of duration. This sublime principle is inimitably set forth by the royal poet in Ps. cxxxix., and in another place he observes, "The eyes of the Lord are in every place, beholding the evil and the good." How then can he be supposed as inattentive to the works of his hands, to the laws of which he hath or

dained, or to the moral conduct of his rational offspring!

But it is asked, Which manifests the greatest skill, a watch occasionally to be wound up, or one endowed with a perpetual motion? When the latter curiosity shall have been produced, we may possibly answer this question. In the mean time we shall observe, that though the material universe is governed in general by fixed laws, we cannot deny to its great Author the power of departing from or suspending those laws upon particular occasions. It is upon this prineiple that we believe in the miracles of the Jewish and Christian dispensations. And with respect to what are called the laws of nature, or the general economy of the Almighty in the government of the universe, it may perhaps be questioned without irreverence, whether Omnipotence itself can so impress inert matter, (which, however modified and organized, is matter still,) as to proceed in one uniform course for thousands of years without any material deviations or irregularities. Dr. S. Clarke ranks this idea only among the possibilities, for it is allowed by all divines, rational and irrational, (the casuists of the Romish church excepted,) that the Divine power is not to be considered as extending to palpable absurdities and contradictions, or to natural impossibilities, or rather that such things are not proper objects of power, and therefore not to be predicated of the Divine. Now, the mundane system, though calculated for a much longer duration than any

framed by human art, is still a machine evidently dependent upon a variety of causes, and incapable as it should seem of going on continually of itself, or on the supposition of the withdrawment (so to speak) of the original contriver. When a man makes a machine, if a good workman, he proceeds upon certain principles which never fail him, and his work remains (barring accidents) as long as its nature and construction will admit; but when we view the great machine of the universe, we can only judge of it from its effects, and know very little of the causes of those effects. Abbé La Pluche has clearly shewn that when philosophers talk of attraction and repulsion, gravity and continuity, they use words without ideas, and can justly reason only as to matters of fact and experience. What is cohesion? We can give no account why those immense masses of granite constituting Waterloo Bridge, which appear to the eye as an infinite num ber of molecules glued together, should remain stationary and be likely so to remain for ages, rather than be every moment in danger of separating and crumbling into dust, further than that the Almighty will have it so. And the planets might surely as easily be kept in their orbits by the instrumentality of invisible vortices, as by the centrifugal and centripetal forces. And why does not the attraction at the centre of the earth, which they say extends to the moon, level all the hills and mountains, and render it as simply round as the globes on which its surface is portrayed? Nature, it is to be feared, would prove but a clumsy manager if all were left to her own discretion: witness those parts of the world which are committed in a great measure to human management and controul. In the capacious but dismal and neglect ed forests of the torrid zone, we read that the increase of vegetation, the accumulation of ages, is so immense and so impenetrable as to defy all human art to render them habitable hence they are the resort only of savage beasts and deadly serpents, the very air is rendered baleful and pestiferous, and the sandy desart of the Arab, seated in his tent, surrounded by his tribe and accompanied by

his faithful camel, becomes a far more desirable residence.

"Nature does rough-hew and design,

Leaves art to polish and refine."

Now, if from these considerations we ascend to the upper regions, and reflect that any material deviation of the planets from their orbits, as they revolve through the unfathomable depths of æther, would involve the wreck of the whole system, men of plain understandings will draw a ra tional conclusion.

Mr. Luckcock relates a story from Mrs. Cappe, and also gives us one of his own, both of which he represents in a ludicrous light. But there is in reality nothing ludicrous in such events; and every good man that has experienced eminent and seasonable deliverances, (and who has not experienced them?) will generally ascribe them to the superintendency, and in some remarkable cases, to the interposition of Providence in his behalf; nor in such cases, can the most ar dent expressions of gratitude to the Deity ever be justly deemed "a purpose little required;" but, on the contrary, a debt of interminable obligation, and, like the principle from which it flows," still paying, still to owe!" Doubtless, a man should be grateful for his crosses as well as for his comforts, when they have been instrumental in promoting his moral and religious improvement.

Some years ago, a merchant was about to engage in a foreign concern, and with this view had embarked the greater part of his property; when the ship was under sailing orders, as he was going on board he fell down and broke his leg, and of course remained on shore: in a short time the vessel was cast away, the cargo and all the crew lost. He soon, however, recovered his health and was gradually restored to prosperity. What are we to make of this? Mr. Luckcock no doubt will say, it was a singular coincidence of circumstances.

Then, as to the general doctrine of Divine influence or suggestion: objections seem to have arisen from mistakes or misrepresentations, confounding it with the miraculous gifts of the Spirit in the apostolic age, and which ceased soon after. But both

with the sacred writers, and that we must supply the sense thus:—“ All things" frequently come alike to all." "There is" sometimes "one event to the righteous and to the wicked." So again, "The race is not" always "to the swift, nor the battle to the strong;" but, in general, the contrary is the fact. Thus the modern Necessarians quote a passage in Isaiah, by a strange coincidence, in the same sense with the Calvinists: "Is there any evil in the city, and the Lord hath not done it? I form peace, and create evil;" but this the context shews to relate to natural evil; and no doubt the sentiment is just in that view; because nothing can happen to states or individuals, which is beyond the Divine controul, and which he cannot overrule or restrain. Or if they will contend that it relates to moral evil also, St. James shall answer them: "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God, for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man."

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To conclude: let the advocates of free inquiry defend the doctrine of the simple Unity of the Deity, and of the true and proper humanity of our Saviour, and also enforce all the noral and scriptural arguments, (guarding them against abuse,) for the final salvation of all mankind. Here, they stand upon a rock, from which the darts of infidelity, and (as we conceive) of mistaken orthodoxy, will ultimately recoil. But the offices of Christ, in the great work of redemption, are "not of private interpretation;" every man should endeavour to form the best ideas upon these points that he is able; but no one has a right to impose his own sense upon his neighbour. And this rule is applicable to those serious Christians who think they can discover the pre-existence of our Lord in the sacred volume. But, above all things, let the persons we are speaking of be cautious, though with the best intentions, of attempting to undermine principles which have stood the test of ages, and which have appeared to the wisest and best of men perfectly consistent with the severest reason and judgment, with the nature of things, and "the analogy of the faith," till they shall have something better to give us in their room.

I. L.

SIR,

Birmingham, September 2, 1823. I HAVE given all the attention in

my power to the statement in the Repository by Mr. Turner, (pp. 399— 405,) in reply to my observations on a Particular Providence, as connected with the Memoirs of Mrs. Cappe, (pp. 163-167), without being able to perceive that I have singularly misconceived" the doctrine, " as it is maintained by the excellent person who is the subject of these remarks;" and, of course, I cannot admit that my "reasoning is founded on a false and gratuitous assumption." I do not mean to assert that the opinions entertained by Mrs. C. may not have been similar to those of Mr. T., but I request my readers will bestow a glance upon my quotation from the Memoirs, and form their own opinion as to which of the two disputants assumes the most. I take the passage as I find it, without any reference to what I suppose may have been her more extended opinions: and it certainly appears to my apprehension, that if there be any meaning in language, any ideas that words can express with something like the perspicuity of correct and definite precision, she has accomplished what she intended in communicating her sentiments. I am well aware of the extreme difficulty in finding words and expressions that shall not be liable to objections. No language can supply an exact picture of the mind and feelings; and we must make a suitable allowance for imperfections, to which no person could be insensible who ever took up his pen to reason on any abstract subject; and more especially on this which is so entirely ideal, and out of the reach of demonstration. Mrs. C., for instance, uses the words happened and accidentally, not because she considered them as philosophically correct; but because there will inevitably subsist a discrepancy between the nice distinctions the mind perceives, and those of which oral or written speech is incapable. When we have made the nearest approaches we can, so as to render ourselves intelligible to each other, we should be satisfied, and not look for perfection where we shall never attain it. I, therefore, shall lay no stress upon these or similar expressions in her statement, nor at

tempt to take any advantage of what may appear to me to be incorrect in her mode of expression. I willingly yield to Mr. T. the palm for logical acumen and definition; I only wish to argue for truth and not for victory. I am no polemic, and perhaps may by some be considered as a busy intruder in the literary republic: be that as it may, I claim the right of rambling in the field of inquiry, and the same liberty I most ardently consent that others should enjoy. I have early in life read Hartley, Hume, Stewart, Helvetius, Price, and other writers on the human mind, and the conclusions I drew from this mass of inquiry were, that I must judge for myself; and that if I pinned my faith upon the sleeve of any individual indiscriminately, I was as likely to be wrong as if I had no such literary authority whatever. I revere their powers of mind, and I give them credit for sincerity; but, after all, I believe common sense to be the best touchstone of opinions and practical merit.

Mrs. C. says, "It was the intention of a gracious Providence by these means, at that time, to preserve my life." Now, what are we to understand by the word "intention"? To my conception, it implies the result of choice or deliberation. Thus, if this event is permitted to take place, "all the salutary convictions will be felt, which similar dangers and similar deliverances are intended to produce;" if it is not permitted, then those consequences will be lost-therefore, it shall proceed. If this be not a special or miraculous interference for the particular purpose, there must surely be an end to all attempt at argument; or, at any rate, is it possible, after mature consideration, to deny that such was her view of the subject? That the effect was produced by what we agree to understand by a combination of natural causes, I admit; but I cannot separate the idea from the conclusion, that she believed that these natural causes or agents were purposely and specially appointed by Providence for the case in point. And am I not right in believing that her opinion was, that though these events were apparently trivial and unconnected, taken distinctly, and in their regular series; yet that the arrangement and combination of them was produced

in her favour by the special "intention" of Providence? It was well for the community that so valuable a life should be protracted to a ripe old age; but what had this event, taking it throughout, to do with prolonging it? Her death did not then take place; and to say that her life was prolonged by these agencies "that are often employed to take away life or to restore it, at the very moment when it is about to expire," appears to me a strange and incomprehensible confusion of ideas. In short, I think myself fully warranted in the conclusion, that the passage I quoted at full length gives me no authority to extend her conceptions of an overruling Providence beyond those of kind and beneficent protection.

I very readily acknowledge that I did not know from whence my quotation was taken, one event," &c. I borrowed it solely from recollection. Mr. T. indirectly, and somewhat exultingly, asks, whether I am competent to undertake a commentary on the book which contains the passage? Most assuredly I am not; but this I can tell him, that when he shall be prepared to explain all the gradations which the sacred volume contains between plenary inspiration and acknowledged interpolations, I will take care to be ready, so that we may both enter the arena together.

I come now to Mr. T.'s explanation of the plans and proceedings of Providence; and if I understand him right, it is his opinion, that all possible events, moral as well as physical, were distinctly and separately appointed by Omniscience from the creation of the world, or from the profound and inconceivable depths of eternity. He nevertheless appears somewhat unwilling to admit an unlimited investigation into the subject, and afraid of the consequences of pursuing the argument to its extremes, lest we should be misled by "minute particularities," and lose sight of general principles. It must, however, in my estimation, be a weak cause that will not bear an examination in all its points; and if some of them should be more vulnerable than others, a disputant is fairly authorized to make his attack wherever it suits him best. By tracing objections to their utmost extent we frequently may arrive at indisputable