the Sapóviov in the sense of Socrates, no genius, no separate and distinct person, can be understood, but only indefinitely some heavenly voice or divine revelation. No passage in Plato or Xenophon speaks of Socrates holding intercourse with a genius. We only hear of a divine or heavenly sign,2 of a voice heard by Socrates,3 of some supernatural guidance by which many warnings were vouchsafed to him.1 All that these expressions imply is, that Socrates was conscious within of divine revelations, but how produced and whence coming they say absolutely nothing, nay their very indefiniteness proves clearly enough, that neither Socrates nor his pupils had any Leben and Schriften, p. 482), who takes δαιμόνιον for a substantive meaning the deity, does not see therein a genius but only a θεῖον. 1 The passage Mem. i. 4. 14; ὅταν οἱ θεοὶ πέμπωσιν, ὥσπερ σοὶ φῇς πέμπειν αὐτοὺς συμβούλους, proves nothing, as σvußouλous is used as a metonym for ouμβουλάς. 2 Plato, Phædr. 242, B.: rd δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο, καί τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόδε ἀκοῦσαι. Rep. iv. 496, C. : τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον. Euthy. 272, E.: éyéveto Tò eiwθὸς σημεῖον, τὸ δαιμόνιον. Apol. 50; τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον TÒ eia lds onpeîov. Ibid. 41, D. c. τὸ σημεῖον. 3 Plato, Apol. 31, D.: euol de τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη. Xen. Apol. 12: θεοῦ φωνή. 4 Plato, l. c. : ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι kai daiμóviov yiyveral. Also 40, Α.: ἡ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ Sapovíov. Theæt. 151, A.: rò 5 Doubtless Socrates regarded СНАР. IV. CHAP. very clear notion on the subject.' These revelations, moreover, always refer to particular actions,2 and 1 It is much the same thing whether τὸ δαιμόνιον be taken for a substantive or an adjective. The probable rights of the case are, as Krische, Forsch. 229 remarks, that Xenophon uses it as a substantive τὸ θεῖον oι ὁ θεὸς, whereas Plato uses it as an adjective, explaining it as δαίμονιον σημεῖον, and says δαιμόνιόν μοι γίγνεται. The grammar will admit of either. Conf. Arist. Rhet. ii. 23, 1398 a, 15. When, therefore, Ast cites Xenophon against Plato's explanation of δαιμόνια ας δαιμόνια πράγματα, he probably commits a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο yévos. The very difference between Xenophon and Plato proves how loosely Socrates spoke of the δαιμόνιον. 2 This applies to all the instances of its intervention mentioned by Plato and Xenophon. They are the following: (1) Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 5, where Socrates, when urged to prepare a defence, replies: ἀλλὰ νὴ τὸν Δία, ἤδη μου ἐπιχειροῦντος, φροντίσαι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίας ἠναντιώθη τὸ δαιμόνιον. (2) Plato Apol. 31, D.: Why did not Socrates busy himself with political matters ? The δαιμόνιον was the reason: τοῦτ ̓ ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. (3) Ibid. (after his condemnation): a singular occurrence took place, yàp εἰωθυϊά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν νυνὶ δὲ, . . . οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἕωθεν οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ ̓ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ. (4) Plato, Theæt. 151, Α. : if such as have withdrawn from my society, again return, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει ξυνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐξ Add to these cases a few others in which Socrates himself more or less jokes about the δαιμόνιον, which deserve to be mentioned because it there appears in the same character as elsewhere. (5) Xen. Symp. 8, 5, where Antisthenes throws in Socrates' teeth: τοτὲ μὲν τὸ δαιμόνιον προφασιζόμενος οὐ διαλέγῃ μοι τοτὲ δ ̓ ἄλλου του ἐφιέμενος. (6) Plate Phædr. 242, B., when Socrates wished to depart: τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ εἰωθὸς σημεῖόν μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο ἀεὶ δέ με ἐπίσχει ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν καί τινα φωνὴν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἥ με οὐκ ἐᾷ ἀπίεναι πρὶν ἂν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὥς τι ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θεῖον. (7) Ibid. Euthyd. 272, E.; as Socrates was about to leave the Lyceum, ¿yéveto tò eiweòs σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον, he therefore sat down again, and soon after Euthydemus and Dionysodorus really came in. In all these cases the daμóviov appears to have been an inward voice deterring the philosopher from a particular action. Even the more general statement that the δαιμόνιον always made its warnings heard whenever So according to Plato assume the form of prohibitions. Sometimes the Saμóviov stops him from saying or doing something.' It only indirectly points out what should be done, by approving what it does not forbid. In a similar way it indirectly enables Socrates to advise his friends by not hindering him from approving their schemes, either by word or by silence. The subjects respecting which the crates thought of a political career, falls in with this conception of it. In a similar sense the passage in the Republic vi. 496, D. should be understood, when Socrates remarks that most of those who had the capacity for philosophy were diverted therefrom by other interests, unless peculiar circumstances kept them, such as sickness, which was a hindrance to political life. TO δ ̓ ἡμέτερον οὐκ ἄξιον λέγειν τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον· ἡ γὰρ πού τινι ἄλλῳ η οὐδενὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονε. The heavenly sign keeps Socrates true to his philosophical calling, by opposing him whenever he contemplates taking up anything else, as for instance, politics. Consequently, not even this passage compels us to give another meaning to its utterances than they bear according to Plato's express words, as conveying a judgment respecting the admissibility of 2 definite action, either contemplated or commenced by Socrates. Even at the commencement of the spurious Alcibiades, this is all that is discussed, and in the Theages. 128, D., the prophecies of the dauó vov only have reference to particular future actions (not only of Socrates, but of others), from which it dissuades. The two latter authorities are, however, worthless. 1 Apol. 31, D.: ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται . ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἡ ὅταν γένηται ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει DE OUTOTE. Phædr. 242, C. 2 From the Platonic statements respecting the δαιμόνιον which have just been given, Xenophon's statements differ, making it not only restraining but preventing, and not only having reference to the actions of Socrates but to those of other people. Mem. i. 1, 4 (Apol. 12): τὸ γὰρ δαιμόνιον ἔφη σημαίνειν, καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ξυνόντων προσηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαί VOVTOS καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμελε. Ibid. iv. 3, 12 : σοὶ δ ̓ ἔφη (Euthydemus), ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐοίκασιν ἔτι φιλικώτερον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι (sc. οἱ θεοὶ) εἴγε μηδὲ ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπό σου προσημαίνουσί σοι ἅ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν кal & μh. Still both statements may be harmonised as in the CHAP. IV. CHAP IV. It heavenly voice makes itself heard are in point of value the utterances of the Saipoviov, and to give its raison d'être, he attempted to prove that the actions which it approved or occasioned were the most beneficial and advantageous. The Saíuoviov appeared therefore to him as an internal revelation from heaven respecting the result of his actions, in a word as an internal oracle. As such it is expressly included, both by Xenophon 2 and Plato,3 under the general conception of divination, and placed on a par with divination by sacrifice and the flight of birds. Of it is therefore true what Xenophon's Socrates remarks respecting all divination, that it may only be resorted to for cases which man cannot discover himself by reflection.* shown that Socrates was, on the one hand thoroughly convinced of the care of God for man down to the smallest matters, and on the other hand was accustomed to estimate the value of every action by its consequences. It followed herefrom that to his mind the only ground on which God could forbid an action was because of its ill-conse quences. 1 See Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 5, where Socrates observes that the δαιμόνιον forbad him to prepare a defence, and then proceeds to discuss the reasons why the deity found an innocent death better for him than a longer life. In Plato, Apol. 40, 3, he concludes, from the silence of the daμovov during his defence, that the condemnation to which it led would be for him a benefit. 2 Xen. Mem. i. 1, 3; iv. 3, 12; Phæd. 242, C.; 4 Xen. Mem. i. 1, 6: тà μèv СНАР. IV. |