of Greece became the dominant philosophy of Christianity. It prevailed in form as well as in substance. It laid emphasis on the conception of God as the Artificer and Architect of the universe rather than as its immanent 'Cause. But though the substance will remain, the form may change. Platonism is not the only theory that is consistent with the fundamental thesis that "of Him, and through Him, and to Him, are all things:" and it is not impossible that, even after this long lapse of centuries, the Christian world may come back to that conception of Him which was shadowed in the far-off ages, and which has never been wholly without a witness, that He is "not far off but very nigh;" that "He is in us and we in Him;" that He is changeless and yet changing in and with His creatures; and that He who "rested from His creation," yet so "worketh hitherto" that the moving universe itself is the eternal and unfolding manifestation of Him.

LECTURE VIII.

GREEK AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.

II. THE MORAL GOVERNOR.

A. THE GREEK IDEA.

1. THE idea of the unity of God had grown, as we have already seen, in a common growth with the idea of the unity of the world. But it did not absorb that idea. The dominant element in the idea of God was personality: in the idea of the world it was order. But personality implied will, and will seemed to imply the capacity to change; whereas in the world, wherever order could be traced, it was fixed and unvarying.

The order was most conspicuous in the movements of the heavenly bodies. It could be expressed by numbers. The philosopher of numbers was the first to give to the world the name Cosmos, the "order" as of a marshalled army.1 The order being capable of being expressed by numbers, partook of the nature of numerical relations. Those relations are not only fixed, but absolutely unalterable. That a certain ratio should be otherwise than what it is, is inconceivable. Hence the same philosopher of

1 Aetius ap. Plut. de plac. phil. 2. 1. 1 (Diels, p. 327), IIv@ayópas πρῶτος ὠνόμασε τὴν τῶν ὅλων περιοχὴν κόσμον ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τάξεως.

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numbers who had first conceived of the Cosmos, conceived of it also as being "invested with necessity," and the metaphysicians who followed him framed the formula, "All things are by necessity."1

This conception linked itself with an older idea of Greek religion. The length of a man's life and his measure of endowments had been spoken of as his "share" or "portion." Sometimes the assigning of this portion to a man was conceived as the work of Zeus or the other gods sometimes the gods themselves had their portions like men; and very commonly the portion itself was viewed actively, as though it were the activity of a special being. It was sometimes personal, sometimes impersonal: it was, in any case, inevitable. Through its character of inevitableness, it fused with the conception of the unalterableness of physical order. Hence the proposition, "All things are by necessity," soon came to be otherwise expressed, "All things are by destiny."3

1 Aetius, ibid. 1. 25 (Diels, p. 321), Πυθαγόρας ἀνάγκην ἔφη περικεῖσθαι τῷ κόσμῳ Παρμενίδης καὶ Δημόκριτος πάντα κατὰ ἀνάγκην. 2 For the numerous passages which prove these statements, reference may be made to Nägelsbach, Homerische Theologie, 2. 2. 3; Nachhomerische Theologie, 3. 2. 2.

3 Aetius, ut supra, 1. 27 (Diels, p. 322), 'HpákλELTOS máνтa Kaľ εἱμαρμένην, τὴν δὲ αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀνάγκην : the identification of ἀνάγκη and ειμαρμένη is also made by Parmenides and Democritus in a continuation of the passage quoted above. But in much later times a distinction was sometimes drawn between the two words, áváyêŋ being used of the subjective necessity of a proposition of which the contradictory is unthinkable: Alex. Aphrodis. Quæst. Nat. 2. 5 (p. 96, ed. Spengel), τέσσαρα γοῦν τὰ δὶς δύο ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐ μὴν καθ' εἱμαρμένην εἴ γε ἐν τοῖς γενομένοις τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην ; but, on the other hand, οἷς καθ' εἱρμὸν αἰτιῶν γινομένοις τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἀδύνατον, πάντα εἴη ἂν καθ ̓ εἱμαρμένην.

Over against the personal might of Zeus there thus came to stand the dark and formless fixity of an impersonal Destiny. The conception was especially elaborated by the Stoics. In the older mythology from which it had sprung, its personifications had been spoken of sometimes as the daughters of Zeus and Themis, and sometimes as the daughters of Night.2 The former expressed its certainty and perfect order; the other, the darkness of its working. The former element became more prominent. It was an "eternal, continuous and ordered movement." It was "the linked chain of causes."4 The idea of necessity passed into that of intelligent and inherent force the idea of destiny was transmuted into that of law.

This sublime conception, which has become a permanent possession of the human race, was further elaborated into the picture of the world as a great city. The Greek Tóλs, the state, whose equivalent in modern times is not civil but ecclesiastical, was an ideal society, the embodied type of a perfect constitution or organization (σúστnμa),5 Its parts were all interdependent and relative to the

1 Nägelsbach, Nachhomerische Theologie, p. 142.

2 Hesiod, Theog. 218, 904.

3 Chrysippus, ap. Theodoret. Gr. affect. curat. 6. 14, elvaι de Tηv εἱμαρμένην κίνησιν ἀΐδιον συνεχῆ καὶ τεταγμένην : so, in other words, ap. Aul. Gell. 6. 2. 3.

4 Aetius ap. Plut. de placit. philos. 1. 28, oi Erwikoì eipμòv aitɩŵv: Philo, ale mut. nom. 23 (i. 598), ἀκολουθία καὶ ἀναλογία τῶν συμπάνTwv, eipμòv čxovσa ádiáλvrov: Cic. de divin. 1. 55, ‘ordinem seriemque causarum cum causa causæ nexa rem ex se gignat.'

5 The Stoical definition of a πόλις was σύστημα καὶ πλῆθος ἀνθρώ Twν vπò vóμον Stoikоúμevov, Clem. Alex. Strom. 4. 26; cf. Arius Didymus, ap. Diels, p. 464.

whole the whole was flawless and supreme, working out without friction the divine conception which was expressed in its laws. The world was such an ideal society.1 It consisted of gods and men: the former were its rulers; the latter, its citizens. The moral law was a reason inherent in human nature, prescribing what men should do, and forbidding what they should not do: human laws were but appendages of it.2 In this sense man was a "citizen of the world."3 To each individual man, as to every other created being, the administrators had assigned a special task. "Thou be Sun: thou hast the power to go on thy circuit and make the year and the seasons, to make fruits grow and ripen, to stir and lull the winds, to warm the bodies of men: go thy way, make thy circuit, and so fulfil thy ministry alike in small things and in great. Thou hast the power to lead the army to Ilium: be Agamemnon. Thou hast the power to fight in combat with Hector: be Achilles." To this function of administration the gods were limited. The constitution of the great city was unchangeable.

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1 The idea is found in almost all Stoical writers: Plutarch, de Alex. Magn. virt. 6, speaks of ἡ πολὺ θαυμαζομένη πολιτεία τοῦ τὴν Στωικῶν aïpeσiv kataßaλoμévov Zývwvos: Chrysippus ap. Phædr. Epicur. de nat. Deorum, ed. Petersen, p. 19: Muson. Frag. 5, ed. Peerlk. p. 164 (from Stob. Flor. 40), τοῦ Διὸς πόλεως ἢ συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων καὶ Oev: Epict. Diss. 1. 9. 4; 2. 13. 6; 3. 22. 4; 3. 24. 10: most fully in Arius Didymus ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. 15. 15. 4, ovтw Kai & κόσμος οἱονεὶ πόλις ἐστὶν ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων συνεστῶσα, τῶν μὲν θεῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐχόντων τῶν δ ̓ ἀνθρώπων ὑποτεταγμένων.

2 Philo, de Josepho, 6 (ii. 46), λόγος δέ ἐστι φύσεως προστακτικὸς μὲν ὧν πρακτέον ἀπαγορευτικὺς δὲ ὧν οὐ πρακτέον . . . . προσθῆκαι μὲν γὰρ οἱ κατὰ πόλεις νόμοι τοῦ τῆς φύσεως ὀρθοῦ λόγου.

8 Epict. Diss. 3. 22, 5

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