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since, consisted chiefly of a collection of facts, and was especially valuable for the richness and variety of its matter, the perspicuity of its style and its adaptation to the existing state of the science in this country. It was then, as it has continued to be, eclectic in its character, and left the author uncommitted to any school of philosophy in his subsequent investigations. His first original work was the “ Treatise on the Will.” In this he assumed a threefold division of the mind, as the basis of the system which he has since more fully illustrated, and which distinguishes it from that of some English and American writers, who appear to have embraced all the faculties of mind in the Understanding and the Will.
The Treatise on the Will was, at the time of its publication, the only one in our language that professed fully to examine this department of mind. The work of President Edwards was not designed to be a full and complete view of the Will, but “of that Freedom of the Will which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame." Nearly every treatise on the Will, which has since made its appearance, has been either a review, or an explanation of, an apology for, or an attack upon Edwards. This work of Professor Upham was, therefore, in some sense a novelty; but was not of that startling kind, which is fitted to excite a momentary wonder, and then be forgotten. The work advances from step to step, calmly and cautiously, without doing violence to cherished associations, without assailing existing prejudices or attempting to overthrow established systems.
After the Treatise on the Will had been published and favorably received, the “Mental Philosophy” was re-written on the philosophical basis already adopted in the Treatise on the Will, viz., that the Mind is to be contemplated in the threefold aspect of the Intellect, the Sensibilities and the Will. The first volume embraces the Intellect, the second the Sensibilities; so that each of the three volumes (the Treatise on the Will forming properly the third volume) is in a sense distinct; and yet all are essential to a full view of the Mind. And perhaps no
fortifying its positions by cumulative evidence and illustration, it can be read with great pleasure and profit by many, who would find some difficulty in mastering the works of Stewart or Brown. As the best justification of our opinion, we proceed to give a brief analysis of the work itself; in which the reader, we trust, will find some interest and instruction.
The propriety of the threefold view of mind adopted in this work seems manifest on a moment's reflection; and the wonder is that it should ever have been overlooked. No other evidence of it would seem to be needed, than what is implied in the simple expressions, I know, I feel, I will.
However these states of mind may be connected, and however rapidly one may succeed the other, our consciousness clearly reveals to us a fundamental distinction in the mental states thus designated. But obvious as the distinction is, the author has done well to exhibit its reality and importance so fully as to remove every objection.
THE INTELLECT. This department of mind receives and combines knowledge. In other words, it perceives, compares and reaonss. The several bodily senses are the inlets of external knowledge. The mind through these becomes acquainted with the external world, and the mental states thus occasioned are named sensations.
When the mind refers these sensations to certain objects as their causes or occasions, and thus has a knowledge of those objects, we are said to perceive; and the states of mind, which then exist, are called perceptions. The mind recalls some past or absent object, and dwells upon it till mental impressions or states arise, similar in many respects to those which the objects occasioned when present; and these mental states are denominated conceptions. The states of mind, which are thus furnished to us, are entitled by our author intellectual states of external origin.
But the mind has an internal as well as an external empire. It has fountains of knowledge in itself. Locke, heretical as he is supposed to be on some points, expressly admits this. He says : " the other fountain of knowledge, from which experience furnishes the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operation of our own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got, which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider them, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without; and such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understanding ideas as distinct as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly within himself, and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with EXTERNAL objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called INTERNAL SENSE. But as I call the other sensation, so I call this reflection; the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself.” Our author, perceiving the errors into which Locke fell, has wisely chosen a phraseology which covers a much broader ground than the term reflection. That knowledge which is of internal origin, considered in reference to powers by means of which it is developed, is susceptible of classification, and is arranged in the work before us as follows:
Original Suggestion. To this important source of internal knowledge, which is distinctly recognized as such by the leading writers of the Scotch school, are traced the ideas of existence, mind, self-existence, personal identity, unity, succession, duration, time and its measurements, eternity, space, power, right and wrong, moral merit and demerit, and a number of others. The reason for using the term suggestion we give in the language of the author. “In giving an account of the ideas from this source, we have preferred as designative of their origin, the term suggestion, proposed and employed by Reid and Stewart, to the term reason, proposed by Kant and adopted by Cousin and some other writers, as, on the whole, more conformable to the
prevalent usage of the English language. In common parlance, and by the established usage of the language, the word reason is expressive of the deductive rather than the suggestive faculty; and if we annul or perplex the present use of that word by a novel application of it, we must introduce a new word to express the process of deduction."
Consciousness. This, considered as a source of knowledge, embraces at least three distinct things. 1, Self or personal existence; 2, a state or operation of mind ; 3, a feeling of relation, that is to say, the relation of the state of mind to the conscious being or self. Consciousness does not properly embrace, or have relation to any thing extraSECOND SERIES, VOL. V. NO. II.
neous to the mind, although it may relate to the sensations which they produce within us; nor to the perceptions and feeling of past times, although we may be conscious of the recollection of them. We are not, strictly speaking, conscious of the existence even of our own minds; but only of their operations, and of the belief of their existence, which these operations indicate. We are conscious of different degrees of belief and disbelief, of doubt, uncertainty,full assent, etc., when our minds exist in those particular states which these terms express. We are concious of thinking, attending, perceiving, conceiving, remembering, comparing, judging, abstracting, reasoning, imagining, and all similar mental acts and operations; not of the mental powers it will be noticed, but of the mental exercises or acts. We are conscious of emotions, desires, affections, and of all other mental states, which properly come under the head of the natural sensibilities. Accordingly it will be perceived, that a wide range of knowledge is opened to us here.
Relative Suggestion or Judgment. These two terms are used by Brown as nearly synonymous, and in the work before us the same usage is admitted, although the author remarks that “the latter term is sometimes employed with other shades of meaning.” Although the number of relations is very great, which are discoverable by means of this power, it is supposed that they are susceptible of being arranged in the seven classes of identity and diversity, degree, proposition, time, place, possession, cause and effect.
Reasoning An idea of this source of knowledge, as it stands related to the other internal sources, we give in the words of the author:
Reasoning is not identical with, or involved in conscious
If consciousness gives us a knowledge of the act of reasoning, the reasoning power, operating within its own limits, and in its own right, gives us a knowledge of other things. It is a source of perceptions and knowledge which we probably could not possess in any other way. Without the aid of Original Suggestion, it does not appear how we could have a knowledge of our existence; without conscious.
reasoning power, therefore, is to be regarded as a new and distinct fountain of thought, which, as compared with the other sources of knowledge just mentioned, opens itself still further in the recesses of the Internal Intellect; and as it is later in its development, so it comes forth with proportionally greater efficiency.
After defining reasoning, and describing the process of mind which takes place in every case of reasoning, the author proceeds to illustrate the two leading kinds or forms of ReasoningDemonstrative and Moral. Demonstrative Reasoning, as is well known, is employed generally, and perhaps exclusively, with abstract ideas and the necessary relations between them. Moral Reasoning, in distinction from Demonstrative, relates to matters of fact ; and in some respects also its conclusions differ. In conclusions drawn from moral reasoning there may be different degrees of belief, expressed by the words presumption, probability, moral certainty, and an opposite belief or opinion may not necessarily be absurd ; but demonstrations do not admit of degrees of belief, and their opposites always involve an absurdity. Three processes of moral reasoning are illustrated by the writer-reasoning by Analogy, Induction, and by Cumulative Argument.
Imagination. Mr. Upham regards this as involving an intellectual, rather than a sensitive process of mind, and as closely related to the Reasoning power; from which, however, he thus distinguishes it. “Reasoning, as it aims to give us a knowledge of the truth, deals exclusively with facts more or less probable. Imagination, as it aims to give us pleasure, is at liberty to transcend the world of reality, and consequently often deals with the mere conceptions of the mind, whether they correspond to reality or not." Such is a concise and imperfect outline of the volume on the Intellectual. We proceed now to the other great department.
THE SENSIBILITIES. The action of the Sensibilities is easily distinguished from