sense and good feeling than the writers who profess to guide public opinion. So much for the reciprocation of those amiable sentiments which English optimists imagine to pervade both countries, but of which, in spite of Free Trade, we enjoy a perfect monopoly. 123 CHAP. VIII. THE QUESTION OF INVASION, AND OF MANNING THE FLEET IN ANY SUDDEN EMERGENCY. BONAPARTE asserted, and Thiers repeats*, that forty-eight hours of French mastery in the Channel would have sealed the fate of England. This may be untrue in respect of the period to which the assertion referred, for with a year's notice we could hardly have been unprepared; but as regards the present moment, or the commencement of any war, I see no grounds to doubt it. That our few regiments would make all the resistance which could be expected from their numbers, and more than would be made by an equal number of any other country, I have enough of British feeling to believe. But the army, excluding the thirty thousand men, at * Thiers tells us (in his fifth volume) that our soldiers and militia could not have encountered the army that conquered Europe; yet our soldiers did (not in England, but in France and Spain,) encounter that army, and in a dozen pitched battles vanquish it too. least, which the peculiar species of "loyalty" inculcated in Ireland would demand for that country, could not exceed twenty or twenty-five thousand disposable men. The pensioners, also, (those at least who have retained their limbs, and are not much crippled by lumbago,) might be useful; but to speak of a "warlike peasantry" (what weapon do they excel in ?) taking any part in the short and sharp contest that would decide the fate of England, or at least of the capital, is madness. Under peculiar circumstances an armed peasantry may greatly harass and impede an invading army; but in England the two most essential circumstancestime and space to act in would be wanting. A force landing in Sussex would, by two days' march, through a country untraversed by mountains, rivers, marshes, or forests, reach London. In so short a march there would be no room for the desultory operations of an armed peasantry to produce any effect. They might harass the enemy's rear, or annoy his flanks; but to commit peasants in action against regular troops, would be to ensure their total and irretrievable dispersion, and possibly to compromise the regular troops with which they acted. People, forgetting the difference between a march on London and a march on Moscow, are apt to deceive themselves, and mistify the matter, by talking about "cutting off an enemy's supplies,' and "intercepting his communications." There would be no question of either in the present case. The troops would carry their own provisions (as they do now for much longer marches in Algeria) on their backs, and as to intercepting communications, there would be none to intercept. An invading force advancing on the metropolis would never think of keeping open its communication with the coast. If successful, it would be needless; if unsuccessful, impossible. In the same manner, we overrate the difficulty of finding means of transport, by supposing the whole matériel of an army-its commissariat, baggage, siege-artillery, and pontoon trains,-to be inseparable from it. So far from this being the case, an army advancing on London would not encumber itself with any of the four abovenamed trains. As already stated, the commissariat would be on the backs of the soldiers. Baggage does not accompany an army actively engaged; siege-artillery would be useless where there is nothing to besiege, and pontoon trains, where there are no rivers to cross. Now the transport of an army divested of these incumbrances is a very simple matter. Having assisted in the embarkation and landing of several thousand troops in steamers, I can speak confidently on this point. During the late civil war in Spain, the royal armies were repeatedly conveyed from point to point by a few British war steamers, the largest of which was what is now considered a small steam sloop. The number of troops conveyed at one time in her Majesty's steamers Phoenix and Salamander, (under 700 tons) varied from 1000 to 1300. Each soldier carried his arms with him, and often landed with every thing necessary to take the field for four days. It is to be observed, too, that this was in the Bay of Biscay, frequently during the winter, and sometimes in very bad weather. If we allow for the greatly increased size of war-steamers in the present day, we may suppose them to average 1100 tons, and to carry 1500 men each upon the upper deck, leaving, as was the case on the occasions referred to, the lower deck for other purposes. Thus ten sloops of average size would carry for a short distance and in fine weather 15,000 men; each steam sloop again would tow tonnage, whether in one or more ships, for as many troops as she carried on board, making another 15,000, or a total of 30,000 men embarked in, or towed by ten steam sloops.* * The troops are here supposed to be infantry, of which |