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difference between one person and another, one time of life and another, one sex and another, affect the question. For in all cases it is one and the same thing, which makes the conduct virtuous,1 and in all persons the same natural capacity for virtue must be assumed to exist.2 The main point then invariably is to cultivate this disposition by education. Some may bring with them more, others fewer gifts for any particular activity; yet all alike require exercise and training; the most talented require it most, would they not be lost in ruinous errors.3 There being no greater obstacle to true knowledge than imaginary knowledge, nothing can in a moral point of view be more urgently necessary than self-knowledge, to dispel the unfounded semblance of knowledge and to show to man his wants and needs. Right action according to Socratic principles invariably follows upon knowledge, just as wrong action follows from absence of

1 Plato, Meno, 71, D., and Aristotle, Pol. i. 13, probably, following the passage in Plato, 1216, a, 20, which he must in some way have harmonised with the Socratic teaching: ὥστε φανερὸν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικός καὶ ἀνδρὸς, οὐδ ̓ ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης . πολὺ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετάς.

2 Xen. Sym. 2, 9: kai 8 Zwκράτης εἶπεν· ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ ἄλλοις δῆλον, καὶ ἐν οἷς δ ̓ ἡ παῖς ποεῖ, ὅτι ἡ γυνακεία φύσις οὐδὲν χείρων τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὖσα τυγχάνει, ῥώμης δὲ καὶ ἰσχύος

L

deîtal. Conf. Plato, Rep. v.
452, E.

3 Mem. iii. 9, 1; iv. 1, 3;
iv. 2, 2. The question whether
virtue is a natural gift or a
result of instruction-the iden-
tical question to which Plato
devoted a thorough discussion
in the Meno and Protagoras-
appears to have become a fa-
vourite topic of discussion,
thanks to the appearance of
the Sophistic teachers of virtue.
Such at least it seems in Xeno-
phon, iii. 9, 1, and in the Meno.
Pindar had previously drawn
the contrast between natural
and acquired gifts. See above,
p. 23.

СНАР.

VII.

CHAP.

VII.

knowledge; he who knows himself will, without fail, do what is healthful, just as he who is ignorant of himself will, without fail, do what is harmful.1 Only the man of knowledge can do anything fitting; he alone is useful and esteemed.2 In short, knowledge is the root of all moral action; want of knowledge is the cause of every vice; and were it possible wittingly to do wrong, that were better than doing wrong unwittingly; for in the latter case the first condition of right action, the moral sentiment, is wanting, whilst in the former case it would be there, the doer being only faithless to it for the moment.3 What, however, the know

1 Mem. iv. 2, 24. For examples of conversations, in which Socrates endeavoured to bring his friends to a knowledge of themselves, see Mem. iii. 6; iv. 2.

2 Mem. i. 2, 52: the accuser charged Socrates with inducing his followers to despise their friends and relations; for he had declared, those only deserve to be honoured who can make themselves useful by means of their knowledge. Xenophon allows that he showed how little useless and ignorant people were esteemed by their own friends and relatives; but he says that Socrates did not thereby intend to teach them to despise dependants, but only to show that understand ing must be aimed at, or Tò ἄφρον ἄτιμόν ἐστι.

Mem. iv. 2, 19: Tŵv dè on τοὺς φίλους ἐξαπατώντων ἐπὶ βλάβῃ πότερος ἀδικώτερος ἐστιν, ὁ ἑκών,

aкwv; The question is afterwards thus settled: Tà Sikata

πÓTEρOV 8 Éкv Yevdóμevos kai
ἐξαπατῶν οἶδεν, ἢ ὁ ἄκων; Δῆλον
ὅτι ὁ ἑκών. Δικαιότερον δὲ [φῂς
εἶναι] τὸν ἐπιστάμενον τὰ δίκαια
τοῦ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον ; Φαίνομαι.
Conf. Plato, Rep. ii. 382; iii.
389, B.; iv. 459, C.; vii. 535,
It is
E.; Hipp. Min. 371, E.
only an imaginary case to sup-
pose that any one can know-
ingly and intentionally do
what is wrong; for according
to the principles of Socrates,
it is impossible to conceive
that the man who possesses
knowledge as such should, by
virtue of his knowledge, do
anything but what is right, or
that any one should spontane-
ously choose what is wrong.
untruth is
If, therefore, an
told knowingly and intention-
ally, it can only be an apparent
and seeming untruth, which
Plato allows as a means to
higher ends (Rep. ii. 382; iii.
389, B.; iv. 459, C.), whereas
want of knowledge is the only
proper lie, a proper lie being

ledge is in which virtue consists, whether experimental or speculative, purely theoretical or practical-is a question upon which Socrates has not entered. In Xenophon at least he places learning and exercise quite naturally together,' although Plato had distinguished them,2 and to prove that virtue consists in knowledge, that it requires knowledge, and can be acquired by instruction, he chooses by preference, even in the pages of Plato, examples of practical acquirements and of mechanical dexterity.3

СНАР.

VII.

monism.
(1) Virtue

As yet, however, all that has been laid down is in C. The Good and the nature of a formal definition. All virtue is knowEudaledge, but of what is it the knowledge? To this Socrates gives the general answer, knowledge of the good. He is virtuous, just, brave, and so forth, who knows what is good and right. Even this addition is as wide and indefinite as those before. Knowledge which

always unintentional, Rep. ii. 382; v. 535, E. See Zeller's Phil. Stud. p. 152.

1 At the beginning of the Meno.

2 Mem. iii. 9, 1, Socrates answers the question whether bravery is a διδακτὸν οι φυσικόν : the disposition thereto is quite as various as is bodily power. νομίζω μέντοι πᾶσαν φύσιν μαθήσει Kai μeλéτη πрòs àvdpíav av¿eσlai, in proof of which it may be noted that no nation with weapons to which it is unaccustomed ventures to encounter those who are familiar with them. So, too, in everything else, it is the muéλeia, the μανθάνειν καὶ μελετᾶν, where

by natural gifts are really de-
veloped to mastery. In Mem.
iv. 1, 3, μάθησις and παίδεια are
generally required, but even
here no difference is made be-
tween theoretical and practical
knowledge.

3 So Protag. 349, E.; Mem.
iii. 9, 1 and 11: aрxovтes are
those moráμevoι apxew, the
steersman in a ship, in agricul-
ture, sickness, and athletics,
those who have made it their
profession, women in spinning.
The question here raised is dis-
cussed at length by Strümpell,
Gesch. d. Prakt. Phil. d. Gr. vor
Arist. 146.

4 See p. 143.

dctermi

ned theoretically.

CHAP.

VII.

(2) Practically the Good is determined cither by custom or utility.

makes virtue, is knowledge of the good; but what is the good? The good is the conception of a thing viewed as an end. Doing what is good, is acting up to the conception of the corresponding action, in short, knowledge in its practical application. The essence of moral action is therefore not explained by the general definition, that it is a knowledge of the good, the right, and so forth. Beyond this general definition, however, Socrates did not advance in his philosophy. Just as his speculative philosophy stopped short with the general requirement that knowledge belonged to conceptions only, so his practical philosophy stopped short with the indefinite postulate of conduct conformable to conceptions. From such a theory it is impossible to deduce definite moral actions. If such are sought no other alternative remains but to look for them in some other way, either by adopting the necessary principles from the prevailing morality without further testing them; or, in as far as principles according to the theory of knowledge must be vindicated before thought, by a reference to experience and to the well-known consequences of actions.

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As a matter of fact both courses were followed by Socrates. On the one hand he explained the conception of the right by that of the lawful.' The

1 Mem. iv. 6, 6: Δίκαια δὲ οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὁποῖα καλεῖται;—"Α οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσιν, ἔφη. Οἱ ἄρα ποιοῦντες ἃ οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσι δίκαιά τε ποιοῦσι καὶ ἃ δεῖ; Πῶς yàp oỡ; In Mem. iv. 4, 12, Socrates says: φημὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τὸ

νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι, and when Hippias asks for further information as to what is meant by νόμιμον: νόμους δὲ πόλεως, ἔφη, γιγνώσκεις;—Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη [οcrates], vóμiuos μèv àv ein d kaTà ταῦτα [ἃ οἱ πολίται ἐγράψαντο] που

2

1

best service of God, he says, is that which agrees with custom; and he will not withdraw himself even from an unjust sentence, lest he should violate the laws. On the other hand, as a necessary consequence of this view of things, he could not be content with existing moral sanctions, but was fain to seek an intellectual basis for morality. This he could only take from a consideration of consequences; and in so doing he frequently proceeds most superficially, deriving his ethical principles by a line of argument, which taken by itself differs in results more than in principles, from the moral philosophy of the Sophists.3 When asked whether there could be a good, which is not good for a definite purpose, he distinctly stated that he neither knew, nor desired to know of such a one : 4 everything is good and beau

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only refusing to allow us to
speak of Sophistic morals as if
they were uniform.

4 Mem. iii. 8, 1-7, where it is
said, amongst other things:
εἴ γ' ἐρωτᾷς με, εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν οἶδα,
ὃ μηδενὸς ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οὔτ ̓ οἶδα,
ἔφη, οὔτε δέομαι Λέγεις σὺ,
ἔφη [Αρίστιππος] καλά τε καὶ
αἰσχρὰ τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι; καὶ νὴ Δί'
ἔγωγ ̓, ἔφη [Σωκράτης] ἀγαθά τε
καὶ κακά .

meaning, as the sequel shows (not as Ribbing, 1. c. p. 105, translates it: good and evil are the same), but the same thing is good and evil, in as far as for one purpose it is useful, that is good, and for another harmful; πάντα yàp ȧyalà μèv kal kaλá čOTI, πρὸς ἃ ἂν εὖ ἔχῃ, κακὰ δὲ καὶ αἰσχρὰ, πρὸς ἃ ἂν κακῶς.

CHAP.

VII.

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