of France; and when we consider that over and above our royal arsenals, we have in private building-yards alone, the power of building a very large fleet in a few months, this preponderance in matériel will be thought fully sufficient. If we look at the quality as well as the number of our ships, it will not be disputed, that there never was a time when England possessed such fine ones as at this moment. The wretched classes of nineties, ninety-eights, and of fifty and sixty-four gunships on two decks-line-of-battle ships in name, without the power of a frigate— have disappeared from the list. The twentyeight gun, or "donkey-frigate," so called because they bore the same affinity to a real frigate as a donkey does to a horse, have also been swept away. The dangerous small craft known as "floating coffins," vessels that could neither fight nor run away, have given place to corvettes and brigs, which even the adversaries of the present surveyor of the navy admit to be excellent. Very possibly the new line-of-battle ships of his construction do not unite every good quality; they may be uneasy in a sea-way, but, at least, they sail well, have fine roomy quarters, and stand up well under their canvass in smooth water.

When we come to steamers, it will be found

that Government have not been insensible to the vital importance of this new arm. Naval architects, eminent for their talent and success, were allowed a fair field for competition, whether already in the public service or in private establishments. While every building-slip in her Majesty's yards was occupied, orders were also given to private ship-builders in the Thames, Mersey, Clyde, and Isle of Wight. Never before were such exertions made in peace time, and never were they more politic or necessary. France has been unusually active. It was the official recommendation of the committee on the naval estimates in 1842, to make steam-power compensate for the superiority of England in sailing-ships: "One power has undoubtedly a larger force of sailing-ships; but this inequality must be compensated by the steam force which the genius and patriotism of France may and

must create."

Unless the acquiescence of England was here assumed, the avowal of an intention to out-build us in steamers would seem to betray much ignorance of our resources. There is no point on which our superiority is so great, so unquestionable, as in the power of constructing both ships and their engines. We have furnished the latter to half the world, (including several to France

herself,) and should the demand be doubled, there is no reason to doubt the supply keeping pace with it.

It was in our power, then, peacefully, yet effectually, to have demonstrated the hopelessness of such rivalry, and probably, by so doing, to have strangled in its cradle the steam force, so publicly announced as the future creation of "French genius and patriotism." As it was, however, eighteen huge steam frigates, under the guise of Trans-Atlantic packets, to carry the imaginary correspondence of a peddling commerce, were ordered. Those in England who know the history of our West India steam packets will appreciate the hopefulness of the French scheme in a commercial point of view. At the same time (and while we had no steamer above 320 horse power) twenty steam frigates of from 450 to 540 horse-power were ordered to be built in France. This would have given her a great preponderance of force; but the TransAtlantic steamers, according to the Prince de Joinville*, did not prove suitable for war; and the other steamers, built expressly for that purpose, were not considered very satisfactory.

* Whether the Prince correctly describes the steamers of his own country or not, he fell into great errors respecting ours, and all on the side of addition.

The French naval estimates of 1846, as elsewhere noticed, provide for an enormous increase of steam force. In the mean time, it is less than that of England; and the French resources for constructing steamers out of all proportion inferior. I have already stated, the total of the French navy in ships at about half our own, as a comparison of the two navy lists, which are accessible to every one, will show. There is reason to think that her arsenals, also, are less abundantly supplied.

CHAP. II.

FRENCHMEN GENERALLY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRESENT INFERIORITY OF THEIR NAVY, LOOK TO THAT SERVICE RATHER THAN THE ARMY FOR FUTURE SUCCESSES. THEIR REASONS FOR DOING SO WORTH INVESTIGATION. THE THREE GROUNDS ON WHICH THE CONFIDENCE OF FRANCE IN HER NAVY RESTS.

SUCH, then, being the material state of the two Navies, it will not be thought the comparison is very encouraging to France; still less will it be supposed, in England at least, that past recollections supply her with the arguments of future confidence. Yet I shall show, that the anticipations of future success by sea terminating in the invasion of England are very generally entertained in France, and believed by Frenchmen to be attainable by their own exertions; or, as M. Thiers* says in his history," dependent on the patriotism of France."

* Le rôle de la navigation à vapeur est impossible à prédire aujourd'hui dans les événements futurs. Qu'elle donne des forces de plus à la France contre l'Angleterre; cela est probable. Qu'elle rende le détroit plus facile à traverser; cela dépendra des efforts que la France saura faire pour s'assurer la supériorité dans l'emploi de cette puissance toute nouvelle ; cela dependra de son patriotisme et de sa prévoyance. (Thiers,