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meaning in the sense now explained. However, the Arians might have known that the eternal existence of the Aoyos was universally taught, and even by those who asserted a temporal generation. Nor indeed were they ignorant of it; but they contrived, for a salvo, to maintain, that the Aóyos, or Word, which was held to be eternal, was not the same with the Aóyos, or Word, begotten; the former being only the Father's own proper Word, and no substantial thing; the latter a created substance, directly contrary to all antiquity, which has nothing to countenance any such notion of a twofold Móyos. Upon this it became necessary to explain in what sense any temporal generation had been asserted; and to keep up the true Catholic doctrine, which had obtained from the beginning; namely, of the eternal Aóyos distinct from the Father; Son of the Father, as partaking of the same divine substance from all eternity; going out from the Father to create the world; and, lastly, condescending to become man: Son, in all these respects, but primarily and chiefly in respect of the first. From the whole we may remark, that an explicit profession of eternal generation might have been dispensed with; provided only that the eternal existence of the Aoyos, as a real subsisting person, in, and of m the Father, which comes to the same thing, might be secured. This was the point; and this was all. In this all sound Catholics agreed; and to dispute it was accounted heresy and blasphemy. If any one, disliking the name or the phrase of eternal generation, thinks it better to assert an eternal Word, instead of an eternal Son, (meaning thereby a distinct person, and consubstantial with God, whose Word he is,) and refers

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* See Bull. Def. F. p. 198. Athan. Orat. ii. p. 507.

This is well expressed by the Antiochian Fathers, against Paul of Samosata; and by Clement of Alexandria; Τοῦτον πιςεύομεν σὺν τῷ πατρὶ ἀεὶ ὄντα, ἐκπεπληρωκέναι τὸ πατρικὸν βάλημα, πρὸς τὴν κτίσιν τῶν ὅλων. Labb. Conc. tom. i. p. 845. Τέκνον αὐτῷ γνήσιον, καὶ κληρονόμον, ὥσπερ ἐπί τινα ξενιτείαν ἐνταῦθα περ πόμενον, ὑπὸ μεγάλης οἰκονομίας, καὶ ἀναλογίας τῷ πατρὶς, δι' οὗ καὶ τὰ φανερὰ καὶ τὰ à‡avñ rõ xóoμu didnμıúgynrai. Clem. Alex. Quis Div. p. 955. Ox.

m Vid. Athan. vol. i. p. 222, 619, 628.

the generation to his first and last manifestation, at the creation and incarnation; there seems to be no farther harm in it, than what lies in the words, and their liableness to be misconstrued, or to give offence. Here therefore every man is left to his own discretion and prudence: only the safer way seems to be, to follow the most general and most approved manner of expression, together with the ancient faith; being, in all probability, the surest means to preserve both. I designedly said, first and last, not first or last. For such as interpret the generation of the last only, stand, I think, " clearly condemned by Scripture; many places whereof can never fairly be accounted for by the miraculous conception solely: besides that from Barnabas and Clemens Romanus, down to the Council of Nice, all the Christian writers speak unanimously of a higher, antecedent sonship; and, generally, even found worship upon it.

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I shall just observe to you, in the close of this article, that, from what hath been said, you may know what judgment to make of an assertion of Dr. Clarke's, viz. "That the learnedest of the most orthodox Fathers, who "asserted the eternal generation of the Son, did yet never"theless assert it to be an act of the Father's eternal power and will." By which the Doctor seems to insinuate, that the good Fathers did not understand eternal in the strict sense. If the learned Doctor can show, that those who maintained only the voluntary and temporary procession of the Son, believed that the Aóyos was eternally preexisting in the Father, by an act of his will; or that those who expressly asserted an eternal generation, believed also that it was an arbitrary thing, and might

■ Sane in ista ex Maria Virgine nativitate, suprema et singularis iǹ atque excellentia filiationis Domini nostri adeo non consistit, ut ea ipsa nativitas ad ejus stupendam ovyxarátur omnino referenda sit. Hoc nos satis aperte docent, si modo a Spiritu Sancto edoceri velimus, multis in locis, S. literæ. -Ita semper credidit inde ab ipsis Apostolis Catholica Christi Ecclesia. Bull. J. p. 39. See also Dr. Fiddes, vol. i. b. iv. ch. 2.

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Script. Doctr. p. 280. alias 247.

have been otherwise, (which I suppose is the Doctor's sense of an "act of the will,") then he will do something. But as none of his authorities prove any thing like it, it would have been a prudent part, at least, not to have produced them to so little purpose. But enough of this matter: I have, I hope, sufficiently explained myself upon this head; and have therefore the more reason to expect a distinct answer from you, whenever you think proper to reconsider this subject.

QUERY IX.

Whether the divine attributes, Omniscience, Ubiquity, &c. those individual attributes, can be communicated without the divine essence, from which they are inseparable?

THE intent of this Query was to prevent equivocations, and to make the next clearer. You agree with me, that the individual divine attributes cannot be communicated without the individual nature in which they subsist. You add, that "Dr.. Clarke, in the 230th page of "his Replies, hath plainly shown, that individual attri"butes, divine or not divine, cannot possibly be commu"nicated at all." Well then; we know what the Doctor means by "all divine powers," in his Scripture Doctrine, (p. 298.) which is one point gained: for when words are stripped of their ambiguity, we may be able to deal the better with them. As to the Doctor's aphorism laid down, (p. 230.) I may have leave to doubt of it; notwithstanding that it is set forth to us with the utmost assurance. It is not unusual with the Doctor to lay down maxims, in relation to this controversy, which himself would not allow at another time, or in another subject. For instance; "a necessary agents are no causes,"

Whatever proceeds from any being, otherwise than by the will of that being, doth not in truth proceed from that being; but from some other cause or necessity extrinsic and independent of that being. Necessary agents are no causes, but always instruments only in the hand of some other power, Reply, page 227. Compare p. 113.

that is, they do not so properly act, as are acted upon. This is very true of all finite necessary agents; for all their necessary or natural acts proceed not so properly from them, as from God the author of their natures. But does it therefore follow, that if God acts by a necessity of nature in some instances, he is therein acted upon likewise? or that all the acts of the divine nature are voluntary and free; none natural and necessary? This should not be said by one who, elsewhere, speaks so much of God's being "infinitely wise," and "infinitely good, "infinitely happy," &c. by an "absolute necessity of "nature;" unless he could be certain that knowing, loving, contemplating, and enjoying himself, do not imply perpetual acting, or that an infinitely active being can ever cease to act. I shall not scruple to assert, that by the same absolute necessity of nature that the Father exists, he exists as a Father; and coexists with his coessential Son proceeding from him. If you say, this supposes the Son self-existent, or unoriginate; I desire it may not be said only, but proved. b In the interim, I take leave to suppose, that unbegotten and begotten, unoriginate and proceeding, are different ideas. Again, (p. 228.) he finds fault with "the author of some "Considerations," for supposing that "the Son is some"thing more than a mere name, and yet not a real dis"tinct being:" and upon this lays down another aphorism; that there is no medium between a being, and not a being: which indeed is a very true one, if being, and being, are taken in the same sense, but not otherwise. For let me mention almost a parallel case. parallel case. Upon the Doctor's hypothesis, that God's substance is extended every where;

• Οὔτε δύο ἀγέννητοι, οὔτε δύο μονογενεῖς, ἀλλ' εἷς ἐςι πατὴρ ἀγέννητος (ἀγέννητος γάρ ἐσιν ὁ πατέρα μὴ ἔχων) καὶ εἷς ἐσι υἱὸς, ἀϊδίως ἐκ πατρὸς γεγεννημένος. Cyril. Catech. x. p. 141. Ox.

To avoid this consequence, he is forced to suppose (p. 29.) that the Son is something more than a mere name, and yet not a real distinct being; that is to say, that he is something between a being, and not a being. Cl. Reply, p. 223.

and that the same is the substratum of space; we may imagine two substrata, one pervading the sun, and the other the moon, which are both distinct and distant. Will you please to tell us, whether these two are real distinct beings, or no? If they are, you may leave it to others to prove them intelligent beings, that is, persons: and, perhaps, the very next consequence will make them two Gods, upon the Doctor's own principles. If they are not real distinct beings, then here is something admitted "between a being and not a being;" contrary to the Doctor's maxim: unless he makes them nothing; and supposes two spaces, without any substratum at all; two extensions, without any thing extended.

But let us consider, whether something may not be thought on, to help both the learned Doctor and us out of these difficulties. The truth of this matter, so far as I apprehend, is, that being may signify, either simply what exists, or what exists separately. This distinction seems to be just and necessary; and such as you will the more readily come into, having occasion for it, as well as we. I hope none are so weak, as to deny the Persons to exist in reality. The very schoolmen themselves never scruple to call them tres res, tres entes, or the like, in that sense; though at the same time, in the other sense of being, they are all but one being, una summa res, and una res numero; which comes much to the same with Tertullian's una (indivisa) substantia in tribus cohærentibus, (only setting aside his particular manner of explication,) and is the sense of all antiquity. Upon the foot of this distinction, you may readily apprehend those words of Gregory Nazianzen, spoken of the three Persons. Zwas καὶ ζωὴν, φῶτα καὶ φῶς, ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν, δόξας καὶ δόξαν Θεὸν ἕκασον, ἂν θεωρῆται μόνον, τοῦ νοῦ χωρίζοντος τὰ ἀχώριςα 4. By the same distinction, you may probably understand a very noted Creed, which seems to have cost the learned.

d Orat. xiii. p. 211. Paris. ed.

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