dented peace-time measure of our neighbours. It is only as augmenting the power of France to equip her fleets speedily, that I have here introduced the subject, and in this point of view it must be regarded as conferring a power never accorded by a British parliament except on the eve of war.

From what has been written above, in elucidation of the footing upon which the peace establishments of England and France are at present placed, I think it may be inferred, that French writers are correct in supposing that within certain limits, as to number, a French fleet would be at sea before an English one. If so, then, of three grounds upon which Frenchmen trust as to future success at sea, two may be granted them.

1st. France (who is most likely to verify her own expectation) may reckon upon the sudden and opportune termination of peace, some day or other, as a sufficiently probable event.

2d. She may, with some degree of probability, reckon upon the comparative ease with which she would man her fleet; for without granting it, in a sense reflecting blame on any one, yet as a fact, we may allow that England, "relying on her vast resources, has neglected to organise them."

53

CHAP. V.

EN

THE THIRD AND LAST GROUND OF THE CONFIDENCE TERTAINED BY FRANCE IN THE FUTURE OF HER NAVY.

We now come to the last French position, and that which will in England, generally, be received with more than mere denial, with something approaching to contempt-THAT THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE FRENCH NAVY IN DISCIPLINE, SKILL, AND GUNNERY, WILL GIVE THEM AN ADVANTAGE OVER US IN FUTURE COMBATS.

It is proper here to quote French authority for their own belief; and although there is dif ficulty in selecting in so great a number of witnesses, I shall give the preference to his R. H. the Prince de Joinville, not on account of his rank alone, but on account of the moderation of his opinions, unaccompanied by the monstrous perversion of past history which deprives French writers of any weight in England. His R. H. incidentally, and in the course of an argument, not meant to exalt his own profession, says, "We had at that moment the advantage over the British squadron in organisation and in

* In 1840.

*

numbers. Our sailors, commanded by an able and active chief, were well exercised, and all promised a victory. I do not here rely on my own recollection, but upon that of one of the most skilful officers in the British navy.

Here, in common with all French writers, and, we must suppose, in common with the minister of the day, whose instructions rendered a collision probable, the prince takes the defeat of the English fleet as certain; a certainty arising partly from their superior numbers, and in part from superior organisation. But the prince, addressing himself to a public most willing to take the prowess of their countrymen for granted, is content to express his own opinion. He neither supports it by history travestied, nor by boasts: not so, however, his opponents. A French writer of a pamphlet, in answer to the prince, goes much farther; he assumes not only the first victory in the quasi war of 1840, but a repetition of such result every time the English ventured to try their fortune. "It was upon seeing the gunners trained by Admiral Lalande that we perceived, for the first time, all the advantage which the French navy would derive from the incontestable

* Prince de Joinville, "Sur l'Etat," &c. &c. Fr. edition,

p. 9.

superiority of her artillery. The guns would have gone off of themselves in 1840, said M. Arago. We may add, that they would have kept up a running fire, before which all must have succumbed. The captains of guns in the flagship had attained to such a pitch of perfection, as to fire in two minutes and a half, or three minutes at the most, the six* prescribed rounds with shot, and to strike a target representing a line-of-battle ship, two hundred and sixty times at two or three cables' length. There was not a shot that would not have told. The other gunners were also very expert. We may judge from the notes of Vice Admiral Missiessy on the naval gunnery of the emperor's time, that they were at least equal, if not superior, to the gunners of the Redoubtable' seventy-four, who at Trafalgar, as we know (?), so completely subdued the fire of the hundred-and-twenty gun ship bearing Nelson's flag, that the batteries were for a time deserted. It would not have been the fault of the gunners trained in our school-frigates, and brought to perfection by Admiral Lalande, if this feat had not been repeated on a large scale in 1840; and it would have been so repeated

เ

*This implies a larger allowance of exercising ammunition than our service affords.

every time the English squadron thought fit to try. For if England be the country of good sailors, France alone can produce men capable of using ordnance properly, and pointing it in the twinkling of an eye."*

Here again we find a French writer upsetting his own argument by boasts which, if well founded, would make history a succession of miracles. It must not, however, be supposed that the whole of M. L'Espinasse's pamphlet is in this strain: it is, generally speaking, well written, and, except a soreness in speaking of English victories, which betrays him into folly, is well worth reading. If his confidence in future success betrays vanity, yet it is a vanity pervading the whole French nation; a vanity which, however we may smile, does not all evaporate in abuse and gasconade, but produces, inter alia, the palpable result of an extraordinary vote of four millions, and, which the day we least expect it ; but that

is in the womb of time.

It is surely then worth our while to trace the origin and history of this belief, all vain: though it may be, and assuming, as we safely may, that it has not its origin in history, as acted:

"Considerations sur les Vaisseaux et les Vapeurs, par le M. L'Espinasse," November, 1844.