and we still see, that in England it requires some months to procure a sufficient number of hands to fit out a few ships, not for an engagement, but merely for a cruise. We therefore contend, that twenty-four ships, hastily collected together in the Channel, might very easily intercept the communications, prevent the junction of the vessels scattered in different ports, burn some dock-yards, destroy some arsenals, and even favour a landing, which would produce the greater effect because it would not have been previously announced. The cannoniers who served our guns in 1840 have not forgotten their trade. A war therefore, suddenly commenced, conducted with prudence and skill, and carried on with vigour, would give us good hopes of success. But even omitting the invasion, which itself alone would terminate all, and which striking England in the heart, would cause her to descend to the rank of a third-rate power, even. omitting that, let us argue on the consequences of a maritime war. Our seamen, let it be remembered, have not forgotten their brilliant triumphs. Neither have they forgotten their glorious defeats, nor the circumstances which led to them. These circumstances, which exist no longer, are well known to them, and we shall *This is too true.

see whether they have nourished in vain in their hearts a hatred of England."

Putting aside the boasting by which Frenchmen always weaken their own arguments, and often sacrifice the credit they are entitled to; it will be seen that there are three grounds here assigned for the confidence expressed : —

1ST. THE CHANCE OF COMMENCING A WAR "SUDDENLY."

2ND. THE DIFFICULTY ENGLAND WOULD EXPERIENCE IN MANNING HER FLEET, HAVING NEGLECTED ΤΟ ORGANISE HER RESOURCES.”

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3RDLY. THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE FRENCH NAVY IN DISCIPLINE, SKILL, AND GUNNERY. A POINT ON WHICH I SUSPECT WE ARE TOO INCREDULOUS, AND ON WHICH MUCH MUST DEPEND.

I do not include the grand and decisive "invasion," as it must be the consequence of success and not the cause. It is also too like selling the lion's skin before his death.

CHAP. III.

THE FIRST GROUND ON WHICH FRENCHMEN REST THEIR HOPES OF NAVAL SUCCESS. ITS REASONABLENESS.

LET us then examine these three grounds; and first, as to the war "suddenly commenced," which the French writer recommends, and which ninetenths of France would sanction.

Some years ago, the peace-loving subjects of Queen Victoria had persuaded themselves that wars between civilised countries were no longer possible. According to them, the Political Millenium had already commenced, and all future misunderstandings were to be adjusted without appealing to that barbarous umpire the sword. We had, in this, carried the principle of judging others by ourselves rather too far, not exactly considering whether other nations. had the same grounds for satisfaction with the statu quo as ourselves. Some very startling events however, and a prodigious clashing of angry tongues across the Channel, dispelled the pleasing dream. We were forced to admit that future wars were possible, nay, far from improbable, and government knowing that when

war did come it would be the war of giants, a war wherein not single ships but fleets would disappear before the destructive weapons and deadly aim of modern art, took their measures accordingly. Besides a great addition to our existing force in matériel the means of future construction and repair on a scale quite new to the world have been planned and are now in progress. The old dock-yards are being enlarged, new slips* constructed, steam-basins (compared to which it would be a pardonable hyperbole to call our present ones wash-hand basins) contracted for, and, in short, preparations are making for another war of twenty years' duration, and twenty times the intensity of the last. In sight of these preparations, counselled by prudence, and sanctioned by public opinion, all faith in the golden age vanished, or sought refuge in the bosom of the "Universal peace preservation society."

But it is natural to man to hug some fond delusion. We assured ourselves that in our days ample warning would always be given before the sword was drawn, and that, though steam had made harbours of refuge for our merchantships, fortifications for our seaports, and some

Slips are the places on which ships are built.

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land forces in case of reverse necessary, we might indefinitely postpone such matters. Yet the different events which nearly led to war lately came upon us suddenly enough, and might, I apprehend, have come in a shape admitting of no pacific adjustment.

In the case of M'Leod, for instance, a man whose existence was unknown in England until it was found to be in jeopardy in the hands of the notorious Judge Lynch, the question of peace or war might have been decided by a lawless mob upon the pot-house boasting of an obscure Canadian.

In the more recent case of the Tahiti affair circumstances as little under the control of government as the winds themselves very nearly embroiled us in a deadly war. A living missionary may be compensated, but what if his life had been taken in prison by the French officer who threatened it? Nothing short of the trial (and execution if found guilty) of the offender would have satisfied the justice of the case, or the indignation of England. Would such justice have been done?

Both these events came upon us quite suddenly, though, fortunately, without the circumstances which might have made an irremediable casus belli. They were, however, "very