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269. FREE-WILL AND MAN'S IMPLICATION IN NATURE.-I. In what sense im-

plicated in nature.-II. Also endowed with reason and therefore free.

III. Freedom from control of circumstances a matter of fact. 1. May

resist natural impulses or concur. Plato's chariot. 2. Under any cir-

cumstances may do right. 3. May reverse the motive. 4. May change

his circumstances. 5. May avail himself of aid from men. 6. May

avail himself of aid from God. 7. A limited power to control the effects

of Cosmic force on the body. 8. Controls the forces of nature to effect

results. Natural selection displaced by man's selection. Man the Lord

of nature. Psalm viii.-IV. Implication in nature indicates him above

nature. Nature not a boundary but a sphere. Senses open the realm

of nature to perception. This the occasion of rational intuition. Reveals

his reason to himself and the universe to his reason. Similar thoughts

as to will, reveals sphere of action and power to act. Death a liberation.

Man the end of nature. The spiritual body and the power of mind. 376-386

¿ 70. DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF FREEDOM.-Moral, physical, real and formal

freedom...
. . 386-389

8 71. THE INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES.-The question stated.-I. Definition of

motive.-II. The motive not the efficient cause of determination. The

will is the cause. No causative act between the will and its determina-

tion. The argument of Edwards. Hamilton's argument from antino-

mies.-III. The motive does not determine the will.--IV. The action of

motives on the will is influence. V. Determinations always made under

the influences of motives.-VI. The common formulas of the influence

of motives ambiguous and worthless.-VII. The uniformity of human

action not thus explicable.
389-396

? 72. CHARACTER IN THE WILL.-I. A choice constitutes character.—II. De-

terminations influence subsequent determinations.-III. Voluntary ac-

tion a continual formation of character.-IV. Man always free to change

his supreme choice.-V. After a character is acquired determinations

are not transition from complete indetermination.

79. SECOND MATERIALISTIC OBJECTION THAT MENTAL PHENOMENA ARE

CORRELATED WITH MOLECULAR ACTION.-I. The objection stated.

II. Explanations. 1. That mental action is accompanied by molecu-

lar action and waste of brain not denied; but materialism cannot ac-

count for the connection. 2. Not necessary to prove that finite spirit

ever exists and acts apart from a material organ. 3. Not necessary to

deny that vitality is correlated with motor-force.-III. The correlation

not sustained by physical science. 1. Mental phenomena cannot be

identified with motion. 2. If energy is transformed into thought it dis-

appears. 3. The energy in the molecular action transformed into physi-

cal movements. A "closed circuit" with mental phenomena excluded.

4. This refutes materialism.-IV. Physical explanations of mental

phenomena inconceivable. 1. Registration of sensations in memory. 2.

Unity of consciousness and identity. 3. The multitude of registrations.

4. Explanation by registration transmitted by heredity.-V. Physical

science has no explanation of mental phenomena. Dogmatic material-

ism impossible.-VI. The existence of spirit explains the phenomena

and avoids the difficulties. 1. Physical science limited in two directions.

2. Existence of spirit transcends the limits. Energizing Reason. 3. Ne-

cessity of assuming the existence of personal spirit. 4. Elements of the

idea given in the knowledge of self. 5. Objection that we have no ex-

perience of disembodied spirit. 6. Objection that mental phenomena

must be resolved into molecular motion in order to be cognizable by science.

-VII. Correlation of facts of personality with motion is incompatible

with the facts themselves.

280. THIRD MATERIALISTIC OBJECTION: FROM EVOLUTION.-The Objection

stated.-I. Distinguish materialistic evolution from scientific.-II. Evo-

lution as a law of nature not scientifically established. 1. The law con-

ditions all other laws. 2. The four subordinate theories not scientifically

proved. 3. Laws of Evolution not scientifically exact. 4. Evolutionists

while regarding the universe as mechanism, substitute the idea of or-

ganic growth in carrying out their theory.-III. Scientific Evolution

consistent with personality of man and God. 1. It does not involve ma-

terialism. 2. Not inconsistent with personality of men. 3. Not incon-

sistent with moral law. 4. Consistent with Theism.-IV. Scientific

Evolution no help to materialism and itself discredited if held as neces-

sarily materialistic. 1. Evolution factual, Materialism metaphysical. 2.

Evolution removes no difficulties of materialism in accounting for physi-

cal universe; proves them irremovable. 3. No aid to materialism in

making mind a function of matter. Leads to the contrary conclusion.

4. Materialistic evolution gives no basis of good morals. First: No data

for constructing an ethical theory. Secondly: Only law deducible for

determining conduct is immoral, viz: Might makes right. Thirdly: No

basis for rights of individuals in relation to the State. Fourthly: No

practically effective motives to virtue. Fifthly: Immoral tendency.

Sixthly: Contradicts moral intuitions. 5. Issues in the extinction of per.

sonality; lapsed intelligence. 6. Materialistic evolution unscientific.-

V. Scientific Evolution at every stage reveals a supernatural power. 1.

Implied in the meaning of it as scientists use it. Incompatible with

materialistic evolution. 2. If mind is to act through matter, the matter

must be prepared to be its organ. Analogy of generation. 3. Accords

with a universal law of the elaboration of matter in preparation for man-

ifesting a higher power. The elaboration not yet completed. Existence

after death. 4. Planes or grades manifesting successively higher powers.

First, manifesting mechanical force. Second, chemical force. Third,

vital force. Fourth, sentient life. Fifth, personality. Are distinct.

Higher power acts on next below; not on still lower grades. 5. Force in

a lower grade does not create force in a higher. Beginning of motion.

Every interaction. Beginning of elemental or chemical force. Begin-

ning of life. Conditioned on previous life. Beginning of sensitivity,

and of human personality. Lower force held in abeyance by the higher.

6. Matter in the higher grades does not originate but reveals the higher

power. 7. Evolution a continual revelation of hypermaterial power.

Concurrence of different schools of thought. Evolution incompatible

with materialism. 8. Appearance of Personality. 9. Conclusion.—VI.

Evolution, if true, demands a personal God. Evolution emphasizes the

teleological argument. 1. Presupposes always a higher power revealing

itself. 2. In this higher power the powers evolved exist potentially. 3.

The Absolute Being is a rational or personal being; is the Absolute Rea-

son. 4. Finite beings have real existence distinct from the Absolute. 5.

In what sense the universe created by God. Evolution presents no

peculiar objection to creation. Evolution requires creation. 6. God im-

manent in the universe. 7. God's action in creating, sustaining and

evolving is individuating. 8. God's action the continuous realization in

the finite of an ideal eternal in the Absolute Reason. 9. God's action

expressing the ideal or plan of Reason is progressive. 10. God's action

in the universe uniform and continuous according to law. Objection

that theism supposes capricious will in nature. 11. The Moral system

gives a sphere for endless progress which is impossible to materialism.
12. Objections by Spencer and others.

. 455-537

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THE

PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF THEISM.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

21. Design of the Book.

A CHRISTIAN man knows God in his own experience; all that is of highest worth to man in life rests on his experience of God's gracious presence and power in his own moral and spiritual development. In the strength of such knowledge many a Christian has lived a life of Christ-like love or gone to a martyr's stake, who never attempted to define or defend the articles of his belief. And the spontaneous religious beliefs of ruder men rest on what they have felt and known of the presence and power of the supernatural in and about them. Thus the knowledge of God begins, like the knowledge of nature and of man, in experience.

But since man is rational he cannot rest permanently in this spontaneous belief. As he advances in intelligence and intellectual development, he must reflect on what he thus believes, must define to himself what it is, and interpret and vindicate it to his reason as reasonable belief and real knowledge. This must be done if religious belief is to commend itself to thinking persons; it must be done anew from generation to generation if, in every period of intellectual activity and of advance in knowledge and culture, Christianity is to retain its preeminence as the light and inspiration of human life and the universal religion of mankind. The knowledge of God, like the knowledge of man and nature, begins in experience, and is ascertained, defined and systemized in thought. Even where God transcends our knowledge, we at least mark definitely the limits of the known. In this transition from spontaneous to reflective knowledge, questions of two classes arise. First are the questions: Have we

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