hated as sin, it is not hated at all; and why we should scruple to allow that if God be not loved as God, he is not loved at all, I cannot conceive. I am not surprised however that those who have been so long, and so deeply imbued in a system, a leading principle of which is, "that godliness consists in love to that which first relieves us," should write in the manner they do.

On some occasions however, Mr. M'LEAN himself can say as much in favour of "disinterested love," as his opponent, and can represent that which arises from "a mere principle of self-love" as being of no value. "There may be some resemblances of repentance (he says) in fear, remorse, and sorrow of mind, occasioned by sin, as in Cain, Judas, Felix, &c. But a mere principle of self-love will make a man dread the consequences of sin, while he has prevalent inclinations to sin itself. There is a difference between mere fear and sorrow on account of sin, and a prevalent hatred of it; between hatred of sin itself, and mere hatred of its consequences; between that sorrow for sin which flows from the love of God and of holiness, and that which flows from an inferior principle. Men may have even an aversion to some kinds of sin, because they interfere with others, or because they do not suit their natural constitutions, propensities, tempers, habits, age, worldly interests, &c. while they do not hate all sin universally, and consequently hate no sin as such, or from a proper principle."*

Yours, &c.

Works, vol. ii. p. 95.

95

LETTER VI.

On the connection between knowledge and disposi

MY DEAR FRIEND,

tion.

You need not be told that this is a subject of prime importance in the Sandemanian system. It every where considers knowledge as the one thing needful, and disposition as its natural and proper effect.

Mr. M'LEAN represents me as maintaining that the understanding, or perceptive faculty in man, is directed and governed by his will and inclinations; and this he supposes to be the principle on which my arguments are principally founded; a principle which can only be true, he thinks, in cases where the original order of things is perverted by sin.* Whether these sentiments be just, or contain a fair statement of my views, we shall inquire as we proceed: at present, I only observe, that the state of the will, or disposition, is, in Mr. M'LEAN's account, governed invariably by the understanding; or, if in any instance it be otherwise, it is owing to the disorder introduced by sin. I should not have supposed however, that sin could have perverted the established laws of nature. It

* Reply p. 8, 9.

certainly perverts the moral order of things, that is, (as Dr. OWEN represents it, to whom Mr. M. refers) instead of the will being governed by judgment and conscience, judgment and conscience are often governed by prejudice. But there is nothing in all this subversive of the established laws of nature for it is a law recognized both by nature and scripture, that the disposition of the soul, should influence its decisions. A humble and candid spirit is favourable, and a proud and uncandid spirit is unfavourable to a right judgment.

"It is a maxim (says Mr. ECKING,) that has not yet been refuted, that the determination of the will must evermore, follow the illumination, conviction, and notice of the understanding."* By the illumination, conviction, and notice of the understanding must be meant, either what the mind judges to be right, or what it accounts agreeable. If the will were always determined by the first, there could be no such thing as knowing the will of God and not doing it. But I suppose this will not be pretended. It must therefore be of the last that Mr. ECKING writes. His meaning must be that the will evermore follows the mind's view of the object as agreeable. But is it certain that the viewing of an object agreeable is properly and perfectly distinct from chusing it? President EDWARDS conceived it was not, and therefore did not affirm that the will was determined by the greatest apparent good, but merely, that "the will always is as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most

*Essays. p. 54.

agreeable is."* This is not saying that the will is determined by the understanding: for as the same author goes on to prove, the cause of an object appearing agreeable to the mind may be "the state, frame, or temper of the mind itself." But so far as this is the case, the judgment is determined by the state of the mind, rather than the state of the mind by the judgment.

A great deal of confusion on this subject has arisen from confounding simple knowledge, pertaining merely to the intellectual faculty, with that which is compound, or comprehensive of approbation. The former is with propriety distinguished from whatever pertains to the state of the will; but the latter is not, seeing it includes it.

Mr. M'LEAN speaking of certain characters, who had heard the gospel, says "It is supposed that such men have now received some information which they had not before, both with respect to their danger, and the remedy of it, and"-what? that their wills or dispositions are in that proprotion changed? No, but "that they are hereby rendered quite inexcusable if they should neglect so great salvation; which neglect must now be the effect of perverseness and aversion, and not of simple ignorance. John iii. 19-xv. 2, 25."+ I do not say of Mr. M. as he did of me, when I was only reasoning upon the principles of my opponents, that he can take either side of the question as he finds occasion;" but this I say, that when writing in favour of the calls of the gospel, he felt him.

self impelled to admit principles which in his controversy on the other side he has quite lost sight of. The above statement appears to me to be very just, and as he here so properly distinguishes simple ignorance from ignorance which arises from aversion or neglect; the one as tending to excuse, the other to criminate; he cannot consistently object to my distinguishing between simple knowledge, which barely renders men inexcusable, and knowledge inclusive of approbation, which has the promise of eternal life.

Simple knowledge, or knowledge as distinguished from approbation, is a mere natural accomplishment, necessary to the performance of both good and evil, but in itself neither the one nor the other. Instead of producing love, it often occasions an increasing enmity, and in all cases renders sinners the less excusable. In this sense the term knowledge, and others related to it, are used in the following passages.- -"The servant who knew his lord's will, and did it not, shall be beaten with many stripes-When they knew God they glorified him not as God-If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them-If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin, but now they have no cloak for their sin-If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin; but now they have both seen and hated both me and my Father."*

But knowledge is much more frequently used in the scriptures as including approbation. The Lord is said to know the righteous, and never to

*Luke xii. 47.-Rom, i. 21.-John xiii. 17-xv. 22,24.