England. A British admiral striking his flag to a French fleet! There is no precedent in history for such humiliation. It is among the proud traditions of our navy, that in our innumerable conflicts with that power, no flag-officer ever lowered his flag to the foe, and among our own seamen there is a belief that an English admiral is not permitted to do so. According to the version current among them, Admiral Byng was the only exception, and he, as they think, was "shot for striking his flag." Though poor Byng, however, was guiltless of this fault, (he would, indeed, have had no excuse for it in his skirmish,) there are, I believe, two instances on record of British admirals having struck their flags; one 255, the other 180 years ago. How boundless, then, would be the popular indigna * * The capture of Sir R. Grenville, in the year 1591, was marked by traits of heroism which have never been surpassed, and which, considering that the enemy's (Spanish) force was fifty-five ships to seven British, almost reconcile us to the misfortune. Sir Richard was Vice-Admiral under Lord Thomas Howard, and being unwilling to retreat, continued the engagement singly, from three in the afternoon until next morning, repulsing the enemy's boarders several times, and causing them a loss of four ships, and 1000 men. When at last overpowered, he proposed setting fire to the magazine but was prevented by part of the crew. He died of his wounds, saying with his last breath-"Here die I, Richard tion against the unhappy man who brought such a stain upon our arms - against those who appointed him, and all who appeared responsible for the disaster! How would public credit be shaken to its foundations, and how utterly would all our confidence in "Kentish hedge-rows," "warlike peasantry," and other fanciful substitutes for disciplined men, vanish into thin air! How unmeasured would be the exultation of our rivals, at a real victory over England, and what sympathy would that exultation meet with in that amiable assembly, whose watchword is, "England's adversity is Ireland's opportunity!" Perhaps cool reflection would, after a time, convince us that such a catastrophe was less unaccountable than it would at first sight appear, and that it came not upon us without some intelligible warnings, unhappily neglected. Was not the affair of 1840 a warning? Was Grenville, with a quiet and a quiet and a joyful mind, for that I have ended my life as a true soldier ought, fighting for his queen, religion, country, and honor; and my soul willingly departing from my body, leaving behind the lasting fame of having behaved as every valiant soldier IS IN DUTY BOUND TO DO." A true type of our Blakes, Benbows, and Nelsons, in later times. Near a hundred years later, in 1666, Sir G. Ayscue having run aground on the Galloper shoal, during a four days' engagement with the Dutch, was forced to strike his flag. 154 FLEET MANNED WITH UNDISCIPLINED CREWS. not M'Cleod's affair? Was not Tahiti? We are told, that in 1840 Thiers meditated a coup de main*, either against Malta, then insufficiently garrisoned, or our fleet, so badly manned. Could we have prevented it? Had we a reserve of seamen, enough for four line-of-battle ships even, a reserve such as the "coast-guard" once afforded us? But the quarrel did not take an unfavorable turn, and we give ourselves the credit of averting a danger we were utterly unprepared for. Providence does wonders for us, and we draw largely on Providence. * The Quarterly Review for March last, in an article on the state of our army, evidently written by a military man, says, p. 529, "What would have become of Malta, for example, had the quarrel between Lord Palmerston and M. Thiers deepened but a little? There was a critical time, when the harbour of Valetta could not show so much as a sloop of war within its anchorage. The guns on the ramparts, besides being of small calibre, had become through age and the effect of the weather well-nigh unserviceable; of artillery-men there were scarce sufficient to fire a double salute; and the infantry of the garrison consisted of a weak battalion. What would have happened had the French fleet from the Dardanelles suddenly steered, as was expected by both parties, in a hostile spirit thither? Indeed, what would have taken place in England itself, had the 20,000 men whom the French are known to have kept in hand, embarked suddenly ?" &c. &c. The "weak battalion," here spoken of, must not be understood as the only infantry in all Malta, but probably in the town of Valetta only. 155 CHAP. X. THE REMEDIES FOR SUCH EVILS AS MIGHT RESULT FROM THE DELAY IN MANNING THE FLEET, AND FROM HAVING UNTRAINED CREWS, ARE IN OUR OWN POWER. BUT should such unprecedented disaster befall us, it is consolitary to know that the remedy lies with ourselves. Our complaints, though of a nature which often proves dangerous, are not hopeless. They are a "plethora" of resources (what the French call l'embarras des richesses), and too long continued prosperity. We have only 350,000 seamen, which accounts for the difficulty of manning our ships even in peace-time. We have been free from invasion for 800 years. Victorious at sea for two centuries, we are rich in the spoils of the world, and therefore we are unwilling to provide for our own defence. But adversity would remedy the evil, and a single disaster at sea. (though disasters seldom come single) would at once cure our over-confidence, and banish that apathy, which is our bane. We should then at once decide, either to maintain, at home and abroad, that preponderating naval force which our safety and position require, or else we should ensure the means of speedily obtaining a supply of efficient seamen when wanted. There may no doubt be reasons of state which make it expedient that our navy in commission should at times be reduced below the force maintained by other countries. Perhaps (as when we withdrew our line-of-battle ships from the "French Lake," formerly Mediterranean,) it may be an attempt to soothe the jealousy of another power, though leaving a freer scope to its friendly and unambitious policy. Perhaps it may be to confirm the earnest disavowal of any claim to naval superiority on the part of Great Britain, which the prime minister lately made, and supported by a Virgilian quotation*, a quotation, by the by, which some think would have been better applied in the sense it was actually used by Neptune, who was far too sensible a god to speak of resigning his trident; he knew that a god out of office was very likely to become out at elbows also, and therefore retained the trident, until he thought he saw in Britannia a worthy heiress to the "Imperium pelagi." But though a minister may disavow our naval "Non illi imperium pelagi sævumque Tridentem, |