perceive truth, he must be esteemed free when he perceives things to be as they really are; but to lie under intellectual necessity when, from mental weakness or the derangement of his faculties, he mistakes falsehood for truth. There are here, as in the cases above, two conditions of the intelligent being of an opposite nature; and if one is confessedly necessity, the other must be liberty. As animal and moral freedom is the exercise of physical and moral power, so intellectual power is the ground of intellectual liberty, and of course the opposite state of mental weakness or ignorance must be considered intellectual necessity. The same contrast is found in the human agent as an animal, a moral and an intelligent being, and if the propriety of the distinction be admitted in the first respects, it cannot be denied in the last.

Viewing then human liberty or necessity in these three aspects, we exhaust the whole subject; for there is no need to imitate Mr. Hume and consider man as purely material, possessing properties in common with inanimate matter. Animal liberty regards him as an agent, possessing merely the power of voluntary motion; intellectual liberty views him as an intelligent and rational being; while moral liberty respects him as uniting both these, in one complex nature, and constituting a moral agent.

Thus it appears that the whole inquiry, respecting liberty and necessity, is reduced to a

simple question of fact, is man such an agent as has been described, or is he not? And how indeed should it be otherwise? An agent is a voluntary or intelligent cause; and if man really be such a cause, and not merely a passive subject, he enjoys freedom co-extensive with his power, limited indeed in degree, as that of all finite beings must be, but not different in kind from that of the Almighty, whose sovereignty can consist in nothing more than the power of acting, in all things, according to his own good pleasure. If a voluntary agent do as he will, what other liberty can he conceive or desire? If a moral agent fix his volition as he judges right, or most advantageous and proper, why should he will otherwise, and how can he will better? And if he judge true what is really true, and right what is really right, can the infinite understanding even of the Deity, in the given instance, do more? There is here no necessity, as shall afterwards be more fully shown, but that implied in the fact of existence-that things cannot be and not be simultaneously. In this fact the whole inquiry respecting liberty is involved. Is man really a sentient, intelligent, and moral agent? If he is so, his freedom may admit of augmentation in degree, but in kind it is already perfect, for it is similar to that of the all-perfect Creator, with whose moral image man was endowed. If, on the other hand, he were not an agent, but a

purely passive subject, as when, for instance, by the opposition of a superior physical force, his agency is restrained and he is unable to carry his purpose into effect; he would then, without question, being in a state quite the reverse of liberty, be truly enthralled by a real necessity. Such then being the plain truth to be ascertained, the subject of inquiry is as distinct and definite as any fact in the material universe; and, by distinguishing the different agencies possessed by man, it will not be found difficult to answer the question as explicitly and satisfactorily as any other question of fact in chemistry or natural philosophy.

With regard to animal liberty, nothing requires to be said in the present Essay, since the subject is well understood and admits of little or no difference of opinion. Intellectual liberty too, so far as facts are concerned, needs little illustration, and is here introduced chiefly to afford an opportunity to obviate some objections, and remove some common misapprehensions respecting the relation of intelligence to free agency. The principal object of the Essay is to ascertain the reality of moral freedom; to inquire whether, in any case or to what extent, man labours under moral necessity; and to illustrate the leading principles and most striking mental processes, by which the human agent secures the enjoyment of the one, or is enthralled by the iron yoke of the other.

SECTION II.

MAN, IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS UNDERSTANDING, USUALLY REGULATES THE DETERMINATIONS OF HIS WILL; that is, enJOYS MORAL FREEDOM.

OUR first inquiry then being simply, whether man, in the exercise of his judgment, controls and regulates his own will, little detail is necessary by way of evidence. It is to be observed, however, in entering upon this part of the subject, that it is not the intention to establish any principle of universal application. All that can be attempted is merely to ascertain and illustrate a general law, supported by a multitude of facts, and leave it to be determined, in a subsequent section, whether or not this law admits of any exceptions.

That man then, in the exercise of his judgment, fixes, in a multitude of instances, the determinations of his own will, every one must be conscious and nobody denies. The merchant seeks the best market for his goods, because he judges it most for his advantage;

while the man of principle prefers virtuous conduct to the commission of crime, because he judges it right. In all such cases, the judgment approves of a certain conduct and the will is determined according to its decision.

Nor is the influence of the understanding limited to the fixing of the volitions at first: it has the power of altering them after they have been determined. Nothing is more common than that a man who has resolved to act in a certain manner, on reviewing the reasons of his resolution, or on receiving additional information, changes his purpose, and determines to pursue a different or opposite conduct. Such facts form a considerable portion of the daily history of the human mind. To adopt a different resolution, to alter one's purpose, to change one's mind, are expressions of common occurrence; and to any one therefore who understands the meaning of the terms, it would be idle to present any lengthened induction to prove, that man possesses the power of fixing, modifying and changing the determinations of his own will, as he judges right, becoming, or most conducive to his inte

rest.

These simple and well known truths then are all that are necessary to be determined; and holding them as acknowledged matters of fact, admitted by all parties, nothing farther is necessary, in the present section, but to offer a few