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the possibility of such a being but his real existence. What can be a ground for an almighty, self-existent being, but such a being itself? There must, therefore, be a really self-existent, almighty being.

Here again, we have the assumption of more in the conclusion, than belongs to the premise, unless we understand that what is ideally true necessarily, is also really true necessarily. The possibility of an almighty, self-existent being is ideal, and the ground of this ideal possibility is the idea of its reality; this necessary idea of its reality is the only warrant we have, therefore, for deducing its necessary, actual reality.

In the above cases we have predicated, as ultimate truths, the possibility of the real existence of the most perfect being, an eternal being-and an almighty, self-existent being and we might continue, in the same way, with every thing in relation to God, which may be assumed as a necessary idea, and thus an ultimate truth; and, in the same manner, deduce the actual from the possible, the real from the ideal; but in all cases, we shall be obliged to make the same assumption, that what is a necessary truth in the idea, must also necessarily exist in the reality. The very essence, therefore, of all purely a priori reasoning on the being of God is contained in this short and simple proposition: the necessary idea of God involves the necessary existence of God.

That this is the essence of Clarke's a priori argument is clear from the following declaration: "We always find in our minds some ideas, as of infinity and eternity; which to remove, that is, to suppose that there is no being, no substance in the universe, to which these attributes or modes of existence are necessarily inherent, is a contradiction in the very terms. For modes and attributes exist only by the existence of the substance to which they belong. Now, he that can suppose eternity and immensity-and consequently the substance by whose existence these modes or attributes exist-removed out of the universe, may, if he please, as easily remove the relation of equality between twice two and four."-Being and Attrib. Sec. III.

The same also is true of Cudworth; who says, speaking of these universal truths or necessary ideas: "For there is an absolute impossibility in this assertion, that these essences of things and verities should be, though there were no substantial entity or no mind existing. For these things themselves must of necessity be either substances, or modifications of substance;

for what is neither substance nor modification of a substance is a pure nonentity. And if they be modifications of substance, they cannot possibly exist without that substance whose modifications they are; which must be either matter or mind: but they are not modifications of matter as such, because they are universal and immutable; therefore they are the modifications of some mind or intellect, so that these cannot be eternal without an eternal mind. And those do but deceive themselves in the hypothetical assertion, that there would have been these universal verities though there had never been a God; neither considering what the nature of God is, whose existence they would question or doubt of, nor what those rationes and verities are, which they would make so necessarily existent, by means whereof they do at once assert and question the same thing; for that which begets so strong a persuasion in their minds that the rationes of things and universal verities are so necessarily eternal, though they do not perceive it, is nothing else but an inward, invincible prepossession of the necessary existence of God, or an infinite, eternal and omniscient mind (that always actually comprehends himself and the extent of his own power, or the ideas of all possible things) so deeply radicated and infixed in their minds, as that they cannot possibly quit themselves of it though they endeavor it never so much; but it will unawares adhere to them, even when they force themselves to suppose the non-existence of God as a person, whose idea they do not clearly comprehend; that is, the force of nature is so strong in them as to make them acknowledge the thing, when they deny the word. So that the true meaning of this phenomenon is nothing else but this, that God is a being so necessarily existent, that though men will suppose the non-existence of him and deny the name, yet notwithstanding they cannot but confute themselves and confess the thing." Im. Mor. Book IV. Ch. 4. Sec. 9.

So also Cousin: "You are a finite being, and you have the necessary idea of an infinite being. But how could a finite and imperfect being have the idea of one perfect and infinite, and have it necessarily, if one did not exist? Take away God, the infinite and the perfect, and let there be only man, the finite and imperfect, and I shall never deduce from the finite the idea of the infinite, from the imperfect the idea of the perfect, from humanity the idea of God; but if God, if the perfect, if the infinite exists, then my reason will be able to conceive them.

The simple fact of the conception of God by the reason, the simple idea of God, the simple possibility of the existence of God implies the certainty and necessity of the existence of God." Psych. Henry's Transl. p. 266.

If then the position, that the necessary existence of God can be inferred from the necessary idea of God, be not true, the whole a priori argument is fallacious and illogical. How can it be sustained as true and solid?

In answer, we will first give the argument in its direct and positive form. Every idea-applying the word both to conceptions from sense and the intuitions of reason-involves an operation of the mind in relation to some object of thought. But objects of thought cannot be created by the mind from nothing. They are cognzied only as existing things before the mind, or, as brought in upon the field of consciousness. As the eye can see nothing, by its own energy, where nothing is, but must, in order to vision, have some real object of vision presented; so the mind has no power to form ideas from nonentities, but must have all the elements of its ideas before it as existing realities. Thus, every simple idea must have its archetype in some actual entity and reality of being.

Where then the mind has necessary ideas, or the intuitions of necessary truths, as in the case of all ultimate and absolute principles, these rational cognitions are a proof of the necessary existence of their archetypes. An idea without a reality is an idea of nothing; and a necessary idea without the necessity of its real archetype is an absurdity. Now the idea of God is a necessary idea, in the various forms of the infinite, the eternal, the perfect, the absolute cause, etc. The mind cannot exist, as a rational, active mind, without a development of this idea in some of its forms; and, in the possession of the idea, there is the consciousness that that, of which it is an idea, is universal and necessary. The eternal, for instance, is an idea which the mind of every person must have as the correlate to limited time; so that if he have the idea of the limited, he must also have the idea of the eternal. And while, in relation to the limited, he knows that it possesses none of the attributes of necessity or immutability, in relation to the eternal, he knows that it cannot but be. Even if he conceives of the idea as dropping from his mind, and even from every other finite mind in the universe, he knows that still the eternal-an unbegun and an unendingis a reality which it is impossible should be annihilated. Its

non-existence cannot take place by the universal loss of all idea of it; and thus the necessary idea must involve the necessary archetype of that idea.

So also of all the a priori ideas of the self-existent, the independent, the omnipresent, etc. They are all the necessary ideas of the human mind; and come with the conviction that all minds, which exercise any rational thought, must have them in more or less distinct development; and, moreover, that the entities, of which they are ideas, are necessary, and cannot be annihilated. And these entities can never be mere forms or empty phantasmata; but are, as Cudworth says, "the most unbending and uncompliable, the most necessary, firm, immutable and adamantine things in the world." And as they are realities thus immutable, they prove that the absolute being, in whom alone they have their ground of existence, is himself a most necessary and immutable being. Thus the actual existence of the absolute God is necessarily involved in our necesidea of him.

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But, still farther to convince the mind, which falters and hesitates from the tenuity of these pure intellections, we add a corroborative form of the argument, in obviating the difficulties which arise. It may be thought, that this arguing from the idea to the reality cannot be valid, inasmuch as,

1. It does not accord with fact. We have many ideas for which there are no archetypes in existence. We form the idea of a phoenix or a centaur, while there never were such existences.

To this it is replied, that while it is admitted that the complex whole of such ideas never had any existing archteypes, yet all the elements of these complex ideas are, and must be realities, as actually given to the mind through the senses. The mind cannot create a single new element; it can only combine old ones into new forms. Having the different elements as realities, the imagination and fancy can arrange and combine them into new modifications indefinitely, or limited by nothing but the rule of permutation of quantities. But the whole work of the mind is exhausted in the act of combination, and can never go beyond the materials given to it from existing things through the senses. This answers the difficulty from the supposed fact; but this is not all. These elements, which are combined by the mind into various forms and given to it by the senses, are by no means invested with any of the attributes of necessity and universality. They are but material effects; and

may be conceived as annihilated, or as never having been caused. Their non-existence is no absurdity. But not so with the existence of absolute principles. Not so with the ideas of eternal, infinite, self-existence, etc., as elementary in the absolute idea of God. These are all necessary in their very nature, and are cognized as uncreated, enduring, changeless realities. The mind can neither create nor annihilate them. They stand forth independent of will or power.*

2. As the idea and its archetype are not identical, they may exist independently of each other; and thus the idea may be without the archetype. It cannot therefore be inferred that because the idea is, therefore the reality is.

To this we answer: Whether the idea and the archetype be identical or not depends upon the fact of the personality or impersonality of the intuitive cognition of ultimate truth. Does the mind get the ideas of these necessary truths by its own personal action—as in the case of material objects through the senses? If it does, as is assumed by Kant, then it is true, as above, that the idea and the archetype are not identical; but the archetype is a distinct existence, external to the mind, and the idea is the subjective cognition of the archetype by the mind's own action. But if it does not, as Cousin maintainsand the necessary or ultimate truth is given to the mind by another agent, like any truth of inspiration, and thus this agent is emphatically" the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world,"-then they are identical, and the idea is but the archetype itself, brought within the field of the mind's own consciousness, by the revolving of that absolute sphere which is the immutable ground of all necessary truth.

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"But it may be I still deceive myself when I say, that the idea I have of extension supposes an object actually existing. For it seems that I have ideas which do not suppose any object. I have, for example, the idea of an enchanted castle, though no such thing really exists. Yet, when I consider the difficulty still more attentively, I find there is this difference between the idea of extension and an enchanted castle that the first being natural, i. e. independent of my will, supposes an object which is necessarily such as it represents: whereas the other, being artificial, supposes indeed an object, but it is not necessary that that object be absolutely such as the idea represents, because every will can add to that object or diminish from it as it pleases."-Regis. Metaphys. Lib. 1, P. 1. cap. 3.

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