tion of catholic Christendom is, that when a man prays to Christ, it will be found, that he "has forgotten the Father for the time," and when he "prays to the Father through the Son, he is, and his mind compels him to be, virtually a Unitarian." While we regard the author as ascending a tribunal to which he has no right, and while we might plead coram non judice, we shall reply as follows. That addresses to the Father give a prominence to the first person of the adorable Trinity, as the fountain of Deity, militates in no degree against the genuineness of belief in the other persons. Such prominence is universally conceded, in full consistency with coequal glory. That any one adorable Person may, for the time, so occupy the contemplation and the faith, as to be its chief, nay its sole object, is only a phenomenon of mental abstraction, and an instance of that finite imbecility to which we have adverted. That God may even, for a time, be regarded, in respect to his essence and nature, as one, rather than in respect to any distinction of persons, is possible, and is fully compatible with the profoundest veneration of the Trinity. But the truer statement of Christian experience is, that so glorious is the indissoluble union of the three divine persons, that he who falls down in the presence of one, bows himself consciously before the triune Jehovah. Or, in the beautiful language of Gregory Nazianzen: "I cannot contemplate the One, but I am surrounded by the shining of the Three; I cannot distinguish the Three, but straightway I am borne onward to the One."*

But it is impossible to believe the doctrine, say our opponents; and no man has ever believed it. "It has existed in studies, in creeds, in theses, in words; but not in the actual conceptions of men, not in their heartfelt belief." p. 60. Our first reply to this regards the temper of the allegation. It is unreasonable and arrogant. The question is one of psychological fact, to be determined by observation and testimony, and not by the dictum, however loud, of any or of all the deniers of a divine Redeemer. Our second reply respects the truth of the assertion. It is a doctrine so unreasonable, forsooth, that no human being can believe it; and, of course, we may add, under any stress of evidence. This is by no means a novel mode of assaulting Christianity. It is the short method of the Deists, with all th

In serm. de sacro Bapt.

doctrines peculiar to revelation. Thus it is, for example, that Hume says to his fellow men, "You cannot justly believe in a miracle; the thing is impossible, and faith is impossible." And how is Hume to be answered? The best reply is to give the identical words of Dr. Dewey, as found on his two hundred and thirty-fourth page. "The author who says to his fellow-men, 'You cannot justly believe in a miracle; the thing is impossible, and faith is impossible,' transcends the bounds of all human experience, if not of all human patience. Because almost all men, who have ever lived, have believed in miracles. And is not the very question before us, in fact, a question about experience? Could all men have believed in miracles, if, as our author contends, an original and fundamental law of the mind forbade their believing in them? Is it not as unphilosophical, as it is intolerable, to say that all mankind have been found believing in a thing which is plainly impossible ?"

We are completely satisfied with this: nothing could furnish us a better reply. To say that the Trinity cannot be believed, "transcends the bounds of all human experience, if not of all human patience." Because almost all Christians who have ever lived, have believed in the Trinity. "And is not the very question before us, in fact, a question of experience?" Could all men have believed in a Trinity, if, as Dr. Dewey contends, an original and fundamental law of the mind forbade their believing it? Nor can we allow ourselves to be charged with professing what we cannot believe, in this case, any more than we demand of Dr. Dewey to allow it in the other. Too many ages have rolled over the Catholic belief, too many libraries have defended it, too many prayers have involved it, and too many martyrs have died for it, to leave any speciousness in the allegation that it cannot be embraced intelligently and sincerely.

The extraordinary assumption just considered is of a piece with the whole character of the denial of the truth in this particular. It is throughout a resistance of Divine testimony by the pride of intellect. And we cannot do better than to close this portion of our strictures in the words of that noble Puritan, John Howe. "To conclude, I only wish these things might be considered and discoursed with less confidence and peremptory determination, with a greater awe of what is divine and sacred. I generally blame it in the Socinians (who appear otherwise

rational and considering men) that they seem to have formed their belief of things, not possible to be known but by the scriptures, without them; and then think they are, by all imaginable arts, and they care not what violence (as Socinus himself hath in effect confessed) to mould and form them according to their preconceived sense."

The doctrine of Atonement is the next in order. Upon this part of the work, we have two general remarks to offer. First that the essay contains scarcely any thing upon what is usually understood by its title; and secondly, from the very low platform which the author occupies, he nevertheless gains some views which are true and enlivening, and which being expressed in his terse and felicitous way, show that the twilight of his system is occasionally broken by a borrowed ray. This is only a new proof, that in theology, as in physics, there may be a penumbra of partial truth, around the portion of total darkness. In opening his essay, the author admits, concerning our Lord, "that the grandest revelation of his character and purpose was made on the Cross." This is true in several senses, but in one sense it is as true of Socrates or of Curtius. Remembering that this is professedly a controversial work, we are scarcely prepared for the declaration, that the author will not attempt to engage the reader's mind "in the ordinary course of a doctrinal discussion." Yet a doctrinal discussion is precisely that which he is bound to furnish, since it is doctrine which he has undertaken to discuss. This retreat from the arena of argument into the coloured mists of beautiful sentimentality, is not fitted to beget confidence. But he proceeds. "I cannot discuss this solemn theme in a merely metaphysical manner. I cannot contemplate a death, and least of all the death of the Saviour, only as a doctrine. It is to me, I must confess, altogether another kind of influence. It is to me, if it is any thing, power and grandeur; it is something that rivets my eye and heart; it is a theme of admiration and spiritual sympathy; it leads me to meditation, not to metaphysics; it is as a majestic example, a moving testimony, a dread sacrifice, that I must contemplate it. I see in it a death-blow to sin; I hear the pleading of the crucified One for truth and salvation, beneath the darkened heavens and amidst the shuddering earth!"

Here we are authorized to say, that the Unitarian has no right to speak thus; to charge upon Catholic Christianity all the cold

ness of scholastic dispute, and to arrogate to himself all the tenderness and awe of holy affection. Most gladly would we rest the whole debate on a fair comparison of the two parties, in respect to the single question of the manner in which they have represented the death of Christ. And it is unbecoming, to say the least, for any one to affect exclusive solemnity and love, in the presence of such Trinitarian writers as Baxter, Leighton, Rutherford, Pascal, and Brainerd.

Hereupon follows a passage, somewhat juvenile in point of taste, and we must not say what, in point of logic; in which the author speaks in florid and elaborate terms, of "a death" being "made a dogma;" of "blood" being "taken to write a creed;" of "martyrdoms wrought into sharp and reproachful metaphysics." After plucking away these prettinesses, which would be brilliant in an album, we discern no residuum requiring notice. We ask too much, perhaps, when we require distinct propositions of truth, in a treatise which disclaims doctrinal discussion; and in the absence of these, reply is scarcely possible. Here and there we almost catch the meaning, but even then it is chiefly negative. Thus, using language of Calvary, which would come forcibly from catholic lips, he says: "I see that that ignominy is glory; that those wounds are fountains of healing!" True, but how-in what sense? The genuine, direct, and honest reply would be-only as an example. Again: “The death of Jesus is the life of the world;" again it is true; but every thing depends on the sense in which it is true.

Relenting, it should seem, in some degree, as it regards "doctrinal discussion," our author proceeds to say something on "the theory of the atonement." Two leading views, he tells us, divide the Christian world. "The one regards it as an expedient, the other as a manifestation." According to the former, "it is some new element, or some new expedient introduced into the divine government, without which it is impossible to obtain forgiveness." Though these are not expressions with which we are satisfied, they do not offend us by any unfairness. The second view is the one which the author adopts; "and certainly," he adds, with a significancy which carries an edge towards a well-known school of American opinion, "many of the more modern orthodox explanations come to the same thing." The interpretation of the scriptural passages on atonement, "is per

plexed by the reasonings of the apostles about the relations of Jews and Gentiles, by analogies to the Jewish sacrifices, by the language and speculations of olden time." We can well conceive the perplexity of any interpreter, who endeavours to reconcile these relations and sacrifices and this language, with any scheme but that of catholic theology. The attempt which is made to illustrate the scheme of manifestation, by an apologue, is ingenious, but only serves more fully to reduce the whole transaction to the bare influence of a great martyrdom. The whole essay is evidently a sermon, addressed to the most popular apprehensions, and never grappling with the strength of the opposing argument.

The Five Points of Calvinism next engage the attention of our author; if indeed they may not be said to float before his mind from first to last. For he singles out Calvinism as the particular object of his antagonism, and appears to regard it as the opposite pole to his own. We see no just cause for such a method, in a work avowedly defensive, not of anti-calvinism, but of anti-trinitarianism; yet in point of strategy, it is adroitly done, as he thereby gains the sympathy of all the opponents of the doctrines of grace. Nevertheless we do not complain of being regarded as at the very antipodes, in this respect, nor of being placed, as for some ages we have been, "in the forefront of the hottest battle."

We have already adverted to the extraordinary distinction between "election" and "selection." In reviewing what is proposed concerning election and irresistible grace, which the author takes together, we are not more favourably impressed with the acumen of the controvertist. If we were disposed to use zigour, in the interpretation of his words, we should claim him as of our part. But his dread of "doctrinal discussion" and of "metaphysics" is visited on his readers, in the incapacity under which they labour, of discovering his exact intentions. Thus, on the ninety-eighth page, we learn that he believes in personal election; that he regards an "election of communities" as an election of the individuals included; and an "election to privileges" as no more saving human freedom than any other election. To all which we add our subscription. Now let us look at his positive side.