СНАР. VII. tiful in relation to the special needs which it subserves, and therefore one and the same thing may be good for one and bad for another. He declared in a manner most pronounced, that the good is nothing else but the advantageous, the beautiful nothing else but the useful; everything therefore is good and beautiful in relation to the objects for which it is. advantageous and useful; confirming his doctrine of the involuntary nature of evil-one of the leading principles of his ethics-by the remark that everyone does that which he thinks advantageous for himself.2 There is, therefore, according to his view no absolute, but only a relative good; advantage and disad-vantage are the measures of good and evil.3 Hence in the dialogues of Xenophon he almost always bases his moral precepts on the motive of utility. We should aim at abstinence, because the abstinent man has a more pleasant life than the incontinent: 4 we should inure ouselves to hardships, because the hardy man is more healthy, and because he can more easily avoid dangers, and gain honour and glory: 5 we 1 Xen. Mem. iv. 6, 8, concluding: τὸ ἄρα ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὅτῳ ἂν ὠφέλιμον ᾖ . τὸ χρήσιμον ἄρα καλόν ἐστι πρὸς ὃ av xphoμov; conf. iv. 1, 5; 5, 6; Symp. 5, 3; Plato, Prot. 333, D.; 353, C., where Socrates meets Protagoras with the statement: ταῦτ ̓ σTiv ἀγαθὰ ἃ ἐστιν ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώTOLS, and afterwards explains good to be that which affords pleasure or averts pain. 2 Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 4: some thing similar is found in Plato's Protagoras, 358, Β. 3 On the other hand, little importance can be attached to the treatment of happiness as the highest end of life in Mem. iii. 2, 4. All Greek philosophers do the same, including Plato, Aristotle, and even the Stoics. 4 Mem. i. 5, 6; ii. 1, 1; conf. iv. 5, 9. 5 Mem. iii. 12; ii. 1, 18; conf. i. 6. 1 4 should be modest, because boasting does harm and brings disgrace. We should be on good terms with our relatives, because it is absurd to use for harm what has been given us for our good; 2 we should try to secure good friends, since a good friend is the most useful possession: 3 we should not withdraw from public affairs, since the well-being of the community is the well-being of the individual; * we should obey the laws, since obedience is productive of the greatest good to ourselves and to the state; and we should abstain from wrong, since wrong is always punished in the end.5 We should live virtuously, because virtue carries off the greatest rewards both from God and man. To argue that all such-like expressions do not contain the personal conviction of the philosopher, but are intended to bring those to virtue by meeting them on their own ground, who cannot be got at by higher motives, is evidently laboured, considering the definiteness with which Socrates expresses himself. Unless, therefore, Xenophon is misleading on essential points, we must allow that Socrates was in earnest in explaining the good as the useful, and consequently in the corresponding derivation of moral duties. 6 True it is that in the mouth of Socrates other utterances are met with, leading us beyond this super 10. 1 Mem. i. 7. 2 Ibid. ii. 3, 19. CHAP. VII. (3) In consis tency of Socratic 6 Mem. ii. i, 27, gives an ex- Morality. tract from a writing of Pro 3 Ibid. ii. 4, 5; ii. 6, 4 and dicus, the substance of which Socrates appropriates. Conf. i. CHAP. ficial ground of moral duties, by placing the essential advantage of virtue, the purpose which it serves and because of which it is good and beautiful in its influence on the intellectual life of man.1 Most undoubtedly and decidedly would this be the view of Socrates could we attribute to him the maxim so familiar to the Socrates of Plato,2 that righteousness is health, unrighteousness disease of the soul, and consequently that all wrong-doing invariably injures him who does it, whereas the right is necessarily and always useful. Language of this kind occurring in the Republic and Gorgias does not justify our believing it. In these dialogues much is put into the mouth of Socrates, which he never said and never can have said. Nor can it be pleaded that Plato would never have held such pure moral conceptions, unless he had had them from his teacher. Otherwise the theory of ideas and much besides which is found in Plato would have to be attributed to Socrates. We cannot even vouch for it that everything contained in the Crito comes from Socrates, its author not having been present at the conversation which it describes. Having apparently, however, been committed to writing no long time after the death of Socrates, and not going beyond his point of view, it is noteworthy that this dialogue contains the same principles: 3 a 1 On what follows compare Ribbing, p. 83, 91, 105, whose researches are here thankfully acknowledged, whilst all his conclusions are not accepted. 2 See Zeller's Phil. d. Griech. p. 561 of second edition. 3 Crito 47, D: as in the treatment of the body, the physician's advice must be followed, so in questions of right and wrong the advice of him & ei μn åкoλovehooμev, διαφθεροῦμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησό circumstance which at least shows that they have a support in the teaching of Socrates. To the same effect likewise the Apology expresses itself, Socrates therein summing up the purpose of his life as that of convincing his fellow-citizens that the education of the soul is more important than money or property, honour or glory;1 declaring at the same time in plainest terms, that whether death is an ill or not he knows not, but that injustice is, he knows well.2 Similar language is found in Xenophon. In his pages too Socrates declares the soul to be the most valuable thing in man, the divine part of his being, because it is the seat of reason and only the Reasonable is of value.3 He requires, therefore, that the first care should be for the soul.1 He is convinced μεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. If, moreover, life in a diseased body has no value : μετ' ἐκείνου ἄρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν διεφθαρμένου, ᾧ τὸ ἄδικον λωβᾶται τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὀνίνησιν, provided this is not a φαυλότερον but a πολὺ τιμιώτερον than that 49, Α: wrong doing always injures and disgraces him who commits it. 1 Apol. 29, D.: as long as he lived, he would not cease φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενος λέγων οἷάπερ εἴωθα, ὅτι, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις ; he would rather blame a man in every case where it was necessary ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ 3 Mem. i. 4, 13: God has not only taken care of the human body, ἀλλ' ὅπερ μέγιστόν ἐστι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κρατίστην τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνέφυσε, i. 2, 53 and 55, where the statement ὅτι τὸ ἄφρον ἄτιμόν ἐστι· is proved by the fact that you bury the body as soon as the soul ἐν ᾗ μόνῃ γίνεται φρόνησις has left it, iv. 3, 14: ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχὴ, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων τοῦ θείου μετέχει. 4 Mem. i. 2, 4: Socrates recommends bodily exercise within certain limits : ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἕξιν ὑγιεινήν τε ἱκανῶς εἶναι καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν (which accordingly regulates the care of the body) οὐκ ἐμποδίζειν ἔφη. CHAP. VII. CHAP. 2 that conduct is better, the more you aim at the education of the soul, and more enjoyable, the more you are conscious thereof.1 The intellectual perfection of man depending in the first place on his knowledge, wisdom is the highest good, without compare more valuable than ought besides. Learning is recommended not only on account of its utility, but far more because of the enjoyment which it directly confers.3 These expressions fully agree with what has been quoted from Plato; they also appear quite consistent in a philosopher who bases the whole of moral conduct so decidedly upon knowledge, and so expressly leads man to knowledge of and to dealing with self, as Socrates does.4 What then must be made of accounts in which Socrates recommends moral duties entirely on grounds of outward adaptation to a purpose, such as we frequently find in Xenophon? Are we to assume that all such explanations are only intended for those who were too unripe to understand the sage's real meaning, to show that even on the hypothesis of the ordinary unsatisfactory definition of purpose, virtuous 1 Mem. iv. 8, 6: ǎpiota μèv γὰρ οἶμαι ζῇν τοὺς ἄριστα ἐπιμελουμένους τοῦ ὡς βελτίστους γίγνεσθαι, ἥδιστα δὲ τοὺς μάλιστα αἰσθανομένους, ὅτι βελτίους γίγνονται. i. 6, 9: οἴει οὖν ἀπὸ πάντων τούτων τοσαύτην ἡδονὴν εἶναι, ὅσην ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτόν τε ἡγεῖσθαι βελτίω γίγνεσθαι καὶ φίλους ἀμείνους κτᾶσθαι; 2 Mem. iv. 5, 6: σοφίαν δὲ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν κ. τ. λ. ; iv. 2, 9, where Euthydemus is com mended by Socrates for preferring treasures of wisdom to treasures of gold and silver ; for the latter do not make men better, τὰς δὲ τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν γνώμας ἀρετῇ πλουτίζειν τοὺς κεκτημένους. * Mem. iv. 5, 10: ἀλλὰ μὴν· ἀπὸ τοῦ μαθεῖν τι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν . οὐ μόνον ὠφέλειαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡδοναὶ μέγισται γίγνονConf. ii. 1. 19. ται. + Conf. pp. 65, 121, 140. |