the value of his labour, is bountiful to him, and thereby is virtuously unjust, provided there be a laudable reafon for that bounty. So that he who rewards above the merit of an action, is as truly unjust, as he who rewards below it; but then, injustice in one inftance is vicious and blame-worthy, whereas injuftice in the other inftance may be virtuous and commendable. Again, juftice, in the administration of punishment, is the mean betwixt mercy and cruelty. He (as I obferved above) who punishes the offender equal to his crime, is just. He who lays upon the offender a greater punishment than his crime deferves, is cruel; that is, he is criminally unjuft. He who remits that punishment, in whole, or in part, is merciful; that is, he is virtuously unjuft, provided there be a laudable reafon for the exercise of that mercy. So that he who punishes below the demerit of a vicious action, is as truly unjust, as he who punishes above it; but then, injuftice in the latter cafe is a vice, and ought to be avoided, whereas injuftice in the former instance is a virtue and truly commendable, provided there be some laudable reafon for the exercise of that mercy. So that juftice is right and fit only when it comes in competition with criminal injustice; but when it comes in competition with virtuous injuftice, and is preferred before it, by punishing the criminal equal to the demerit of his crimes, when he has rendered himself the proper object of mercy, then, and under these circumftances, juftice degeneM 2

rates

rates into unmercifulness, and is in itself truly blame-worthy. I fay, juftice itfelf is blameworthy in fuch cafes where there is a laudable reafon for the exercifing of mercy to the criminal, and what that laudable reafon is comes now to be confidered.

I have already obferved, that punishment is relative to guilt, the latter of these being the ground and foundation of the former. I have likewife obferved that actions derive their guilt, not from their effects and confequences, but from their causes; that is, from those evil or vicious difpofitions of mind which are the ground and caufe of them. I here farther obferve, that when once guilt is contracted, it can never be taken away; that is, when once an evil action has been committed, that action cannot be undone, nor can it ever be otherwise but an evil action, and confequently, the perfon who committed it muft continue to have been guilty of that evil action to all eternity, or, at leaft, fo long as he fhall continue to exist. And this is the cafe upon all schemes, whether the criminal fuffers the punishment his crime deferves, or whether we admit the abfurd fuppofition of another's fuffering in his stead, or whether his punishment be remitted, in whole, or in part. But then, tho' an evil action cannot be undone, but must continue to have been committed to all eternity; yet that evil difpofition of mind out of which it sprang may be put away, and when that is the cafe, then, he that before was the proper object of punishment,

punishment, by this ceafes to be fuch, and becomes thereby the proper object of mercy. For as in things natural, take away the caufe, and the effect will ceafe; fo in things moral, take away the caufe; and the effect ought to cease. A man in a state of poverty is the proper object of relief, and therefore ought to be relieved: But then, take away the caufe, and the effect ought to ceafe; that is change his circumstances by putting him into a state of plenty, and then he ceases to be the proper object of relief, and therefore ought not to be relieved. In like manner, a man who from a wicked difpofition of mind has been guilty of a wicked action, becomes thereby the proper object of punishment; but then, take away the caufe, and the effect ought to cease, that is, change his circumftances by removing that wicked difpofition which took place in him, and which was the ground of his misbehaviour, and then he ceases to be the proper object of punishment, and becomes thereby the proper object of mercy. For when the grounds of refentment and punishment cease, which is the cafe here, then, in reafon and equity, refentment and punishment ought to ceafe alfo. And it would be the fame abfurd conduct, to punish a man after he is become a penitent, for his having before been guilty of an evil action; as it would be to relieve a man in a state of plenty, for his having before been in a state of poverty. This change of circumRances in an offender, changes his character and relations. For, whilst he was under the

power

power of vicious affections, and was difpofed to gratify them to the publick hurt, he was then an evil or vicious creature, and an enemy to the intelligent and moral world, and, as fuch, was the proper object of resentment and punishment. But when he became changed as aforefaid, he then ceafed to be that vicious or evil creature, and is become virtuous and good, he is no longer an enemy, but a friend and a benefactor to the intelligent world as far as it is in his power fo to be, and, as fuch, he is no longer the proper object of refentment and punishment, but is become, by the forementioned change, the proper object of compaffion and mercy. So that if the Deity will follow nature, and be guided by it, (which he moft certainly will) then, he must deal with fuch a creature according to what he is, and not according to what he has been; he must deal with him, not as an offender, confidered fimply as fuch, which would render him the proper object of punishment, this not being his whole character; but he muft and will treat him as a penitent offender, that being his whole character, and the prefent ftate of his cafe, and, as fuch, he is the proper object of God's mercy. To fay in this cafe, that the penitent offender Still continues to have been guilty of the crimes he has committed, and therefore, he ought to be punished, this is weakly urged; because, (as I have already observed) that is the case upon all schemes, and therefore, it ought not to be urged here; and is the fame kind of

reasoning

reafoning as to fay, that the man who has been in a state of poverty, tho' his circumstances are changed, and he is now in a state of plenty; yet he fill continues to be the man who has been in a state of poverty, and therefore fill ought to be relieved; the weakness of which, I think, appears at first fight.

From what I have obferved, I think, my reader cannot avoid seeing what it is which renders men, who have, by their greatly departing from that rule of action they ought to be governed by, rendered themselves juftly difpleafing to their Maker; I fay, I think, my reader cannot avoid feeing what it is which will render fuch offenders the proper objects of God's mercy; and confequently, will be the ground of the divine mercy to them. Namely, it is paffing through fuch a change, which, (to fpeak in the figurative language of the New Testament) is called a being born again, becoming a new creature; being created a new, in, or according to Chrift Jefus; and the like. Whatever offender paffes through this change, he thereby ceases to be the proper object of punishment, and becomes the proper object of mercy; and therefore, we may be affured, he will most certainly obtain it at God's hand. I am not here enquiring what is, or may be, the ground or reafon of remitting punishment among ft men, which, perhaps, fometimes is relation, friendship, precedent obligations, and the like. These cannot take place with respect to God, and therefore, whether, and bow

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