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reasoning power, therefore, is to be regarded as a new and distinct fountain of thought, which, as compared with the other sources of knowledge just mentioned, opens itself still further in the recesses of the Internal Intellect; and as it is later in its development, so it comes forth with proportionally greater efficiency.

After defining reasoning, and describing the process of mind which takes place in every case of reasoning, the author proceeds to illustrate the two leading kinds or forms of ReasoningDemonstrative and Moral. Demonstrative Reasoning, as is well known, is employed generally, and perhaps exclusively, with abstract ideas and the necessary relations between them. Moral Reasoning, in distinction from Demonstrative, relates to matters of fact; and in some respects also its conclusions differ. In conclusions drawn from moral reasoning there may be different degrees of belief, expressed by the words presumption, probability, moral certainty, and an opposite belief or opinion may not necessarily be absurd; but demonstrations do not admit of degrees of belief, and their opposites always involve an absurdity. Three processes of moral reasoning are illustrated by the writer-reasoning by Analogy, Induction, and by Cumulative Argument.

Imagination. Mr. Upham regards this as involving an intellectual, rather than a sensitive process of mind, and as closely related to the Reasoning power; from which, however, he thus distinguishes it. "Reasoning, as it aims to give us a knowledge of the truth, deals exclusively with facts more or less probable. Imagination, as it aims to give us pleasure, is at liberty to transcend the world of reality, and consequently often deals with the mere conceptions of the mind, whether they correspond to reality or not." Such is a concise and imperfect outline of the volume on the Intellectual. We proceed now to the other great department.

THE SENSIBILITIES.

The action of the Sensibilities is easily distinguished from that of the Intellect, inasmuch as it always implies an antecedent intellectual action. "As a general thing," says the writer, "there is, and can be, no such thing as an emotion, desire, or feeling of moral obligation, without an antecedent action of the intellect. If we are pleased or displeased, there is necessarily before the mind some object of

pleasure or displeasure; if we exercise the feeling of desire there must necessarily be some object desired, which is made known to us by an action of the intellect." In this department of the mind the leading distinction adopted by the author is between the Natural and Moral sensibilities. The distinction is important, as the following statement, taken from the second volume, will show.

The Natural and Moral Sensibilities appear to take fundamentally different views of the objects, in respect to which The one considers objects they are called into exercise. chiefly, as they have a relation to ourselves; the other as they relate to all possible existences. The one looks at things in the aspect of their desirableness; the other fixes its eye on the sublime feature of their rectitude. The one asks, what is GOOD? the other, what is RIGHT? The Natural Sensibilities, which are first considered, admit of a subordinate division. The result of the action of the Natural Sensibilities are found in the two classes of Emotions and Desires. Emotions preThis is not only the order in cede and give rise to Desires. succession of time; but it is also the order of nature."

The emotions are represented as being numerous; and as we have a knowledge of them by Consciousness, every person has a key to them, if he will learn to use it. As they arise in consequence of previous intellectual acts, their character will change in accordance with changes in the perceptions. They give rise to desires; and without careful analysis and attention we are liable to confound them with desires, from which they should be distinguished. Among other emotions of especial interest are those of Beauty. The occasions of these emotions "All nature, taking the word in a wide sense, is are various. the province of beauty; the Intellectual and the Sensitive, as well as the Material world." The examination of objects in reference to their power to awaken emotions of beauty admits Hence we have what may be called of a twofold view. Original beauty, and also, in distinction from it, Associated beauty. Objects may awaken emotions by means of their original and intrinsic elements; or they may do it by association with other objects. Nearly allied to emotions of beauty are those of Sublimity, differing from them more in degree than in nature or quality. There are also Emotions of cheerfulness, joy, gladness, melancholy, sorrow, grief, surprise, astonishment, wonder, dissatisfaction, displeasure, disgust, regard, reverence,

adoration; all of which and others are subjected to examination and analysis.

The Desires. These are embraced in the Second Class of mental states, resulting from the action of the Natural Sensibilities; and are distinguished from the Emotions by the position they occupy and by other characteristics. Their place, as we have already seen, is after the emotions. They are separated from intellections by the emotions which are antecedent to them; and come between the emotions and volitions; which last evidently have a subsequent place in the mind's action. They differ from emotions in having more permanency. They also necessarily imply an object, which is desired. And it is another characteristic, that their fulfilment (that is to say, the attainment of their object) always gives pleasure. The term Desires is, for reasons which are particularly indicated, employed generically. And under this general head the author considers a number of distinct mental states, some simple and others complex; particularly the Instincts, Appetites, Propensities, and Affections.

The Affections. These are still higher in rank than the principles which have been mentioned, and distinguished by characteristic features. One characteristic of the Affections is, that they are not simple states, as the Appetites and Propensities may probably be, but complex. The Affections are emotions either pleasant or painful, exercised in view of some object; and combined with and modified by a desire of good or evil to that object. They are accordingly divided in the work before us on this basis-the nature of the desire-into the Malevolent and Benevolent Affections.

Under the class of the Malevolent Affections are arranged Resentment or anger with its modifications, Peevishness, Envy, Jealousy, Revenge, Fear. The author suggests the query, which would naturally arise, whether Fear should be classed among the Malevolent Affections, but as it includes the emotion of pain with the desire of avoiding the object of fear, it neces sarily implies a degree of aversion, and seems naturally to fall into this class.

Benevolent Affections. Love or benevolence in general being first considered, we have then arranged under the general head of these affections, the Parental affection, the Filial affection, and the Fraternal affection. These, in accordance with common parlance, are properly termed the Domestic Affections; and

their uses and moral character are beautifully dwelt upon by the Author. Humanity or the love of the human race is also set down as belonging to the Benevolent affections; and the evidence that it is an original affection is examined at considerable length. Patriotism or love of country and Friendship are regarded not so much as distinct and original affections, as modifications of other affections; and yet they are sufficiently important and remarkable to deserve a separate notice. Pity or Sympathy is classed with the benevolent affections; for, although attended by painful emotions, it is connected with a desire of good to the object of sympathy.

In this part of the work is a chapter devoted to an interesting inquiry; the result of which we can only state in few words, earnestly inviting the attention of our readers to the discussion itself. The inquiry is, whether there should not be, in order to complete the proportions and preserve the harmony of the Sensitive nature, another affection, which reaches forth and claims the Supreme Being as its object. The conclusion of the Author is, that originally such was the case. The relations we sustain to God, the evidences of design and adaptation in all other departments of mind, our necessities, the testimony of the Scriptures that man was created in the image of God, the passages which contemplate the restoration of that image, are all appealed to in support of the position, that, originally, supreme love to God was an implanted element of human nature, and that at the present moment, it is, or ought to be, in every human being a distinct and operative principle. It is in this part of the work also, that we find the Author's views of Human Depravity, which seem to agree with those of President Edwards, and which naturally flow out of the general principles of his philosophy.

The law of Habit, which first makes its appearance in the volume on the Intellect, is considered in relation to the Sensibilities likewise, and we have various illustrations of the fact that the mind, in its sentient as well as intellective action, acquires strength and facility by repetition. The Appetites, Propensities, and Affections of every grade are subject to this law, and may acquire strength of action for good or for evil, of the most glorious or the most fearful import.

The Moral Sensibilities come next under review. The fact that man has a moral nature being established, the classification of the phenomena embraced in it, and its place or position,

mentally considered, are attended to. The results or actings of the Moral Sensibilities are divided into moral Emotions, viz., feelings of approval and disapproval, and feelings of Moral Obligation. The Moral emotions, like the Natural or Pathematic emotions, are immediately successive to acts of the Intellect; and the feelings of moral obligation, which succeed the emotions, may be considered, like the desires, as in immediate proximity to the Will. If we may be allowed the expression, the Will has an opportunity of acting sometimes in accordance with the feelings of moral obligation, and sometimes in accordance with the desires.

The relation of the reasoning power to the moral nature, which has led many to confound the two, and to deny the existence of the Conscience as a distinct moral principle, is carefully considered. This connexion, it is admitted, is very intimate, and yet, the two mental principles are found to be distinct. Reasoning, when in exercise, is purely an intellectual process, in distinction from an emotive or sensitive process. They belong, therefore, to different departments of the mind. Yet such is the connexion of the conscience with the reasoning power, that it admits of improvement or perversion by means of this connexion; and is susceptible of education as well as other parts of mind. Men may consequently be guilty of wrong consciences as really as of wrong affections. So that man is under obligation to keep a conscience void of offence, and to enlighten and strengthen it by the appropriate exercise of his intellect.

The various principles which are laid down under the general head of the Moral Sensibilities, furnish basis enough for a consistent and durable Moral Education. This education should begin early. The earliest years of life are favorable to moral culture. It is true, the Intellect is developed first in the order of nature; but the Heart and the Intellect are so closely united, that emotions, both natural and moral, follow closely the intellectual perceptions and deductions. Accordingly if the intellect is early occupied, whether with good or bad principles, these principles must necessarily affect the heart. If good principles are neglected, bad ones will inevitably spring up; and as they gain strength by time and repetition, it will not be easy to dislodge them. There is no ground of discouragement if the efforts for moral culture seem for the time being less effective than those of an intellectual kind. "The moral and religious

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