1849.] The moral constitution of Man. 639 actually existing, any more than I can change or take away the idea of the equality of twice two to four, the certainty of the existence of that thing is the same, and stands on the same foundation as the certainty of the other relation. For the relation of equality between twice two and four has no other certainty but this, that I cannot, without a contradiction, change or take away the idea of that relation." (Demonst. p. 21.) Elsewhere he thus expresses the same thing: "We always find in our minds some ideas, as of infinity and eternity, which to remove, that is to suppose that there is no being, no substance in the universe to which these attributes or modes of existence are necessarily inherent, is a contradiction in the very terms. For modes and attributes exist only by the substance to which they belong. Now he that can suppose eternity and immensity removed out of the universe, may, if he please, as easily remove the relation of equality between twice two and four." (Dem. p. 15.) This argument is based evidently on the assumption that immensity and eternity are attributes of substance or being; an assumption purely gratuitous, and without proof. Space answers both these conditions, possesses both these qualities or attributes, eternity and immensity. With all respect, then, - Yet space is not being, much less is it God. for the truly great man who thus reasons, we can but regard this as an argument more specious than solid, about which the thing chiefly wonderful is, how it could ever have misled or perplexed a truly discerning mind. Respecting the ideal argument, as a whole, the conclusion at which, after a candid and thorough examination, the lover of truth will be likely to arrive, would seem to be this; - that while the idea which the human mind forms of God, and the fact that it does, of its own accord, as it would seem, reach and entertain that wonderful idea, do afford strong presumptive evidence of the existence of such a being, and may well and greatly strengthen our belief in that existence, derived from other sources, they cannot be regarded as in themselves furnishing clear and absolute demonstration of that great truth. For this we must look elsewhere. IV. It remains for us to discuss only the argument derived from the moral constitution of man. Among the various active principles and powers of the human soul, each having its appropriate object and sphere, and tending each to a certain definite result, there is observed one whose office and operation it seems to be to preside over all the rest—the regulator, as it may not inaptly be termed, or law-power, of the whole moral machinery in its various and complicated movements. This is the prin ciple which we call conscience, whose established authority in the soul is one of the most remarkable phenomena in its history and constitution. It has indeed been contended by some that this is by no means, in fact, a universal and invariable law; that men, and even whole tribes and nations, are to be found, who seem to have no conscience. Now it is doubtless true that many are to be found in the world who do not obey this law of the inner being;-in whom it comes, by desuetude, to be a silent and virtually a dead letter; but certainly there is a palpable and broad distinction between the authority, and the actual power of a law. That which is a law de jure, may not in all cases be a law de facto. It is sufficient that there is in man a moral principle, or power, whose object, and evident legitimate office, is to control his moral action; and that when left to its own proper functions, unperverted, undestroyed, it does execute that office, not without a sort of majesty and truly regal sway. It is no evidence against the existence and rightful authority of a king in the land, that he is for the time driven from his palace and his throne by a revolutionary faction; nor against the existence and rightful authority of a statute, that in a state of anarchy and rebellion, men no longer recognize its right, or submit to its control. This distinction between the lex de jure and the lex de facto, as regards the human conscience - a distinction which was first clearly pointed out by bishop Butler, and has been fully elaborated by Chalmers, is at once a very plain and a very important distinction, and constitutes a sufficient answer to the objection now stated. Upon this observed peculiarity in the moral constitution,this law of our nature, theologians have constructed a favorite and powerful argument in proof of the divine existence. Here is a law. Where, and who, is the law-maker? Here is the various machinery of a court. Is there not, somewhere, a legislator, and a judge? So it would seem; and so, we presume, men would naturally and generally conclude. The evidence may be regarded however as presumptive rather than demonstrative, when we come to look more closely at it, inasmuch as it proceeds upon the supposition that the soul of man is a creation. Here, says the reasoner, is a piece of curious mechanism a watch whose movements are all nicely controlled by an adjustment called the regulator, which certainly seems to have been intended for this very purpose. Is there not, somewhere, an intelligent contriver and controller of these movements? Precisely such is the office of conscience in the human soul, and precisely such its testimony as to the existence somewhere of a power capable of appointing and enforcing this authority. Unquestionably, we reply, if there be here veritable 1849.] Value of the Moral Argument. 641 regulation, there must be, somewhere, a regulator; if mechanism, then a maker. But are we sure of the premises? What if the watch, to which this apparatus belongs, should fail to be proved a machine; what if the soul of man, instead of being a creation, a thing made, should turn out to be an uncaused and self-existent thing; then, for aught we know, this regulating apparatus, in both watch and soul, may have always pertained to them, and in full play, as an integral part of themselves. Let it be granted, or first proved, that man himself this spiritual, conscious moral being, which we call the soul — is a created existence, that there is, in other words, true and real mechanism here, that what we call the law of conscience is a bona fide law, and not simply a mode in which the spiritual nature has always acted, that it is an arrangement, a begun thing, and it follows of course that there is, somewhere, or at least was, a beginner and producer thereof. But how are we to know this? That which is here assumed is the very thing to be proved-the very point we seek to establish. Nor is it from the inspection of the mind itself, or of the watch itself, independently of other sources of information, that this is to be learned. The regulator, in itself considered, cannot inform us whether it has always existed and operated as at present, or whether it is a piece of pure contrivance and mechanism; neither can the law of the human soul, which we term conscience. The question is, have we truly and properly a law a creation -a contrived and originated property of a begun and continued existence. Not until this point is settled, can we appeal to the regulating power or principle, in the watch or in the soul, as evidence clear and positive of the existence of a being extrinsic to themselves, who is in reality the controller and governor, as he was the contriver, of these truly wonderful move ments. Now we do not deny that the argument from our moral nature, as also that from design, of which we have already treated, does furnish evidence of a certain kind, presumptive evidence, and that in a high degree, of the existence of a supreme being; that it serves greatly to strengthen our belief, already formed, in such a being; that it corroborates the evidence derived from other sources, and brings it very near and closely home to us; nay, further, that it is in itself sufficient to bring the mind practically to the conviction that there is a God; and that its actual operation, in the world as we find it, is to this effect; but only that it is not what in theology, and as the basis of a science, we demand, and must in some way obtain a sure and clear demonstration of this great truth. For nothing can be plainer than that a kind or degree of evidence which may be amply sufficient to guide one's mind, and determine one's course and conduct in the practical affairs of life, may not be a sufficient basis on which to lay the firm and sure foundations of a science. The moral argument properly comes in, then, so far as the theolo gian is concerned, not to demonstrate the existence of God, but to bear important testimony respecting his character and attributes, when once that previous point is settled; to show what sort of a being God is; and in this respect it is one of the most valuable and powerful arguments in the whole compass of natural theology. Especially does this principle of conscience manifest the righteousness of God. If he were not himself a righteous being, and a lover of rectitude, he would not have implanted, as he has, this law of the right, and this love of it, in every human bosom. As it is, he has so made man that, by the very constitution of his being, and aside from any external or revealed law, he is placed under obligation to do right. There is a law within him, prior to anything from without, written on or rather wrought into the soul itself, as the figure is woven into the fabric which it adorns. The soul of man, approving of the true and the right, whether it will or no, wherever these are discerned, points with unerring certainty to that which is the source of this its moral power, viz. the rectitude of the divine character,- -even as the poised steel, turning ever to the mysterious north, indicates the existence of that unknown power, which from afar controls all its vibrations, whose influence it ever feels, and at whose presence it trembles. The principle of conscience establishes also the inflexible justice of God. It has its awards and punishments. It visits the evil-doer with the terrible stings of guilt and remorse, and throws over him the deep chill shadow of a coming retribution. It dashes into every cup of forbidden pleasure, the unfailing, inseparable element of consequent wretchedness. It links together human crime and human suffering, the vices and the miseries of men, so that the one shall follow the other invariably, as sound and echo pursue each other along the mountain side. There is with it no respect of persons, no taking of bribes. With its whip of scorpions it pursues the wrong-doer, whoever he may be, wherever he may go; tracks him into every obscurity, finds him out in the deepest retirement and the darkest night; overtakes him in his swiftest escape, and like the terrible avenger pursues and hangs over him wherever he takes his way. On the other hand, the pleasure which, according to the working of this same law, dispensing its awards as well as its punishments, attends all virtuous and right action, is not less a proof of the divine benevolence. Thus to connect inseparably together right-doing and hap 1849.1 Advantage of the Moral Argument. - 643 piness, wrong-doing and misery, so to construct and constitute the mind, the spiritual nature, that by its own natural working this great end shall be secured, this self-regulating power, in other words, of the moral machinery, is in itself one of the highest evidences not simply of the divine wisdom and skill, but (what is much more to the purpose, and more important to establish) of the goodness of God. We can conceive that man might have been so constituted that, while under the highest obligations to virtue, nevertheless every instance of right action should be accompanied, not as now with a verdict of selfapproval, and that purest of all pleasures, the happiness which he feels who is conscious of right intentions, and a conduct void of offence toward God and man, - but on the contrary with pain and selfreproach, and the wretchedness of an unsatisfied nature; while, on the other hand, evil action, and all wrong-doing, should secure the enjoyment of a present gratification and a consequent and enduring happiness. We can conceive that a malevolent being would have so constituted his creatures, arraying the moral principles of the soul against its innate love of happiness, placing in antagonism what are now intimately and inseparably joined, and thus removing at once what are now the strongest incentives to virtue and consequent well-being. Indeed we can have no clearer and more certain indication that benevolence constitutes a leading trait in the divine character, than the fact we are now considering, that he has actually constituted his moral creatures in such a way that duty and happiness shall with them be ever concomitant; that the moral nature shall approve of that which the divine law requires; that the ways of virtue are ever found to be ways of pleasantness, and all her paths peace. In truth, the whole phenomena of conscience evince most clearly to the observant and thoughtful mind the highest regard, on the part of the Creator, for the well being of man, which is only another expression for the highest and purest benevolence. It would seem to be, then, the great advantage of the argument now under discussion, as compared with those previously named, that it brings into bold relief, and places in a clear, strong light, the moral character of God; in which respect the material or physical argument is, it must be confessed, in a measure defective. We can show, from the arrangements of the material world, the power, the wisdom, the skill, of the mighty builder. But what is there in external nature to demonstrate his righteousness, his justice, his goodness? Indications of these attributes, doubtless, there may be; hardly, as we think, proofs. The physical structure of the shark affords as clear evidence of the skill of the Creator as do the anatomy and organization of the |
