dubious in any writing, may be a cause of ambiguity, as in the word Cato, for it means one thing in the nominative, when its second syllable is short,* and another in the dative or ablative, when that syllable is made long. There are many other species of ambiguity besides, which it is not necessary to specify. 14. Nor is it of importance whence ambiguity arises, or how it is removed; it is sufficient that it presents two senses to the mind; and the mode of understanding the writing or the pronunciation, is a matter of equal consideration for both parties in a suit. It is a useless precept, therefore, that we should endeavour, in this state,t to turn the word or phrase in our own favour, for, if that be possible, there is no ambiguity. 15. Every question of ambiguity, however, has respect to the following points; sometimes, which of two interpretations is the more natural; and always, which of the two is the more equitable; and which was the meaning attached to the words by him who wrote or spoke them. But the manner of treating these questions, for or against, has been sufficiently shown in what I have said ‡ on conjecture and quality. CHAPTER X. Affinity between different states, § 1-4. Some precepts with regard to causes can be given only when the causes themselves are stated, 5-7. Impossible to give instruction on every particular point, 8, 9. Many things the student must teach himself, and must depend for success on his own efforts, 10-17. 1. BETWEEN the states § there is a certain affinity, for in definition the question is, what is the meaning of a term; in the syllogism, which is the most nearly related to definition,|| * Quintilian speaks as if the o in the nominative case of Cato were uniformly shortened. "This shortening of nominatives in o," says Spalding, "perhaps became general in the age of Quintilian; see Vossius de Arte Gramm. ii. 27, though he does not refer to this passage. Compare Varro vocat, viii. 6, 73." † III. 6, 1, seqq. + See c. 6, fin. § Not the two, of which he has just been speaking, but states in general, and especially the four legal states. Spalding. See sect. 3, and iii. 6, 54. See c. 8, sect. i > 8 the object is to ascertain what the writer meant; and from antinomia, or the contradiction of laws, it appears that there are two states of writing and intention of the writer. Definition, again, is itself a kind of ambiguity, as the meaning of a word may be regarded in two lights. 2. The state of what is written and the intention of the writer has regard also to the signification of terms, and the same object is kept in view in antinomia. Hence some rhetoricians have said, that all these states merely constitute that of letter and intention; others think that in that of letter and intention lies the ambiguity which gives rise to dispute. But all these states are in reality distinct; for an obscure law is one thing, and an ambiguous law another. 3. Definition is concerned with a general question regarding the nature of a term; which question may be unconnected with the scope of a cause; the state of letter and intention discusses the meaning of the very word which is in the law; syllogism tries to settle what is not in the law; ambiguity considers a word under two senses; antinomia is a comparison between two contradictory laws. 4. This distinction, accordingly, has been justly admitted by the most learned rhetoricians, and continues to be observed among the generality of the wisest. As to discussions of this kind, though directions on all points could not be given, yet it has been practicable to give some. 5. There are other particulars which allow facility for instruction concerning them only when the subject, on which we have to speak, is propounded; for not only § must a whole cause be divided into its general questions and heads, but these divisions themselves must also have their own distribution and arrangement of matter. In the exordium there is something first, something second, and so on; and every question * One in regard to each law. + Scriptum et voluntas habet in verbis vocis quæstionem ; quod idem in antinomia petitur.] That this passage is not sound, we may conclude even from the troublesome intrusion of the word vocis. I am also dissatisfied with the expression idem peti, in regard to antinomia. Quid tandem petitur? An ulla quæstio potest peti? Let some one more sagacious than myself discover what correction should be made. Spalding. Turnebus refers to Cicero de Orat. i. 26. § I read, in the text, non enim causa modò universa, &c. Spalding observes that modò is required. and head must have its own disposition of particulars, as single theses. 6. For is it possible that he can be thought sufficiently skilled in arrangement, who, after dividing his case into these points, whether every kind of reward ought to be granted to the deliverer of his country; whether he should be permitted to take private property; whether a marriage with whom he pleases should be allowed him; whether a married lady should be given him; and whether the lady whose case is before the court, should then, when he has to speak on the first point, mix up his observations indiscriminately, just as each happens to come into his head, not knowing that he should consider first whether we should hold to the letter of a law, or to the intent of it, that he should make a commencement on this question, and then, connecting with it what follows, should arrange the whole of his speech with the same regularity as the parts of the human body, of which, for example, the hand is a portion, the fingers a portion of the hand, and the joints portions of the finger? 7. It is this nicety of arrangement that a writer on rhetoric cannot teach, unless when he has a certain and definite subject before him. 8. But what would one or two examples avail, or even a hundred or a thousand, in a field that is boundless? It is the part of a teacher to demonstrate day after day, sometimes in one kind of causes and sometimes in another, what is the proper order and connexion of particulars, that skill may gradually be acquired by his pupils, and the power of application to similar cases. 9. All cannot be taught that art is able to accomplish. What painter has learned to copy every object on the face of the earth? But when he has once acquired skill in copying, he will produce a representation of whatever he takes in hand. What artist in fashioning vases has not produced one such as he had never seen? Some things, however, depend not on the teachers, but on the learners. 10. A physician will teach his pupil what is to be done in every sort of disease, and what is to be conjectured from certain symptoms; but it is the pupil's own genius that must acquire for him the nice faculty of feeling the pulse, * General or indefinite questions. See iii. 5, 8; ii. 4, 24. † Almeloveen very properly refers to Cicero de Orat. ii. 16. A painter--an artist- -a physician. Similar comparisons are made ii. 21, 15. Spalding. of observing the different degrees of heat, and the alterations in respiration and complexion, and of noting what tokens are significant of any particular malady. In like manner, let us seek most aid from ourselves, and meditate our own causes, reflecting that men discovered the art of oratory before they taught it. 11. For that is the most effective arrangement of a pleading, an arrangement justly called economie, which cannot be made but when the whole cause is spread as it were before us, and which tells us when we ought to adopt an exordium, and when to omit it; when we should make a continuous statement of a case, and when a statement subdivided into heads; when we should begin at the beginning, and when, after the manner of Homer,† in the middle or towards the end; 12. when we should make no statement at all; when we should commence with our own allegations, and when with those of our adversary; when with the strongest proofs, when with the weaker; in what sort of cause questions should be propounded in the introduction; in what causes the way should be prepared for them by prefatory hints; what the mind of the judge will be likely to admit if expressed at once, and to what he must be conducted gradually; whether our refutation should oppose the arguments of the adversary one by one, or in a body; whether our appeals to the feelings should be reserved for the peroration, or diffused through our whole speech; whether we should speak first of law, or of equity; whether we should first charge our opponent with past offences, or repel them if advanced against ourselves, or confine our remarks to the points for decision; 13. and, if cause be complex, what order should be observed in our conduct of it, and what oral or written evidence, of any kind, should be set forth in our regular pleading, or reserved.t This is the virtue as it were of a general,§ dividing his forces to meet the various events of war, retaining part to garrison fortresses or defend cities, and distributing other parts to collect provisions, to secure passes, and to act by land or by sea as occasion may require. 14 But such merits in oratory he * Compare iii. 3, 9. + See v. 12, 14. Reserved for the altercation or discussion, as I suppose. See b. vi. c. 4. Spalding. § Compare v. 12, 14. Quintilian is very happy in his similes from military affairs. Spalding. only will display, to whom all the resources of nature, learning, and industry, shall be at hand. Let no man expect, therefore, to be eloquent only by the labour of others. Let him who would be an orator be assured that he must study early and late; that he must reiterate his efforts; that he must grow pale with toil; he must exert his own powers, and acquire his own method; he must not merely look to principles, but must have them in readiness to act upon them; not as if they had been taught him, but as if they had been born in him. 15. For art can easily show a way, if there be one; but art has done its duty when it sets the resources of eloquence before us; it is for us to know how to use them. 16. There remains then only the arrangement of parts; and in the parts themselves there must be some one thought first, another second, another third, and so on; and we must take care that these thoughts be not merely placed in a certain order, but that they be also connected one with another, cohering so closely that no joining may appear between them; so that they may form a body, and not a mere collection of members, 17. This object will be attained, if we take care to observe what is suitable for each place, and study to bring together words that will not combat but embrace each other. Thus different things will not seem hurried together from distant parts, all strangers one to another, but will unite themselves, in a sure bond and alliance, with those that precede and those that follow; and our speech will appear not merely a combination of phrases, but all of a piece. But I am perhaps proceeding too far, as the transition from one part to another beguiles me; and I am gliding imperceptibly from the rules for arrangement into those for elocution, on which the next book shall formally enter. |