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wicked men. The princes and potentates of the earth are apt to exercise an arbitrary and a defpotick power over their fubjects, to manage their people with craft and mystery, and to pride themselves in the huzzas and acclamations of the multitude; and this is the very picture which fome Religionifts draw of their Maker.

And, as there is, a natural and an effential difference in things, and a rule of action refulting from that difference, which every moral agent ought in reafon to govern his behaviour by, and, as God will most certainly govern his actions by this rule; fo from hence it will follow that fome actions are in themselves juftly approvable, and others justly condemnable, when confidered abstractedly from any promulged law; that fome actions render the agent the proper object of approbation and affection, and other actions render the agent the proper object of dislike and refentment to every other intelligent being, and therefore, to our Maker as fuch; confequently, fome actions are in themselves religious, others irreligious, when confidered in the abftract nature and reafon of things; that man is by nature an accountable creature; and that there is in nature a just foundation for a future judgment and retribution. These, I think, follow by a natural and neceffary confequence from the principles. before laid down. If happiness is in nature better than mifery, then the communication of happiness is in nature better or preferable to G 2

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the communication of mifery, the former is juftly approvable, and the latter is justly condemnable to every other intelligent being, and confequently, to our Maker as fuch. render that to another which is the proper object of every one's approbation and liking, is, in the nature of the thing, commendable and praife worthy; to render that to another which is the proper object of every one's averfion and fhunning, is, in the nature of the thing, difreputable and juftly condemnable; and this is the cafe when confidered abftractedly from, and independent of, any promulged law. Again, if the communicating of happiness is in nature juftly approvable, and if, the communicating of mifery is in the nature of the thing juftly condemnable, and if there is a reafon refulting from the nature of things for the communication of the former, and a reafon against the communicating of the latter; then the communication of the former renders the agent the proper object of approbation and affection, and the communication of the latter renders the agent the proper object of diflike and refentment to every other intelligent being, and therefore, to the Deity as fuch; confequently, fome actions are in themfelves religious, others are irreligious; that is, fome actions render the agent pleafing, others difpleafing to God, when confidered in the abftract nature and reafon of things. * As the reafon

*See my Difcourfe intitled, The Sufficiency of Reafon in Matters of Religion farther confidered.

reasonableness of an action ought to determine the will of every rational being for the choice of that action, fuppofing no other motive be fuperadded, and fuppofing many temptations invite to the contrary; fo upon this the equity and certainty of a future judgment is founded, and not upon any divine revelation concerning it. For, as there is a natural and an effential difference in things, and a rule of action refulting from that difference, which every moral agent is in reafon obliged to govern his actions by, and as there is planted in man a capacity or power which enables him to difcern that difference, and as it is left to his choice to act either agreeably with or repugnant to reason, and thereby to be either a benefactor or a plague to the intelligent world: fo from hence arifes the equity and reaJonableness of God's calling fuch creatures to an account, (when they have finished their course in this world,) and rewarding the virtuous, and punishing the vicious parts of our fpecies, according as they have rendered themfelves the fuitable and proper objects of either. *Happiness is the end of being to intelligent beings; whoever therefore freely and generously contributes to the happiness of others, by this he becomes a benefactor to the intelligent world, and by this the intelligent world becomes in reafon obliged gratefully and generously

* See my Difcourfe intitled, The Equity and Reafonableness of a Future Judgment and Retribution exemplified; or a Difcourfe on the Parable of the unmerciful Servant.

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generously to return the kindness, by contributing to the increase of their benefactor's felicity, when power and opportunity ferve, which contribution is properly called reward. And, as happiness is the end of being to intelligent beings; fo whoever viciously opposes and endeavours to fruftrate and disappoint the general end of being, by barring the happiness, and contributing to the mifery of others, fuch an one is an enemy to the intelligent world; and by this the intelligent world becomes in reafon obliged, (except his repentance and re⚫ formation has rendered him the proper object of mercy,) to return the evil upon his head, by contributing to his mifery, in proportion to the vicioufnefs of his actions, which contribution is properly called punishment. So that rewards and punishments when justly diftributed are founded, not in paffion or affection, but the reafon of things. And therefore, when punishment is justly inflicted upon a proper object, this is not punishing for punishment fake, nor is it the effect of mere refentment; but it is punishing upon juft grounds, and when the reafon of things requires it; neither is it contrary to, but perfectly confistent with, true goodness, yea it refults from it. For, a being who has the greatest concern and regard for a general good, has, in confequence thereof, the greatest diflike of, and a just indignation against, those who oppofe it. This is the ftate of the cafe independent of any promulged

mulged law, and when confidered in the abstract nature and reason of things.

As the three points I have been explaining and proving, are (I think) the ground and foundation of argument, in all questions of moral confideration; fo I have quoted at large what I have before written upon the subject, that hereby my reader may at once have a full view of the cafe, without having recourse to those writings; and that he may fee those objections obviated, which may lay against it. These things being premifed, I am now to apply them to the point in queftion, and accordingly I am to enquire first, whether Religion, when the term is ufed to exprefs piety, has any foundation in nature, and what it is that nature points out to men with refpect to it. And here I obferve, that tho' thofe words piety, devotion, worship, &c. which I here ufe as fynonymous terms, are ufually applied to the outward actions of men, fuch as bowing the body, vocal prayer, and the like, yet these outward actions are not the thing itself, but only visible marks and tokens of it. And in this cafe the fign is, by a figure of speech, put for the thing fignified, and is therefore called by the famé name. True piety consists in a juft and worthy fenfe of God impreffed upon the mind of man, which impreffion excites in him the affection of love, or joy, or hope, or defire, or the like, and which fenfe of the Deity affecting the mind of man as aforefaid is, or may be, expreffed or made vifible, if I

may

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