necessity common to matter and mind.-Freedom of will pe-
culiar to voluntary agents.-The nature of liberty and ne-
cessity. This distinction threefold, regarding man as an
animal, a moral agent, and an intelligent being.

.....

Page

SECT. II.-MAN, IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS UNDERSTANDING, USUAL-
LY REGULATES THE DETERMINATIONS OF HIS WILL, THAT IS, EN-
JOYS MORAL LIBERTY,............................
..........71
The principle not universal.—It is established by facts.-The men-
tal process illustrated.-- Analysis of volition.-The nature of mo-
tives; which are of two sorts, sentient and intellectual.—All
motives have not the same relative power in fixing volition.-
Instances of the manner in which the judgment determines
the will, and changes it after being determined.—The think-
ing faculty combined with the judgment independent of the
will.-Intellectual and sentient association.—The mistake of
dividing the powers of mind into intellectual and active.-
The intellectual powers only essentially active and the source
of all human agency.-Their activity depends solely upon the
existence of mind.-Hence the thinking being possesses the
power of regulating his own will, and secures his moral free-
dom in multitudes of cases.

..............98

SECT. III.-OF INTELLECTUAL LIBERTY,..............
From the certainty of human knowledge an argument is deriv-
ed against moral liberty.-The necessity alleged nothing but
the fact of existence.-The intelligent being free when he
perceives truth to be true.-A finite being possesses per-
fect freedom when he enjoys it to the extent of his capacity.
The will determined according to external circumstances
considered.-The Almighty perfectly free, and man placed
practically in precisely the same situation.-His moral na-
ture similar to that of the Creator.-The moral Creator and
the moral creature approve the same things.-Hence were
man acting uniformly upon his judgment, his will would con-
stantly coincide with the will of God.-To be wise and to
be happy the only necessity under which man is placed by
the law of his constitution.-Correctness of Mr. Locke's
views on this subject.

SECT. IV.-MAN, IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS UNDERSTANDING, IS

Page

OCCASIONALLY UNABLE TO REGULATE THE DETERMINATIONS OF

HIS WILL, THAT IS, IS SUBJECT TO MORAL NECESSITY,...............122

This is an exception to the general law. The understanding
approves of all the volitions as the most agreeable at the
time.-Man often wills what he knows to be wrong.-The
process explained.-The strength of desire, and hence the
existence of volition depends on two causes, the strength of
the susceptibility and the amount of the perceived good.-
Some susceptibilities too strong; some too weak.-This is
the ground of moral necessity.-Sentient association favours
the stronger feeling.-Habit increases necessity.-Multitudes.
of moral beings completely enthralled; and all in some de-
gree.-Correct views of Luther and the reformers.

SECT. V.-THE MEANS OF BEING DELIVERED FROM MORAL NECES-

SITY, AND THE UNIVERSALITY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY,.......................152

An argument derived from real necessity against moral respon-
sibility. Man now furnished, however, with the means of
being delivered from it.—The natural conscience can do some-
thing to effect deliverance.-A man possessing the know-
ledge of Christianity can do more.-The power of the Divine
Spirit alone can effect a man's complete deliverance.-Means
of obtaining divine aid.—The analogy between faith and vo-
lition.-Universality of moral responsibility.-Absurdity of
those who deny it.

SECT. VI.-OF THE INTRODUCTION OF MORAL EVIL,................ 184

Mode of conducting the inquiry.-Our information clear and

satisfactory to a certain point. No account of the origin of

evil among the fallen spirits.-Nature of moral government.-

Physical and moral will of God distinguished.—The account

of the fall illustrated.-Satan introduces evil in direct oppo-

sition to the moral will of the Deity.-Objections answered.

God's permission of sin explained.-God being the author of

evil by a secret purpose considered.*-God the author of

* Correct Views of the Westminster Confession, Note G.

Page

good only; Satan the original author of all evil in our world.-

The ancient doctrine of a good and evil principle practically

correct.

SECT. VIL-REVIEW OF EDWARDS,..........

His correct account of the sense in which the will is fixed ac-

cording to the last dictate of the understanding.—His just

views of the nature of the necessity which is opposed to li-

berty. He leaves this, and proceeds to establish moral cau-

sation, or philosophical necessity.-He cannot establish moral

obligation by his philosophy, and has recourse to Scripture.-

His work not on liberty and necessity, but a refutation of

prevalent errors, and most triumphant.

SECT. VIII-REVIEW OF WHITBY,.............

........

He clearly establishes the general principle of freedom in his
Discourse on Grace.-His definition of liberty a correct ac-
count of the present state of man, though not of liberty.—
Two sorts of indifference, sentient and intellectual, confound-
ed. His opponents admit his principle as generally true, but
maintain the exceptions as matters of fact.-His Discourse,
therefore, in reference to the controversial object he had in
view, is a complete failure.-The direct practical conse-
quences of his principle.-Work of the Holy Spirit.

APPENDIX,......

221

248

Note A. BROWN AND EDWARDS ON VOLITION.-B. ASSOCIATION.

E. LOCKE ON VOLITION AND MORAL NECESSITY.-E. (p. 173)

FAITH.-F. GROUND OF MORAL OBLIGATION.-G. PREDESTI-

NATION.-H. MEANS OF GRACE.

ERRATA.

Page 20, line 14 from top, for very read every

33, line 8 from top, for laws read law

50, line 11 from top, for inquire read inquires

97, line 9 from top, for read :-

209, line 1 from top, for trust read truth

235, line 11 from bottom, for inconvenience read inconveniences
250, line 7 from bottom, for philosopher read philosophers.

INTRODUCTION.

NATURE OF CAUSATION.

THE subject of Causation is so intimately connected with that of Liberty and Necessity, or rather the one subject is so directly the basis of the other, that it may not be amiss to present a short account of it, by way of introduction to the subsequent Essay. And as one can scarcely give any account of the relation of Cause and Effect without noticing the opinions of so distinguished a writer as Dr. Brown, particularly as his arguments have not yet, so far as we have seen, been fairly and candidly met, we shall now offer some remarks on the theory which this accomplished philosopher attempted to establish.

Of the dispute between Dr. Brown and Mr. Hume concerning the origin of the idea of power and causation we shall by and by be better able to form an opinion; but before proceeding to the principal subject of inquiry, it may not be improper to determine the meaning of the terms

B

power, property, or quality. "The words property and quality," says Dr. Brown, "admit of exactly the same definition, expressing only a certain relation of invariable antecedence and consequence in changes which take place in the presence of the substance to which they are ascribed. They are strictly synonymous with power: or, at least, the only difference is, that property and quality, as commonly used, comprehend both the powers and susceptibilities of substances."*

The

The terms power and property are, in vulgar language, frequently employed indiscriminately; but they are strictly synonymous only so far as they express the same thing, in like manner as the king of Hanover and the king of Great Britain at present mean the same person. words refer to the same thing, but they express it in different relations; and many affirmations therefore might be truly made respecting the one, which would be false regarding the other. The terms power and susceptibility express only, let it at present be admitted, a certain relation of invariable antecedence and consequence in changes that take place in the presence of the substance to which they are ascribed; but it is not so with the words property and quality. A property or quality is something which is con

Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect, p. 18.