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greatening of the being; the more and the greater the powers, the more and greater the reality, and the farther the remove from nothing. And the affirmation of these powers in defining the being is not a negation, it is not the assertion of defect but of reality. The more determinate a being is in its attributes the higher it is in the order of being. The notion dog has more essential attributes than the notion animal; and thereby the extent of the notion is limited; there are fewer dogs than animals; but the dog is not limited but greatened by the attributes which make it more determinate. Man is a being still more determinate, because he has other and higher attributes; but he is not therefore less than a dog but greater. Reason compels us to believe in the existence of absolute being, the Absolute Reason acting in freedom, endowed with almighty power, perfect in wisdom and love; but these attributes do not limit, they greaten him; the determinateness of his being in the possession of these attributes is not a negation nor a limitation; and the affirmation of it is not a negation of reality but the affirmation of reality and perfection of being in its highest thinkable richness. This principle Spinoza himself enunciates in the ninth proposition in the first part of the Ethics: "The more reality or essence (esse) anything has, the more attributes belong to it."

In like manner the complete determinateness of the being as an individual is indeed a negation or limitation of the mathematical total and of the logical general notion, but it is not a negation or limitation of the concrete being. It is no limitation of a person that he is himself, and not a stone, or a dog, or another person. This is inherent in the essence of personality and is a perfection and not an imperfection, a reality and not a limitation of the being. The loss of this individuality would be the loss of being itself; the loss of it would involve negation. Hence the affirmation of individuality is not a denial of reality but an affirmation of it; but the denial of individuality would be a negation of reality and of being.

It follows that God is not limited by his own unity and identity whereby he is distinguished from stones, and dogs and men, and all finite things. God is not the sum total of finite things; he is not the largest general notion of logic; he is not the universal abstract idea of pure being; he is not the sum of all attributes; he is the living God, distinct in his divine oneness of being from all finite beings. That he is the Absolute Reason and the Almighty Power, limits and conditions all other beings as finite and dependent on him; but it does not extinguish the reality of their being; and their being does not limit him. In truth the universe, instead of limiting God by its existence, is the ever-progressive expression and revelation of his infinite fullness

of being and his complete determinateness in all the attributes of God. Mr. Mulford says, "In the realization of personality as it advances in man toward the universal, this element of individuality tends to recede and disappear. But the personality of God, in his own infinite being, is not formed in the differences of a finite process, that the element of individuality should attach to it."*

This belongs to those nebulous spheres of thought in which the sharp distinctions of real being have faded away, and the progress of man towards unity with God can be conceived only as a gradual loss of his own individual being in his progress towards absorption into the misty homogeneousness of the Absolute. †

VI. The distinction of science into physical science and metaphysical, has its origin and necessity at the beginning of human knowledge in perceptive intuition. In this, as we have seen, the knowledge of being in its modes of existence originates. We have seen that self-consciousness and sense-perception, in one and the same act, reveal to man himself and his environment. Here, therefore, in the very beginning of human knowledge are the origin and necessity of this twofold distinction of science.

Accordingly we find that human thought from the beginning has flowed in these two channels. In some ages men's thinking has been chiefly occupied with the one; in other ages with the other; and from time to time with controversies as to the legitimate relations of the two. But always the human mind busies itself with both. Complete positivism, the theory that human knowledge is confined to sensible phenomena, is incompetent for physical science as really as for metaphysical, and the scientific mind has never been able to confine its investigations within those narrow limits. Boole says: "The particular question of the constitution of the intellect has attracted the efforts of

* Republic of God: p. 32.

†The maxim, “ Omnis determinatio negatio est," is commonly attributed to Spinoza. I have not, however, noticed it formally stated in his writings. In letter 40 (to an unknown correspondent) he says: "If the nature of that being is determined and conceived as determined, that nature is conceived as not existing beyond those bounds (terminos); which is contrary to its definition" as infinite. Evidently he deludes himself here with the conception of a body bounded in space, which necessarily excludes all bodies beyond its bounds. In letter 41 he says that determination denotes nothing positive but only the privation of existence, and therefore whatever exists cannot be determinate; which would imply that it cannot exist in any definite mode. Elsewhere also his reasoning rests on the assumption that the maxim is true. But he seems to be inconsistent with it when he ascribes attributes and modes of existence to the one and only substance and so identifies it with the universe; and when he determines it by his definition, "Natura naturans et natura naturata in identitate est Deus." And Proposition IX. of the Ethics, already cited, seems to enunciate a principle contradictory of the maxim.

speculative ingenuity in every age. For it not only addresses itself to the desire of knowledge which the greatest masters of ancient thought believed to be innate in our species, but it adds to the ordinary strength of this motive the inducement of a human and personal interest. A genuine devotion to truth is, indeed, seldom partial in its aims, but while it prompts to expatiate over the fair fields of outward observation, forbids to neglect the study of our own faculties. Even in ages the most devoted to material interests, some portion of the current of thought has been reflected inwards, and the desire to comprehend that by which all else is comprehended, has only been baffled in order to be renewed. It is probable that this pertinacity of effort would not have been maintained among sincere inquirers after truth, had the conviction been general that such inquiries are hopelessly barren."*

*Laws of Thought, p. 400.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE TRUE: THE FIRST ULTIMATE REALITY KNOWN THROUGH RATIONAL INTUITION: NORM OR

STANDARD OF THINKING AND KNOWING.

32. The five ultimate realities known through rational Intuition.

IN rational intuition the mind comes in sight of reality of which neither reflective thought nor presentative intuition can of themselves give any knowledge. The ultimate genera of the realities thus given I call the Ultimate Realities known through Rational Intuition, and our ideas of them I call Ultimate Ideas of Reason. They are the Noumena in the true sense of the word. This word has, however, been so appropriated by false philosophy, that it is difficult to divest it of the erroneous meaning thus attached to it and I do not attempt to reclaim it.

The Ultimate Realities known in rational intuition, which I shall consider, are five :

The Truc, the contrary of which is the Absurd;

The Right, the contrary of which is the Wrong;

The Perfect, the contrary of which is the Imperfect;

The Good determined by the standard of Reason as having true worth or as worthy of the pursuit and enjoyment of a rational being, the contrary of which is the Unworthy, the Worthless, or the Evil.

The Absolute or Unconditioned, the contrary of which is the Finite or Conditioned.

The four first are the Norms or Standards of Reason and are classed together. They are the basis of Mathematics, of Logic, and of Speculative, Ethical, Æsthetic and Teleological Philosophy. The fifth as the Unconditioned and All-conditioning One stands by itself and is the basis of Theology.

The four first are norms or standards by which Reason estimates and judges beings in all their modes and actions. The True is the rational norm or standard of thinking and knowing; the Right is the norm of efficient action, personal or impersonal; the Perfect, of the creations of thought and their realization by action; the Good, of all

that is acquired, possessed and enjoyed. The third of Kant's three

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questions, What can I know? What shall I do? " What may I hope?" must be divided into two: " What may I become?" "What may I acquire and enjoy?" The four norms correspond to these four questions; the true is the rational norm or standard of what a man may know, the Right, of what he may do, the Perfect, of what he may become, and the Good, of what he may acquire and enjoy.

We also apply these standards to nature. In so doing we assume that nature itself is the expression of Reason and therefore can be judged by the standards of Reason:-the True, the Right, the Perfect, and the Good. If Nature is not the expression of rational thought there is no propriety nor significance in judging it by the standards of rational thought. When we judge of nature by these norms or standards of Reason the questions are:-Does it express or reveal truth? Is it ordered under law? Does it realize or tend to realize ideals of perfection? Is it productive of good?

The ancient classification, the True, the Beautiful and the Good, is inadequate. I have substituted the Perfect instead of the Beautiful as a more correct designation of that idea and comprehending all that belongs under it, of which visible beauty is but a part. I have added The Right. Plato, to whom this classification of the True, the Beautiful and the Good is commonly ascribed, attempted to develop the idea of right from the good, and sometimes seems to resolve virtue into expediency. The idea of the right, however, appears sometimes instead of the true. Pythagoras is said to have discoursed of the just, (otzátor) the beautiful and the good; and in Plato's Parmenides, Socrates and Parmenides converse of the just or right, (ôtzaio) the beautiful and the good. The idea of the right cannot be developed from the idea of the good and is certainly entitled, if any thing is, to a place among the fundamental realities known in rational intuition.

I call attention again to the fact that rational intuition does not give the knowledge of being, but only of the unchanging forms in which, because the universe is grounded in Reason, all beings exist, and in which therefore Reason, when they are brought under its knowledge, must know them as existing. When any object, thought as a being existing thus or thus, is brought to the notice of Reason, Reason must estimate it according to its unchanging rational forms, as true or absurd, as right or wrong, as perfect or imperfect, as good or evil, and as finite or absolute. The intuition that Absolute Being must exist presupposes the knowledge of beings. Beings are already known to exist; then Reason sees that a Being that is absolute and unconditioned must exist. And again I call attention to the error of abstract and scholastic thought, that because our knowledge of finite beings precedes

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