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pleasure or displeasure; if we exercise the feeling of desire there must necessarily be some object desired, which is made known to us by an action of the intellect.” In this department of the mind the leading distinction adopted by the author is between the Natural and Moral sensibilities. The distinction is important, as the following statement, taken from the second volume, will show.
The Natural and Moral Sensibilities appear to take fundamentally different views of the objects, in respect to which they are called into exercise. The one considers objects chiefly, as they have a relation to ourselves; the other as they rela to all possible existences. The one looks at things in the aspect of their desirableness; the other fixes its eye on the sublime feature of their rectitude. The one asks, what is GOOD ? the other, what is right ? The Natural Sensibilities, which are first considered, admit of a subordinate division. The result of the action of the Natural Sensibilities are found in the two classes of Emotions and Desires. Emotions precede and give rise to Desires. This is not only the order in succession of time ; but it is also the order of nature.”
The emotions are represented as being numerous ; and as we have a knowledge of them by Consciousness, every person has a key to them, if he will learn to use it. As they arise in consequence of previous intellectual acts, their character will change in accordance with changes in the perceptions. They give rise to desires; and without careful analysis and attention we are liable to confound them with desires, from which they should be distinguished. Among other emotions of especial interest are those of Beauty. The occasions of these emotions are various. “ All nature, taking the word in a wide sense, is the province of beauty; the Intellectual and the Sensitive, as well as the Material world." The examination of objects in reference to their power to awaken emotions of beauty admits of a twofold view. Hence we have what may be called Original beauty, and also, in distinction from it, Associated beauty. Objects may awaken emotions by means of their original and intrinsic elements; or they may do it by association with other objects. Nearly allied to emotions of beauty are those of Sublimity, differing from them more in degree than in nature or quality. There are also Emotions of cheerfulness, joy, gladness, melancholy, sorrow, grief, surprise, astonishment, wonder, dissatisfaction, displeasure, disgust, regard, reverence, adoration; all of which and others are subjected to examination and analysis.
The Desires. These are embraced in the Second Class of mental states, resulting from the action of the Natural Sensibilities; and are distinguished from the Emotions by the position they occupy and by other characteristics. Their place, as we have already seen, is after the emotions. They are separated from intellections by the emotions which are antecedent to them; and come between the emotions and volitions; which last evidently have a subsequent place in the mind's action. They differ from emotions in having more permanency. They also necessarily imply an object, which is desired. And it is another characteristic, that their fulfilment that is to say, the attainment of their object) always gives pleasure. The term Desires is, for reasons which are particularly indicated, employed generically. And under this general head the author considers a number of distinct mental states, some simple and others complex; particularly the Instincts, Appetites, Propensities, and Affections.
The Affections. These are still higher in rank than the principles which have been mentioned, and distinguished by characteristic features. One characteristic of the Affections is, that they are not simple states, as the Appetites and Propensities may probably be, but complex. The Affections are emotions either pleasant or painful, exercised in view of some object; and combined with and modified by a desire of good or evil to that object. They are accordingly divided in the work before us on this basis--the nature of the desire-into the Malevolent and Benevolent Affections.
Under the class of the Malevolent Affections are arranged Resentment or anger with its modifications, Peevishness, Envy, Jealousy, Revenge, Fear. The author suggests the query, which would naturally arise, whether Fear should be classed among the Malevolent Affections, but as it includes the emotion of pain with the desire of avoiding the object of fear, it neces. sarily implies a degree of aversion, and seems naturally to fall into this class.
Benevolent Affections. Love or benevolence in general being first considered, we have then arranged under the general head of these affections, the Parental affection, the Filial affection, and the Fraternal affection. These, in accordance with common parlance, are properly termed the Domestic Affections; and their uses and moral character are beautifully dwelt upon by the Author. Humanity or the love of the human race is also set down as belonging to the Benevolent affections; and the evidence that it is an original affection is examined at considerable length. Patriotism or love of country and Friendship are regarded not so much as distinct and original affections, as modifications of other affections; and yet they are sufficiently important and remarkable to deserve a separate notice. Pity or Sympathy is classed with the benevolent affections ; for, although attended by painful emotions, it is connected with a desire of good to the object of sympathy.
In this part of the work is a chapter devoted to an interesting inquiry; the result of which we can only state in few words, earnestly inviting the attention of our readers to the discussion itself. The inquiry is, whether there should not be, in order to complete the proportions and preserve the harmony of the Sensitive nature, another affection, which reaches forth and elaims the Supreme Being as its object. The conclusion of the Author is, that originally such was the case. The relations we sustain to God, the evidences of design and adaptation in all other departments of mind, our necessities, the testimony of the Scriptures that man was created in the image of God, the passages which contemplate the restoration of that image, are all appealed to in support of the position, that, originally, supreme love to God was an implanted element of human nature, and that at the present moment, it is, or ought to be, in every human being a distinct and operative principle. It is in this part of the work also, that we find the Author's views of Human Depravity, which seem to agree with those of President Edwards, and which naturally flow out of the general principles of his philosophy.
The law of Habit, which first makes its appearance in the volume on the Intellect, is considered in relation to the Sensibilities likewise, and we have various illustrations of the fact that the mind, in its sentient as well as intellective action, acquires strength and facility by repetition. The Appetites, Propensities, and Affections of every grade are subject to this law, and may acquire strength of action for good or for evil, of the most glorious or the most fearful import.
The Moral Sensibilities come next under review. The fact that man has a moral nature being established, the classification of the phenomena embraced in it, and its place or position,
mentally considered, are attended to. The results or actings of the Moral Sensibilities are divided into moral Emotions, viz., feelings of approval and disapproval, and feelings of Moral Obligation. The Moral emotions, like the Natural or Pathematic emotions, are immediately successive to acts of the Intellect; and the feelings of moral obligation, which succeed the emotions, may be considered, like the desires, as in immediate proximity to the Will. If we may be allowed the expression, the Will has an opportunity of acting sometimes in accordance with the feelings of moral obligation, and sometimes in accordance with the desires.
The relation of the reasoning power to the moral nature, which has led many to confound the two, and to deny the existence of the Conscience as a distinct moral principle, is carefully considered. This connexion, it is admitted, is very intimate, and yet, the two mental principles are found to be distinct. Reasoning, when in exercise, is purely an intellectual process, in distinction from an emotive or sensitive process. They belong, therefore, to different departments of the mind. Yet such is the connexion of the conscience with the reasoning power, that it admits of improvement or perversion by means of this connexion; and is susceptible of education as well as other parts of mind. Men may consequently be guilty of wrong consciences as really as of wrong affections. So that man is under obligation to keep a conscience void of offence, and to enlighten and strengthen it by the appropriate exercise of his intellect.
The various principles which are laid down under the general head of the Moral Sensibilities, furnish basis enough for a consistent and durable Moral Education. This education should begin early. The earliest years of life are favorable to moral culture. It is true, the Intellect is developed first in the order of nature; but the Heart and the Intellect are so closely united, that emotions, both natural and moral, follow closely the intellectual perceptions and deductions. Accordingly if the intellect is early occupied, whether with good or bad principles, these principles must necessarily affect the heart. If good principles
instruction, communicated to the youthful memory, is deposited in the keeping of a power, which may sometimes slumber, but can never die. It may long be unproductive; it may remain for years without giving signs of vivification, and of an operative influence; and yet it may be only waiting for some more favorable and important moment, when it shall come forth suddenly and prominently to view.” The importance, in this view, of correct speculative opinions, and of a knowledge of the Supreme Being, and of religious truth generally, as insisted on by Mr. Upham, will be distinctly seen.
THE WILL. The Treatise on the Will, as it may be important for the reader to recollect, is philosophical and practical, rather than theological. It appears in a separate volume, and is sold separately; but it is bound uniformly with the volumes on the Intellect and the Sensibilities, and seems to be necessary to a complete view of this great subject. The first part of this treatise is chiefly occupied with a classification of mental powers, and with the relation of the intellect and the sensibilities to the will. The student who has examined the other volumes, will probably not regret this circumstance, as it affords substantial aid in reviewing and fixing principles more firmly in the mind. And to those, who had not this preparatory training, this course seemed absolutely necessary.
There is, however, one other important topic, which is discussed in Part I. of this Treatise, on the Distinction between Desires and Volitions. Edwards, Brown, and some other writers appear to regard them as identical. The writer of these volumes, reasoning at some length, endeavors to show that they are not so. The reader will naturally pay close attention to the various arguments which are adduced on this topic; because if there is a failure here, it necessarily vitiates the whole book. If desire and volition are identical, what need of a philosophy of the Will ? Does not the philosophy of the Desires cover the whole ground ?
Part II. is occupied with the difficult subject of the Laws of the Will. In entering on this topic, our Author seems duly