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dence nor am under his inspection, I have no relation to such a Being, nor can he exercise any controul over me. Indeed, neither of these Beings can have any cognizance of the other, or at all influence each other's condition. For, because each is self-sufficient, he cannot therefore acquire any greater perfection by any nearness to, or distance from the other, or lose any thing of his perfection: otherwise he would not be self-sufficient. Therefore, though it be highly gratifying to an inquirer after truth to be able clearly to demonstrate an independent Being to be only one; yet if it should happen that it cannot be clearly demonstrated, nothing seems to be thence detracted from the necessity and perfection of religion, because it is only one Being upon whom I depend. Such was the substance of that eminent person's discourse, so far as I understood him.

I have not examined the train of argument in your Essay of Human Understanding, though I doubt not but you have proved that there is some Being on whom we depend, and that such a Being is eternal and selfsufficient. The argument to prove this is clear and convincing. But I know not whether you could thus prove that you depend on one Being alone, and could not depend upon more. The argument of that eminent person, indeed, implies that I depend on an eternal Being, but I have not yet seen it proved by him that I depend on one Being alone; which only respects the first proposition. For in the second, it is laid down that besides that eternal Being on whom I depend, no other Being can be eternal. So that here it seems, probably, to be understood, that I depend on one Being alone, yet I have not found that distinctly proved, which is, how ever, necessary to be done before we proceed to the evidence of the second proposition. It is also to be examined whether, indeed, reason permit the supposition of eternal and self-sufficient matter, for if a Being can be self-sufficient and eternal, such an one must be every way perfect; whence it follows, that matter, which is an inert substance, destitute of all life and motion, cannot possibly be understood to be eternal and self-suffi

cient.

That eminent person desired that I would inform you distinctly what kind of proofs he desires. He ex pressly directed me to send you his best respects. He thanks you for the pains you have taken to gratify him; and regrets the afflicted state of your health; and if it should ill allow you to indulge profound speculations, he requests that you will not expose yourself to the fatigue of studies, burdensome in your state of ill health, or unfavourable to your recovery. In the mean time, he ardently wishes for you a firm and vigorous health; and that, should that permit, you will greatly oblige him by sending your opinion of the second proposition as now stated by me, according to his views of the subject. You will judge for yourself concerning his method, and what to answer. I only add, that when I read your letter to him he did not require a copy, but acquiesced in the terms which you had proposed. Had he made such a request I should have politely refused. But he had too much kindness thus to give me pain.

It is quite time to leave off. well, most worthy friend.

Fare

Yours affectionately,
P. à LIMBORCH.

No. 41.

John Locke to Philip à Limborch. (Lettre de M. Locke à M. Limborch.)

SIR,

Oates, May 21, 1698.

THOUGH my health will not allow me easily to indulge my desire to execute the orders of that great man who so favourably accepted my re flections, inconsiderable as they were, it is however certain that I could not sacrifice it on a worthier occasion than in pursuing the subject to which he calls my attention, and thus shewing my inclination to obey him. Yet this engagement will scarcely demand such a sacrifice, for if I do not hazard my reputation in his opinion, I am satisfied that my health will not suffer by this correspondence. Having to do with one who reasons so clearly, and so fully comprehends the subject, I shall have no occasion to say much, to be understood. His great penetration will enable him at once to perceive how my arguments are sup

ported; so that, without engaging myself in long deductions, he will easily perceive whether they are well or illfounded.

I cannot help remarking his exact judgment in the orderly arrangement of his propositions, and it is true, as he well observes, that in putting the third in the place of the second, divines, philosophers, and even Descartes himself, assume the Unity of God instead of proving it.

If, when the question was first proposed to me, I had comprehended, as I now do, the intention of that learned person, I should not have offered him the reply which I sent you, but one more concise and better suited to the order of nature and reason; each article appearing in its proper place.

I think that whoever turns his thoughts upon himself, must assuredly know, without being able to hesitate, that there has been, from all eternity, an intelligent Being. I also believe, that it is evident to every reflecting person that there is also an infinite Being. But I say, that as there must be an infinite Being, so that infinite Being must be eternal, because that which is infinite, must have been infinite from all eternity, for any additions made in time, could not render any thing infinite, if it were not, so in itself, and of itself, from all eternity; such being the nature of infinite, that nothing can be added to, or taken from it. Whence it follows, that infinite cannot be distributed into more than one, and must remain in one alone.

This, in my judgment, is a proof à priori, that the eternal, independent Being is only one, and if we add the idea of all possible perfections, we have then the idea of a God eternal, infinite, omniscient and omnipotent, &c.

• If this reasoning should accord with the opinion of the excellent person who will examine it, I shall be very much gratified. And if it should not appear to him satisfactory, I shall esteem it a great favour if he will communicate to me his mode of argument, which I will either conceal or divulge as he may choose. Pray assure him of my profound respect. I am, &c. J. LOCKE.

No. 42.

Philip à Limborch to John Locke.
Amsterdam, Cal. Jul. 1698.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

But

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YOUR last letter I communicated to that eminent person, who is much obliged by your exertions, in compliance with his request, though he does not fully acquiesce in your mode of reasoning. His own method is to prove, in the first place, that there must be some Being self-existent and self-sufficient; then that such a Being is only one; and in the third place, that such a Being contains in himself all perfections, and is, therefore, God. you, in your train of argument, presume, as evident to every man of serious consideration, that there must be an infinite Being, as to whom, nothing can be added or taken away. This appears to him the same as to take for granted that there is an allperfect Being, which is the third position of his Thesis. And thus, by anticipating this third part of his Thesis, you prove the second. Yet the second should rather have been first proved, from whence the third might then have been concluded. For this reason I submitted to your consideration, whether his order might not be advantageously changed, and then his third would become his second proposition. But as the reasoning proceeded in the other order, the proposition ought not to have been presumed, but rather proved from the first proposition. Or, adopting his method, it ought first, from the acknowledged existence of an eternal and self-sufficient Being, to be proved that he is one; and then from this proof it might be deduced that such a Being must be infinite or all-perfect.

He has not yet communicated to me his method, and I very much doubt whether he will. His scruples are the same as yours. He fears the severe censures of the divines who set a black mark on whatever does not proceed from their own school, and allow themselves to traduce it as the vilest heresy. I will try, however, whether, in a longer conversation which he has promised to afford me, may not discover something, which I will endeavour to send you. Farewell, my most worthy friend. Yours affectionately,

AP. à LIMBORCH.

No. 43.
Philip à Limborch to John Locke.

Amsterdam, Sept. 12, 1698.
MY WORTHY Friend,

SINCE my last conversation with
that eminent person I have had no
opportunity of meeting him, as he
has been lately indisposed with a
slight fever.
I have conversed with
one of his friends, who remarked, that
he could not approve the reasoning
of that eminent person, when he con-
tended, that if we grant thought to be
self-existent, and quite distinct from
matter or extension, it will follow
that neither could have any know-
ledge of the other. Extension, indeed,
(he said,) can have no knowledge of
thought, but it cannot from thence
be concluded that thought can have
no knowledge of extension; because
since thought is self-existent and in-
dependent, it is also infinite, and
thence must be able to conceive the
existence of extension, by the innate
force of its own infinite powers.

But when I replied that the eminent person in question disapproved of the reasoning by which all other attributes are ascribed to a Being selfexistent and independent, before it has been proved that he is only one, he answered, that such a Being must be affirmed to be infinite, not only in his own nature, but to be endowed with infinite knowledge, and his substance to be of infinite extension, if, indeed, he be self-existent. But from thence it appeared to me to follow, that other attributes also might be proved; for his infinity being once proved, it may thence be also proved that other attributes belong to him, without which his infinity cannot be imagined. This he did not deny; and thus he appeared to think with me, that it was vain to inquire after the Unity of /such a Being by such a mode of reasoning; but that the second proposition ought to be the third. It has occurred to me that the eminent person laid down that method of investigating the truth for himself, and when he could not find arguments satisfactory to himself, sought them from others. It seems to me difficult to prove a Being, existing by the ne cessity of his nature to be only one, before you deduce from his necessary existence other attributes which ne

cessarily accompany it. If the eminent person could produce such arguments, they would be well worthy of being communicated to the learned world.

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Professor Vander Waeyen published lately a small treatise of Rittangelius, and prefixed to it a long and virulent preface against M. Le Clerc, in which he endeavoured to refute the explanation of the beginning of the Gospel of John, which had been published by M. Le Clerc. † I wish to see that subject treated with candour and judgment. At last he attacked me, though slightly, because in my Christian Theology I had said of Burman, that much of what he had said on the Divine omnipotence, in his Synopsis of Theology, had been taken from the Metaphysical Thoughts of Spinoza. This he does not deny, but contends, notwithstanding, that Bur man was not a Spinozist, which indeed I never asserted. Neither of us chooses to take any notice of such a superficial writer.

A few weeks since I gave N. N. a

Professor of oriental languages in the University of Konigsberg, where he died, 1652. He is said to have been educated a Catholic, afterwards to have professed Judaism, and then to have become a Lutheran. In his Notes on Ezra he main. tained that the Chaldee Paraphrase furnished arguments against Jews and Antitrinitarians. This remark engaged him in a controversy with a Polish Socinian, who wrote under the name of Irenopolita. See Nouv. Dict. Hist. 1772, V. 180.

+ At the commencement of this year (1698) Le Clerc had published Hammond on the New Testament, translated into Latin, with additional Notes, "quibus," as he speaks of himself in the third person, "aut leniter Hammondum confutabat, aut ab eo dicta confirmabat, aut omissa supplebat." See C. Clerici Vita et Opera, 1711, pp. 91, 253.

It was, no doubt, these additional notes to Hammond, which Vander Waeyen attacked. Le Clerc appears to have considered the Word, in the proem of Joha,

as

"the Divine Wisdom, by which all things were created," and which "dwelt in Jesus." See his Harmony, translated from the Latin, 1701, 4to. pp. 44. Also his Le Nouv. Test., 1703, pp. 262-264. Le Clerc is, probably, not very incorrectly described by his French biographer, See Nouv. Sectateur sécret de Socin. Dict, Hist. II. p. 229.

letter of introduction to you, but he is yet detained at Rotterdam. He is a learned and worthy person. You are not one of those who shun their society who do not exactly accord with you in religious sentiments. When he comes, he can tell you more of our affairs.

This week Mr. Guennelon brought me your salutations and your excuse for not having yet answered my last letter. Your letters are always most acceptable to me, and the more frequent, the more agreeable. Yet I cannot allow myself to exact them from you so importunately as to interrupt your more important concerns.

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MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNICATIONS.

Mr. Cogan's Strictures on some of the Arguments in " Apeleutherus," with regard to the Natural Evidences of a Future Stute. SIR,

M

Y attention having been lately directed to the subject of natural religion, I send you a few reflections upon it, to make such use of as you shall please.

By natural religion, as distinguished from revealed, might seem to be meant that system of faith and worship which has prevailed in the world where revelation has been unknown. But this appellation is rather given to certain principles which, while they have been admitted by some, have been rejected by others, and which have been very indistinctly apprehended by the majority of mankind. But whatever may be the principles of natural religion, and however clear may be their evidence, I ask, what has this religion effected? Has it ever saved mankind from the grossest idolatry and the most debasing superstition? Has it at any period led the great mass of the human race to the worship or the knowledge of one all-wise, all-powerful, all-benevolent Creator?

The fundamental principle of religion is the being of a God; and it is generally admitted, that there is no truth in the whole circle of moral inquiry, which rests upon such satisfactory and conclusive evidence. We also, as Christians, believe that this God is infinite in wisdom, power and

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goodness; and this glorious truth we pronounce to be not more the doctrine of revelation than the dictate of sound philosophy. But let us hear the voice of an enlightened Heathen. Cicero begins his work on the Nature of the Gods with this memorable declaration, that the question respecting the nature of the gods is very difficult and very obscure. And whoever reads the Treatise through, may see reason to congratulate himself that he did not live in an age when such a disputation could be held on such a subject. I pass over the providential government of God, to the doctrine of a future life; and on this important doctrine I shall quote a few observations from a work recently published, and entitled "Apeleutherus," premising that though I differ from the Author most materially, this difference does not diminish my respect for his talents, or my admiration of his sincerity. But I shall first make a remark on a position of our Author's, respecting the evidence of what he terms supernatural revelation.

"The history of a miracle cannot, without absurdity, be admitted as evidence of the truth of any doctrine, since it cannot communicate that certainty which it does not itself possess." What it does not possess it undoubtedly cannot communicate. But suppose it to possess some degree of probability, which indeed the Author virtually admits, there will certainly be no absurdity in taking its evidence

as far as it will go; but there would be a great absurdity in rejecting this evidence altogether, because it does not amount to certainty; unless, in deed, the doctrine for which it pleads "is already supported by more than sufficient evidence of an indisputable kind." "In all cases in which human nature can feel an interest, would it not be much more easy to learn the truth, independently of the miracle, than to arrive at absolute certainty concerning the miracle, in order to prove the doctrine? I say absolute certainty, because nothing short of this can be of any use in the case we are considering." Do the principles of natural religion, then, rest upon absolute certainty?* If not, they can be of no use whatever, and we shall be in danger, for want of certainty, of having no religion at all. But why is this absolute certainty required? Human belief and human conduct in general are governed by probability, and by probability alone. The conviction, however, which is produced by historical testimony, and that with respect to facts of great antiquity, is scarcely to be distinguished from the confidence of certain knowledge. And though "human testimony," according to our Author, "however credible, may or may not be true," when upon sufficient inquiry we have satisfied ourselves that it is true, we feel persuaded that in this particular case it cannot be false. "But if any man could persuade me that my eternal salvation were depending upon its truth, he would, at the same moment, fill my mind with doubt and anxiety." Let me feel the same conviction of the reality of any fact, as I do of the reality of many facts even of ancient date, and my mind would be filled with no doubt or anxiety, whatever were depending upon its truth.

But to proceed to the subject of a future life; "what I principally rely on," says our Author," is the obvious suitableness and propriety of a sequel

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to our present existence, and the manifest absurdity of supposing the wise and benevolent Creator to have produced so noble a work as man, for the mere purpose of destroying him; and I rely principally on this, because, from its simplicity and force, it appears eminently calculated to affect, and is, in fact, that consideration which has always affected, the mass of mankind, and produced that universal expectation of a future life which we find to prevail in the world;" and which he tells us elsewhere, has prevailed among the ge nerality of the human race, "with scarcely the intervention of a doubt." What has been thus confidently received by the generality of the human race, I am not able to say; but there are many passages in the ancient authors which satisfactorily demonstrate that the wisest philosophers of Greece and Rome could not advance beyond this alternative, that death would either prove the extinction of

But our Author proceeds, "Not indeed that this argument necessarily presents itself to the unassisted understanding of every individual of mankind; or even that a majority of the human race has in any age possessed powers and information to reason correctly in this way; but that in Creator and Governor of the universe to every age it has pleased the sovereign raise up men of superior discernment and penetration, who, after having explored the paths of science for themselves, have delighted in communicating their discoveries to others." This does not appear very consistent with what we read in P. 128, that "the religion of reason and who is willing to open his eyes, and to nature is intelligible to every human being, fix them attentively upon its luminous and instructive lessons." But if, as we are informed, there is a manifest absurdity in supposing the wise and benevolent Creator to have produced so noble a work as man for the mere purpose of destroying him, I cannot help inquiring how it came to pass that superior discernment and penetration should be necessary for discovering this absurdity? Did the difficulty lie in ascertaining the premises, or in drawing the conclusion? As for the multitude who were too dull to discern this absurdity themselves, there is reason to suspect that they took the matter upon trust, and never distinctly apprehended the force of the argument by which they were so much

affected.

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