2. Inadequate for synthetic processes and judgments. 3. The three

axioms of formal logic insufficient. 4. Leibnitz' Sufficient Reason.

Prof. Bowen's three principles. 5. Principles underlying concrete

thought. 6. These last principles at the basis of all scientific thought.

7. All science empirical, philosophical and theological, advanced chiefly

by concrete thought...
. 54-61

14. INDUCTION AND THE NEWTONIAN METHOD.-I. Simple or Baconian In-

duction. 1. Extends knowledge beyond observation. 2. The principle

on which it rests. Known by rational intuition. Indefinite statements

of the principle. The uniformity of Nature defined. 3. Distinguished

from erroneous conceptions of it. 4. This brings no discredit on Induc-

tion. 5. Induction and Hume's objection to miracles.-II. The hypo-

thetical, or Newtonian Method. 1. Differs from induction in data, meth-

ods and results. 2. Illustrated from common life; the lost camel. 3.

The hypothesis created by imagination. 4. Aided by previous know-

ledge, habits of observation, analogy. 5. Verification: two requisites;

a third way sometimes. 6. The intuitive principle on which it rests.

7. Importance and general use of this method. 8. Now called induc-

tion; improperly so. 9. Neither method peculiar to physical science.

10. Anticipations..

. . . 61-72

? 15. RELATION of Reflective THOUGHT TO INTUITION.-I. Reflection gives

no elemental material for thought. 1. True only when intuition in-

cludes presentative and rational. 2. True only of primitive or elemen-

tal realities.-II. Within these limits knowledge enlarged by thought.

-III. Can discover the unknown only by the known.-IV. Reflective

knowledge always preceded by spontaneous knowledge. 1. In what

sense faith precedes knowledge. Not peculiarly applicable to religious

knowledge. 2. No Faith-faculty as the distinctive organ of religious

belief. 3. Various meanings of faith. 4. Belief of Testimony.—V.

Reflection and experience become spontaneous in common sense.

. 72-81

16. RELATION OF REFLECTIVE THOUGHT TO UNIVERSAL REASON.-The

universe is grounded in and the manifestation of Reason.-I. This the

ultimate ground of knowledge by inference and by induction.-II. Only

by this can thought solve its ultimate problem. 1. Thought culminates

in finding the unity of the manifold. 2. Must be the unity of rational

system. 3. Possible only in recognizing a personal God.-III. Primary

motive of scientific investigation. Kant's three questions of philosophy.81-85

17. PROBABILITY.-I. Assent according to degree of evidence.-II. When the

improbability is slight, it is unnoticed.-III. Assent on probable evi-

dence a guide to conduct.—IV. No peculiar significance in application

to religious belief.

. 85-87

CHAPTER IV.

WHAT IS KNOWN THROUGH PRESENTATIVE INTUITION.

18. WHAT IS KNOWN THROUGH SENSE-PERCEPTION. . .

19. WHAT IS Known Through SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.—I. Object, subject

and knowledge known simultaneously. Essential in every act of know-

ing. Object and subject are two realities known in one intellectual act.

88-91

Implicit or virtual consciousness. Formulas expressing direct and in-

verse knowledge.-II. Knowledge of our own mental operations.

Comte's objection. Answer.-III. The mind has knowledge of itself.

1. The error that the operations may be known, not the mind. 2. Error

that we are more certain of the operations of the mind. 3. Error that

mind is a series of states of consciousness, 4. Mind conscious of self

only in its operations.—IV. Individuality and identity known in con-

sciousness.-V. Rationality and Freedom known in consciousness. At-

tributes of Personality. Knowledge of personality positive not negative.

Can know others as persons. Knowledge of self as person prerequisite

to knowing God.

. . 91-99

? 20. KANT'S THING IN ITSELF.-Statement of his doctrine.-I. Phenomenal-

ism his fundamental error.-II. Error of presenting noumenon and

phenomenon in an antithesis and reciprocally exclusive. Origin of two

incompatible types of thought.-III. Misinterprets and contradicts con-

sciousness.-IV. Not a noumenon or necessary idea of reason. 1. Is an

attempt to conceive of substance without properties. 2. The postula-

tion contrary to reason. 3. Assumes creation in thought of an element

not given in intuition.-V. Discredits Reason by making its ideas

fictitious.-VI. Involves absurdity. No knowledge if a mind knowing.

Knowledge of the unknowable the condition of knowing. Implies a

faculty above reason to criticise it. The only way in which Reason can

be discredited.-VII. Issues in agnosticism.
99-109

¿ 21. RELATIVIty of KnowledGE.—I. Objection stated. First form. Second

form. Third form.-II. Answer to Third form. 1. Answered by ?? 18,

19, 20.
2. The statement of the objection implies knowledge of

reality. 3. Involves absurdity. 4. Issues in agnosticism.

109-113

CHAPTER V.

WHAT IS KNOWN THROUGH RATIONAL INTUITION.

? 22. UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES NOT PARTICULAR REALITIES.

114-115

23. RISE AND DEVELOPMENT IN CONSCIOUSNESS.-I. Are constituent ele-

ments of reason.-II. Appear in consciousness on occasion in experi-

ence.-III. Regulate thought and action before they are recognized in

thought.-IV. Not innate ideas. Dr. Büchner's mistake.

115-117

24. SIGNIFICANCE AS REGULATIVE.-I. Significant only as applied to beings.

Distinguished from Mysticism.-II. Do not guarantee correctness of

judgment. Objection that the ancients believed antipodes impossible.

Objection by Helmholz.-III. Determine the possible and the impos-

sible. 1. What is possible to thought. 2. What is possible for will-

power to effect. 3. What is possible in nature.

.

117-121

25. VALIDITY OF RATIONAL INTUITIONS.-I. Sustain all the criteria of pri-
mitive knowledge.-II. Indispensable in Reasoning. - III. Verified in
experience. In common sense. In physical science. Exemplified in
Mathematics. Prof. Clifford's objection. This verification continually
going on.-IV. Essential to interpret sense-perception.-V. Objection
that not universally believed. 1. Unknown to infants and savages. 2.

Not necessarily believed by the cultivated; J. S. Mill's objection.

Inane objections.-VI. Objection that they are self-contradictory; 1.

Kant's Antinomies explained; Prof. Clifford's use of them. Hamilton's

use of them. Mansel's use of them. 2. If the objector's assertion is

true the objection is fatal; but it is the only objection. The objection

itself appeals to the authority of reason. 3. The antinomies rightly un-

derstood are not contradictions but complemental truths; examples.

4. The true argument from the antinomies. Kant's explanation of it;

and why inadequate. 5. H. Spencer's Antinomy and agnosticism. 6.

Kant's admission as to his phenomenalism.-VII. Objection that ra-

tional intuitions arise from the experience of the individual by associ-

ation of ideas. Statement of Mill. Statement of Diderot. 1. Individual

experience inadequate to account for them. 2. If thus arising, they would

be inveterate prejudices. 3. Falls into subjective idealism and agnosti-

cism. 4. Has been found inadequate and is abandoned.—VIII. Objection

that they are the result of the experience of the race in its evolution. 1.

Admits they are now constitutional and a priori to the individual. 2.

Admits they are valid and give real knowledge. 3. If so, their origin is

of minor consequence. 4. Evolution does not account for them. 5. Ob-

jection that evolution reaches back of the primitive man. 6. Laws of

thought not in continuous flux.-IX. Objection that rational intuitions

are subjective and illusive. 1. Is a specific application of the theory of

relativity of knowledge. 2. Incompatible with the theory of ancestral

experience. 3. Without rational intuitions knowledge is disintegrated

into subjective impressions. 4. Reason is everywhere and always the

same.-X. The validity of rational intuitions involves the existence of su-

preme and absolute Reason. 1. Truth has no significance except as a

mind is its subject. 2. These principles not peculiar to an individual.

3. They have reality only as truths of absolute Reason. 4. Reason in

man the same as in God. 5. Christian Theism explains and confirms

them by the truth that man is in the image of God. 6. Objection; this is

anthropomorphism. 7. Objection; this involves Pantheism.-XI. The

only reasonable explanation is that the intuitive principles are truths of

Reason. Failure of the three empirical positions exhausts the resources

of empiricism.-XII. Three conditions of the possibility of science.-

XIII. Atheism rests on some theory involving agnosticism.

.

121-151

CHAPTER VI.

THE ULTIMATE REALITIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

? 26. MEANING OF ULTIMATE REALITIES.-Categories: Aristotle's use of the

word and Kant's .

152

27. MATTER AND FORM.-Plato's "Ideas."-Kant's error as to forms and

categories. The true position.
152-153

28. CLASSIFICATION.-The two classes and their subdivisions, and why.

Aristotle's classification of categories. Knowledge begins as knowledge

of particular beings; issues in knowledge of the Absolute Being. 153-154

CHAPTER VII.

ULTIMATE REALITIES PRIMARILY KNOWN IN PERCEPTIVE INTUI-
TION; BEING AND ITS MODES OF EXISTENCE.

29. BEING.-I. Known in perceptive intuition and cannot be defined other-

wise.-II. Is a particular or determinate being.-III. In perceptive intui-

tion known as existing in various modes; in rational intuition known

by reason in its true significance and reality.-IV. Known in its whole

reality as substance and quality. The Greek usage. Does everything

flow? substance, persistence, existence. Not essential to being that it

be eternal, self-existent, etc. Synthesis of being and phenomenon.-V.

Being is fundamental; all other realities pertain to being. Aristotle's

genera of Being. The concrete determinate Being is the unit of know-

ledge.

155-158

30. MODES OF EXISTENCE.-I. Power. Power in motion; intellectual power;

will-power. Quality. Substance and cause. Power hypostasized. James

Mill's denial of power. Cause: agent, transitive, reactive, free. Object

or recipient.—II. One and many. 1. Individuality and identity; origin

of the ideas. Does not imply simplicity. In what sense indivisible.

Belief in existence after death from belief of personal individuality

and identity, not from shadows and dreams.

other beings. Knowledge of the outward object. Things and persons.

3. Number; origin of the idea.-III. Extension in space. Origin of the

idea. Not a subjective form of sense but a form of things. The fourth

dimension of space.-IV. Duration in time.-V. Quantity.-VI. Differ-

ence and relation.

.

2. The individual and

158-167

31. INFERENCES.-I. Knowledge ontological in its beginning. Critical point
against agnosticism.-II. Knowledge begins as knowledge of personal
beings and impersonal. Mansel's objection. Excludes materialism and
idealism. Kant's phenomenalism. J. G. Fichte's attempt to avoid it by
knowledge of self. Hegel's attempt to avoid it. His near approach to the
true philosophy and his failure. These failures prove that knowledge
must begin ontological if it ever becomes so.—III. Knowledge begins as
knowledge of determinate being. 1. Excludes the error that being is
primarily in the genus or the universal. 2. Being is not the one only sub-
stance of pantheism. 3. Finite persons and things are real beings.-IV.
Being is not an attribute but the subject of attributes. Not the sum
total of all attributes. Affirmation of being not the weakest of affirma-
tions. Attributes common to all beings.-V. Determinateness of being
is not limitation. Omnis determinatio negatio est. The fallacy of ag-
nostics and pantheists in reasoning from this maxim. God determinate
but not limited.--VI. Origin and necessity in perceptive intuition of the
distinction of science into physical and metaphysical
167-179

CHAPTER VIII.

THE TRUE: THE FIRST ULTIMATE IDEA OF REASON.

32. THE FIVE ULTIMATE IDEAS OF REASON.-Meaning. Noumena. The
Five Realities of rational Intuition named and defined. Rational Intui-
tion does not give knowledge of being.

180-182

2 33. THE TRUE: THE FIRST NORM OR STANDARD OF REASON.-I. Defini-

tion.-II. Are principles of things as well as of thought. Are archety-

pal in Absolute Reason; Plato's Ideas. Rational beings know the su-

preme reason.

182-184

CHAPTER IX.

THE RIGHT, OR LAW: THE SECOND ULTIMATE REALITY OF

REASON.

34. GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RIGHT OR LAW.-Definition of Law.-I.

Law to intellectual and physical power. 1. Determine what it is possi-

ble for power to effect. Laws of thought. Laws of Physical Power. 2.

Definition of Right. 3. Law of nature as commonly used, distinguished

from Rational Law. 4. Some so called laws of nature are laws of rea-

son.-II. Principles of Reason are laws to Will. 1. Declare what the

will ought to do. 2. Right denotes conformity of action of will with

law. 3. Truth as Law to will is moral law.-III. Common characteris-

tics of Law to thought, force, and will.

. . 185-187

35. ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RIGHT AND LAW.-I. Origin.-II. Signifi-

cance of Ethical Terms. 1. Ought, Obligation, Duty. 2. Right. 3.

Law. 4. Authority. 5. Government. Moral Law distinguished from

statute law. III. Ethical principles are of the highest certainty. 187-190

36. MORAL LAW UNIVERSAL, IMMUTABLE, IMPERATIVE.-I. Because it is

truth of Reason known as law to action. -II. Implies the existence of

God, the Absolute Reason.-III. Falsehood and absurdity the intellectual

basis of wrong doing.-IV. Law requires conformity to the constitution

of things.-V. Transgression must issue in failure and loss.-VI. En-

forced by penalty.-VII. Answer to the objection that intuitive ethics

is void of significance. .
. . 190-193

2 37. INTUITIVE ETHICS DISTINGUISHED FROM FALSE THEORIES.-I. Theories

of association of ideas.-II. Theories attempting to derive the idea of

right from happiness.-III. That moral distinctions originate in the feel-

ings.-IV. Hutcheson's theory of the Moral Sense.-V. That moral dis-

tinctions rest on the will of God.-VI. That truth and law are eternal in

the nature of things independent of God.
193-203

238. THE FORMAL PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW AND THE REAL.-I. The formal

principle of the Law.-II. The Real Principle.-III. The significance

and necessity of the formal principle. 1. Gives the distinctively ethical

ideas. 2. Declares the real principle to be law. 3. Gives the aspect of

virtue as obedience to law or doing duty. 4. Gives the aspect of virtue

as harmony of the will with reason. 5. Recognizes virtue as harmony

with God and the constitution of the universe.-IV. Significance and

necessity of the real principle. Without it no knowledge what the law

requires. Without it duty, if known, would be done without love. So

done it is debasing as a blind obedience. The will consents to the formal

principle only in the act of love.
. 203-207

39. EVIDENCE THAT THE REAL PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW IS THE LAW OF Love.
I. So declared by Christ.-II. The rational ground is that man exists in a