"propria vi et operatione liberi arbitrii?....Sed non operatur in nobis sine nobis, ut quos ad hoc creavit ❝et servavit, ut in nobis operaretur, et nos ei cooperare 66 mur, sive hoc fiat extra regnum suum generali omni"potentia, sive intra regnum suum singulari virtute Spi"ritus sui." Opera, vol. ii. p. 474. In what sense Erasmus understood this passage, his reply, published under the title of Hyperaspistes Diatribæ, puts beyond a doubt: "Ego," he remarks, " nihil tribui libero ar"bitrio, nisi quod se præbet gratiæ pulsanti, quod co"operatur gratiæ operanti, et quod ab utraque se potest "avertere; semper excipio singularem Dei voluntatem, qui potest ex causis incognitis vi rapere, quocunque "velit. Hæc eadem fatetur Augustinus, et tamen po"nit liberum arbitrium, et illi tribuit actionem. Idem "fatetur Lutherus." Opera Erasmi, vol. x. p. 1480. ed. Lugd. Bat. 1706.

But, more accurately to comprehend the sentiments of Luther, we must previously understand the specific point in dispute. This may be easily collected from the following Scholastical quotation: "Ordine natu"ræ talis dispositio præcedit gratiam; quod autem du"ratione simul sint talis dispositio et gratia, patet sic; "sicut est in operibus naturæ, in quibus Deus principa"liter operatur dando formam, licet agens naturale co"operatur disponendo materiam, sic est in operibus gra“tiæ, in quibus Deus principaliter operatur dando gra"tiam, licet liberum arbitrium cooperetur disponendo "subjectum vel materiam; sed in prædictis operibus na"turæ videmus, quod disposita materia per agens na"turale ultima dispositione statim a Deo introducitur "forma, (ut patet in generatione hominis,) ergo in jus"tificatione peccatoris, quod est opus gratiæ, in quo li"berum arbitrium cooperatur Deo, (dicente Augustino, " qui creavit te sine te non te, &c.') posita ultima dis"positione per actum liberi arbitrii statim a Deo in

"funditur gratia, quæ est forma justificationis." Durandus de S. Porciano. In Lib. Sentent. lib. iv. distinct. 17. quæst. 1. Here the preparation of the subjectmatter for the reception of the form is distinctly assigned to free will alone, which is thus said to contribute by its own exertions a necessary requisite. This sole efficiency of free will Luther expressly opposed, frequently recalling the attention of his adversary to the only object of debate; an efficiency, which (as he conceived) renders divine cooperation superfluous; merely granted, "ut superbia liberi arbitrii, per sese satis ro“busti, gratia, velut superfluo ornamento, diebus Bac"chanalibus gestiat et ludat." Vol. ii. p. 475. de servo Arbitrio. "Si enim liberum arbitrium de solo non

potest velle bonum, (loquimur enim de libero arbitrio, "seclusa gratia, et utriusque propriam quærimus vim) "quis non videt solius gratiæ esse bonam illam volun"tatem, meritum et præmium?" Ibid. p. 453. "Quid "vero dicit, quod homo adjutus Dei auxilio possit ope"ribus moralibus sese præparare? Disputamusne de "divino auxilio, vel de libero arbitrio? Quid enim "non sit possibile divino auxilio ?" Ibid. p. 469.

With the rejection therefore of all self-energy in free will thus to prepare itself to grace, the controversy properly terminated. But a subsequent question arose of a still more intricate description. Is the disposition to good produced wholly by grace, or conjointly with the operation of the human mind? This implicated enquiry, foreign to the subject, was first introduced into it (not by the Lutherans themselves, but by their most formidable opponent, the wily Eccius,) in the celebrated disputation of the year 1519. In an epistle written at the time, Melancthon thus alludes to the circumstance: "Itaque die 27 mensis Junii, congrediuntur Johannes "Eccius et Carolostadius. De libero arbitrio propo"situm est," An sit aliquod nobis audaíperov bonum

opus,' hoc est, ut ipsi dicunt, 'An de congruo mereä'mur gratiam, cum facimus quod in nobis est.' Utor "enim ipsorum verbis. Hoc cum agi deberet, vide

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quorsum contentione rapti sint, et in quos scopulos "impegerint. Agi debebat quid per sese citra gratiam "possit voluntas nostra. Ipsi quæstionem alio rapiunt, " et quatuor credo continuos dies in eo disceptant, An ' voluntas tantum recipiat bonum opus, ipsumque bonum 'sola efficiat gratia. In has symplegadas coegerunt causam, non ita multum necessarias, et plane alienas "ab instituto Carolostadii." Melanct. Epist. in Oper. Lutheri, vol. i. p. 337.

When Luther indeed touched upon this point, he certainly seemed to support the proposition, that the act of volition was solely derived from grace. At the same time, however, it should be particularly observed, that he held the power of admitting or rejecting this operative principle to be vested in the mind of man, as well as that of cooperating with it in the production of every Christian virtue. On the first head the passages already quoted leave us no room to doubt his meaning. Upon the second, the following seem equally explicit. "Sabbatismus autem, ut, operibus nostris ces"santibus, Deus solus operetur, perficitur duobus mo"dis. Primo per nostram propriam exercitationem, se"cundo per alienam externamque exercitationem, vel

agitationem. Nostram igitur exercitationem sic opor"tet esse institutam et instructam, ut primo videntes 66 quo sit nostra caro intenta, nostrique sensus, voluntas, "et cogitationes nos irritent, eis resistamus ac minime "obsequamur." Opera, vol. v. p. 592. "Duplex est "justitia Christianorum, sicut et duplex peccatum est "hominum. Prima est aliena et ab extra infusa. "...Secunda justitia est nostra et propria, non quod "nos soli operemur eam, sed quod cooperemur illi primæ "et alienæ. Hæc nunc est illa conversatio bona in ope

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"ribus bonis; primo, in mortificatione carnis et crucifixione concupiscentiarum erga seipsum, sicut: Galat. v. Qui "autem sunt Christi carnem suam crucifixerunt cum "vitiis et concupiscentiis.' Secundo, et in caritate erga "proximum. Tertio, et in humilitate ac timore erga "Deum. De quibus plenus est Apostolus et omnis "Scriptura. Breviter autem omnia ad Titum ii. com"prehendit, dicens, Sobrie, (quoad seipsum in carnis crucifixione,) et juste, (quoad proximum,) et pie, (quoad 'Deum,) vivamus in hoc seculo." Opera, vol. i. p. 69.

But as the subtle and perplexing turn, which this controversy first assumed in the public disputation with Eccius, ceased with the Hyperaspistes of Erasmus in the year 1527, and was not revived among the Lutherans until after the era when our Articles were composed, it appears not necessary to trace it more minutely. It seems only of importance to state what was considered to be the Lutheran opinion upon the point, between the two periods alluded to; upon the single point, whether the cooperation of free will with grace assisted in forming the disposition itself to good, or only in producing its effects. In no established code of doctrines was the question directly alluded to, but, when occasionally hinted at, apparently viewed in a light different from that, in which Luther had previously placed it. The first slight reference to it occurred in the Articles composed for the Visitation of the Saxon Churches, in which it was said, "Non enim delectatur "Deus ista vitæ feritate quorundam, qui cum audierint "non justificari nos viribus et operibus, somniant se "velle expectare, a Deo donec trahantur, interea vivunt "impurissime; hi maximas poenas dabunt Deo." Art. de Lege. In the Augsburg Confession the same hint is less obscurely, if not distinctly, given; which, after stating that the human will retains a certain liberty in moral actions, adds, "Sed non habet vim sine Spiritu

"Sancto efficiendæ justitiæ Dei, seu justitiæ spiritualis; "1 Cor. ii. 14. • Quia animalis homo non percipit ea, quæ sunt Spiritus Dei;' sed hæc fit in cordibus, cum per verbum Spiritus Sanctus concipitur; Art. 18. implying, that with the Holy Spirit it is competent jointly to effect what, without such an aid, would prove impossible. And again, in a paragraph quoted from St. Austin; "Esse fatemur liberum arbitrium omnibus ho"minibus, habens quidem judicium rationis, non per "quod sit idoneum in iis, quæ ad Deum pertinent, "sine Deo aut inchoare aut certe peragere;" contending that free will cannot either begin, or (if it can begin) at least not complete, a good work. But while we admit, that the supposed idea in these passages is not fully explained, we may surely argue, that the tendency of them is too obvious to escape observation. Although, however, in a formulary of faith, Melancthon (the author of both the preceding productions) might have thought it necessary to avoid a complete declaration of his meaning, yet he afterwards became explicit upon the point, in a work expressly composed for public instruction, the corrected edition of his Loci Theologici ; a work, generally esteemed at the period under our consideration, of the greatest authority among the Lutherans, and one, as I have observed, of which Luther himself spoke in terms of high commendation. In the chapter De Libero Arbitrio, the doctrine of Synergism in conversion (as such a cooperation has usually been denominated) is thus openly avowed: "De actionibus

spiritualibus quæritur. p. 89. Sciendum est autem, "Spiritum Sanctum efficacem esse per vocem Evangelii "auditam seu cogitatam, ut Galat. iii. dicitur, Ut pro'missionem Spiritus accipiamus per fidem;' ac sæpe "dictum est, cogitantes de Deo oportere ordiri a verbo "Dei, non quærere Deum sine suo verbo. Cumque ❝ordimur a verbo, hic concurrunt tres causæ bonæ actio