dence this, he says, implies that it may be capable either of raising additional ideas in the mind, or of detaching some of the ideas already there, from the rest with which they are associated, and dismissing them from view; which is contrary to the conclusions of the best metaphysical writers. "But the proof of the involuntary nature of belief depends not on the justness of any metaphysical argument. Every one may bring the question to the test of experiment; he may appeal to his own consciousness, and try whether, in any conceivable case, he can at pleasure change his opinion, and he will soon find that the most ardent wishes can be of no avail. Take any controverted fact in history; let a man make himself perfectly acquainted with the statements and authorities on both sides, and, at the end of his investigation, he will either believe, doubt, or disbelieve the fact in question. Now apply any possible motive to his mind. Blame him, praise him, intimidate him by threats, or allure him by promises, and after all your efforts, how far will you have succeeded in changing the state of his intellect with regard to the fact? How far will you have altered the connexion which he discerns between certain premises and certain conclusions? To affect his belief you must affect the subject of it by producing new arguments or considerations. The understanding being passive as to the impressions made upon it, if you wish to change those impressions you must change the cause which produces them. You can alter percep tions only by altering the thing perceived. Every man's consciousness will tell him, that the will can no more modify the effect of an argument on the understanding, than it can change the taste of sugar to the palate, or the fragrance of a rose to the smell; and that nothing can weaken its force, as apprehended by the intellect, but another argument opposed to it."-Pp. 14, 15. Section III. treats of the "Opinions of Locke and some other Writers (Reid and Bacon) on this Subject." These great writers are shewn to have maintained the involuntary nature of belief. A little inconsistency is pointed out in Locke's language. The author had exposed in the 1st Section the incorrectness of some of the definitions in the "Essay on Human Understanding." These exceptions to Locke's accuracy are not made in disparagement of that great philosopher; their being made is in fact an acknowledgment of his just authority. No one is at the pains to vindicate his dissent from Stillingfleet, Norris, or any other of Locke's antagonists. 66 In Section IV. the author suggests 'the Circumstances which have led Men to regard Belief as voluntary." The common error may, he thinks, be mainly ascribed to the intimate and the expression or declaration of connexion subsisting between belief it, the latter of which is at all times an act of the will; the term assent being used to express the intimation of our concurrence with an opinion as well as the concurrence itself. Another source of the error he conceives to be the practice of confounding the consent of the understanding with that of the will or feelings. He further accounts for the error by remarking, that it may have arisen in some degree from the circumstance of many people having no real conception of the truth or falsehood of those opinions which they profess. With such persons opinions are mere professions, a party-badge, not depending on the understanding, and to be assumed or discarded at pleasure. In regard to some subjects, all mankind are in this predicament; opinions being on most occasions simply objects of memory, results at which we recollect to have arrived without at the moment recollecting the process. Hence it is obviously possible for even an acute logician to be mistaken, as to the opinions about which he has attained a decisive conviction, and not to find out his mistake till he is reduced to the necessity of recollecting, or rather repeating, the process through which he had originally gone. The author proceeds in Section V. to "the Sources of Differences of Opinion," and on this very difficult part of the subject displays great ingenuity. Belief is an involuntary state of mind, but may, like sleep, which is also involuntary, be to a certain extent prevented or induced ac cording to our pleasure. This result is traced to wilful partiality of attention or examination. Again, external circumstances which vary in the case of each individual, occasion different ideas to be presented to each mind, different associations to be established even amongst the same ideas, and of course different opinions to be formed. National circumstances occasion national, and individual circumstances individual peculiarities of thinking. How then, if belief is perfectly independent of the will, shall we account for the fact, that the same events or the same arguments produce different effects on different minds? Different conclusions from the same arguments originate either in that defect of language, in consequence of which the terins employed do not convey to every mind the same ideas, or in those circumstances which occasion other ideas besides those actually expressed, (and different ideas in the case of different individuals,) to present themselves to the understanding: to which we may add such circumstances as, when the original arguments or consequent suggestions are numerous and complicated, have a tendency to fix the attention of different persons on different parts, and thereby occasion different considerations to remain ultimately in view. Section VI. is a continuation of the same subject, as far as regards "the feelings and passions of mankind." Here the author describes and explains the peculiar influence possessed by the sensitive over the intellectual part of our nature. The effects of arguments partly depend upon states of feeling. The attribute of drawing and fixing the attention belongs in a remarkable degree to all strong emotions: as have been overlooked and have vanished, it is those by which the judgment will be determined."-Pp. 53, 54. ness of the common saying, “quod The author next examines the justvolumus facile credimus," "we readily believe what is agreeable to our wishes;" on which he remarks, that, like many other maxims current in the world, it points at a truth without much precision. Wishes, he contends, are totally inoperative till they are transformed into hope. If, instead of having a ground for hope, we have a reason for fear, our apprehension disposes us, in the same way, to believe the reverse of what we wish. this part of the argument sufficiently Perhaps, the Essayist has not in adverted to the natural tendency of wishes to form themselves into hopes, and thus into opinions. The Roman poet appears to us to describe the true philosophy of the human mind: Quæque cupit, sperat; suaque illum oracula fallunt. The influence of general opinion and some of the most striking effects of eloquence are explained by the author on the principle of the partiality of attention which they tend to create. Emotions are shewn to have less room to operate in proportion to the perspicuity of our views. With regard to the major part of mankind, traditionary prejudices and early associations have a predominant influence, imparting a tincture to every subject, and leaving traces in every conclusion. The author proceeds to the practical part of his subject in Section VII., which is entitled, "On Belief and "Fear, for example, may so concentrate our thoughts on some particular features of our situation, may so absorb our attention, that we may overlook all other circumstances, and be led to conclusions which would be instantly rejectedOpinions as Objects of Moral Appro by a dispassionate understanding. "While the mind is in this state of excitement, it has a sort of elective attraction (if we may borrow an illustration from chemical science) for some ideas to the neglect of all others. It singles out from the number presented to it those which are connected with the prevailing emotion, while the rest are overlooked and forgotten. In examining any question, it may really comprehend all the arguments submitted to it; but, at the conclusion of the review, those only are retained which have been illuminated by the predominant passion; and since opinions, as we have seen, are the result of the considerations which have been at tended to and are in sight, not of such bation and Disapprobation, Rewards and Punishments." It follows, of course, that if opinions be involuntary they cannot involve either merit or demerit. The nature of an opinion cannot make it criminal. Praise or blame may, however, be justly attached to the manner in which an inquiry is prosecuted. But the consideration of opinions, as reprehensible in so far as they are the result of unfair investigation, can scarcely be rendered a useful or practical principle; for opinions furnish no criterion of the fairness or unfairness of investigation, since the most opposite results, the most contrary opinions, may ensue "The allurements and the menaces of power are alike incapable of establishing opinions in the mind, or eradicating those which are already there. They may draw hypocritical professions from avarice and ambition, or extort verbal renunciations from fear and feebleness; but this is all they can accomplish. The way to alter belief is not to address motives to the will, but arguments to the intellect. To do otherwise, to apply rewards and punishments to opinions, is as absurd as to raise men to the peerage for their ruddy complexions, to whip them for the gout, and hang them for the scrofula."P. 70. The Essayist distinguishes, at the same time, between the innocence of the man and the harmlessness of his views, and between holding opinions and expressing them: the expression of opinions is always a voluntary act, and, being neutral in itself, may be commendable or reprehensible according to the circumstances in which it takes place. The author treats, in Section VIII., "On the Evil Consequences of the common Errors on this Subject." One of its most obvious effects has been to draw mankind from an attention to moral conduct, and to lead them to regard the belief of certain tenets as far more deserving of approbation than a course of the most consistent virtue : "The error under consideration has also produced much secret misery, by loading the minds of the timid and con scientious with the imaginary guilt of holding opinions which they regarded with horror while they could not avoid them. What is still worse, it has frequently alarmed the inquirer into an abandonment of the pursuit of truth. Under a confused supposition of criminality in the belief of particular doctrines, men have with reason been deterred from examining evidence, lest it should irresistibly lead them to views which it might be culpable to entertain. If it is really true, indeed, that the least deviation from a given line of opinion will be attended with guilt, the only safe course is to exclude all examination, to shun every research which might, by possibility, terminate in any such result. When it is already fixed and determined, that an investigation must end in a prescribed way, otherwise the inquirer will be in volved in criminality, all inquiry becomes not only useless but foolish. This appre hension of the consequences of research once extended even to natural philosophy; and there is little doubt that it may be justly charged by moral science with much of the slowness of its progress. If the former has long since emancipated itself from this error, the latter still confessedly labours under its oppression. The intellect is still intimidated into a desertion of every track which appears to lead to conclusions at variance with the prescribed modes of thinking: "Men grow pale Lest their own judgments should become too bright, And their free thoughts be crimes, and earth have too much light." Pp. 74, 75. The same error has probably been scriptions to a long list of abstruse, one principal cause of requiring subcomplex, and often unintelligible doctrines, in order to qualify the aspirant not only for ecclesiastical, but even for civil and military offices. The has been the attempt to regulate men's most fatal consequence of the error tion and punishment. All religions creeds by the application of intimidapersecutors have been more or less acEven the victims themselves appear, tuated by the mischievous principle. in many instances, not to have called in question the right of persecution, but only the propriety of its exercise history of intolerance, our pity for the on their own persons. In reading the sufferers is often neutralized by a detestation of their principles, by a knowledge that they would have insaries had they had equal power; and flicted equal tortures on their adverall that is left for us to do is to mourn over the degradation of our common nature. Other causes may have mingled their influence in persecution. There seems to be a principle inherent in the nature of man that leads him to seek for the approbation of his fellowcreatures, not only in his actions but in his modes of thinking. Hence he is uneasy under dissent and disagreement. He resents not only the opposition to his doctrines, but the presumption of the opponent, and grows eager to chastise it. Those men in general are the least hurt at opposition who, having a clear discernment of "It is a curious fact, which, I think, may be observed in the history of persecution, that men are generally more inclined to punish those who believe less than they themselves do, than those who believe more. We pity rather than condemn the extravagancies of fanaticism, and the absurdities of superstition; but are apt to grow angry at the speculations of scepticism. If any one superadds something to the established creed, his conduct is viewed with tolerable composure; it is when he attempts to subtract from it, that he provokes indignation. Is it that we feel a sort of superiority at perceiving the absurdity of what others believe, and, on the other hand, are mortified when any body. else appears to arrogate the same superiority over ourselves?"-P. 87. More fixed and steady sources of intolerance may be found in the connexion often subsisting between men's permanent interests or favourite objects, and the maintenance of certain doctrines. In concluding this Essay the author glances at the inquiry, how far these causes of intolerance continue in action, in the present day, and in our own country. As far as they are placed in the passions of mankind, we can only look for a mitigation in proportion as the passions are weakened, or placed under stricter controul: and the spirits of men are evidently softened by the improvement of the age, and the sympathies of mankind constrain that bigotry to be contented with reproach and invective, which in a former age would have had recourse to more formidable weapons. The advancement of knowledge also lessens the intolerance which is founded in ignorance and error, though it has not yet accomplished its destruction. There is still a boundary in speculation beyond which no one is allowed to proceed; at which innocence ter minates and guilt commences; a boundary not fixed and determinate, but varying with the creed of every party. "Although the advanced civilization of the age rejects the palpably absurd application of torture and death, it is not to be concealed, that, amongst a numerous class, there is an analogous, though less barbarous persecution, of all who depart from received doctrines-the persecution of private antipathy and public odium. They are looked upon as a species of criminals, and their deviations from established opinions, or, if any one prefers the phrase, their speculative errors, are regarded by many with as much horror as flagrant violations of morality. In the ordinary ranks of men, where exploded prejudices often linger for ages, this is scarcely to be wondered at; but it is painful, and on a first view unaccountable, to witness the prevalence of the same spirit in the republic of letters; to see mistakes in speculation pursued with all the warmth of moral indignation and reproach. He who believes an opinion on the authority of others, who has taken no pains to investigate its claims to credibility, nor weighed the objections to the evidence on which it rests, is lauded for his acquiescence, while obloquy from every side is too often heaped on the man, who has minutely searched into the subject, and been led to an opposite conclusion. There are few things more disgusting to an enlightened mind than to learned or illiterate, who have never see a number of men, a mob, whether scrutinized the foundation of their opinions, assailing with contumely an individual, who, after the labour of research and reflection, has adopted different sentiments from theirs, and pluming themselves on the notion of superior virtue because their understandings have been tenacious of prejudice. "This conduct is the more remarkable, sion, that belief is not dependent on the as on every side we meet with the admisthis admission is readily made, will argue will; and yet the same men, by whom and inveigh on the virtual assumption of the contrary. "This is a striking proof, amongst a multitude of others, of what the thinking mind must have frequently observed, that a principle is often retained in its applications, long after it has been discarded as an abstract proposition. In a subject hoves intelligent men to be rigidly conof so much importance, however, it besistent. If our opinions are not voluntary, but independent of the will, the contrary doctrine and all its consequences ought to be practically abandoned; they ought to be weeded from the sentiments, We shall return in the next number to this very able and truly pleasing writer. Our apology for dwelling so long upon the first Essay is the great practical importance of the subject. The influence of the truth which the Essayist seeks to establish is, in our judgment, incalculably beneficial. "It often happens," as he well observes in the Preface, pp. vii. viii.," that an important principle is vaguely apprehended, and incidentally expressed, long before it is reduced to a definite form, or fixed by regular proof: but while it floats in this state on the surface of men's understandings it is only of casual and limited utility; it is sometimes forgotten and sometimes abandoned, seldom pursued to its consequences, and frequently denied in its modifications. It is only after it has been clearly established by an indisputable process of reasoning, explored in its bearings, and exhibited in all its force, that it becomes of uniform and essential service; it is only then that it can be decisively appealed to both in controversy and in practice, and that it exerts the whole extent of its influence on private manners and public institutions.” ART II.-Plain and Familiar Lectures on the Leading Evidences and Truths of Natural and Revealed Religion; addressed principally to the Rising Generation. By Lawrence Holden. 12mo. pp. 262. Portrait. Sherwood and Co. 68. 1820. MR R. HOLDEN has been for many years the acceptable and highly esteemed pastor of the Presbyterian or Unitarian congregation at Tenterden, in Kent. He has, we are informed, become more abundant in labours, as he has advanced in age. This volume is an evidence of his activity in the pastoral care; it consists of addresses to the youth of his flock, at whose request it has been published, accompanied with a faithful portrait of the worthy author. The following are the contents of the Lectures: I. On the various Fa The prevalence of infidelity led Mr. Holden to instruct the younger members of his congregation in the princi ples of their faith; but he does not join in the undistinguishing clamour against unbelievers, as if they were not men, or not worthy to live. He says, (Pref. p. vi.,) "In any occasional observations on the arguments and objections of unbelievers which may be met with in the course of the following Lectures, the author would persuade himself that nothing will be found to have escaped from him disre spectful, uncandid, or inconsistent with the benignant and charitable spirit of our holy religion; assuredly nothing of this nature is intended; nor would he for a moment attempt to justify an appeal to the strong arm of the law to check or put a stop to their writings. Let them write, and let them be answered. Justly as he condemns the misrepresentations and partial quotations of these writers, and much as he has been at other times disgusted with their sarcastic mockery and profaneness, he considers reason and argument as better weapons than force; and that, if divine revelation cannot be supported by its own evidences, it should fall. His own decisive conviction of the firm foundations upon which it rests, is connected with a corresponding assurance |
