OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS, FROM 1789 TO 1856. FROM GALES AND SEATON'S ANNALS OF CONGRESS; FROM THEIR REPORTED DEBATES, BY JOHN C. RIVES. BY THE AUTHOR OF THE THIRTY YEARS' VIEW. VOL. VIII. C NEW YORK. D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 346 & 348 BROADWAY. COLUMBUS, O.: FOLLETT & FOSTER. 1858. EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS.-FIRST SESSION. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. CONTINUED FROM VOL. VIL THURSDAY, April 15, 1824. Occupation of Columbia River. gether, might be able to bring into the field, from twenty to thirty thousand warriors. Most of those nations communicate, either with the British to the Mr. FLOYD, from the committee appointed on north and west, or the Spaniards to the south. In the 29th of December last, to inquire into the the event of war, that force, with a few hundred forexpediency of occupying the mouth of the Ore-eign troops, or under the influence of foreign compagon or Columbia River; made a report thereon, nies, might be made more formidable to us than any which was read, and laid on the table. The re-force which Europe combined could oppose to us. On port is as follows: The committee to which was referred the resolution of the 29th day of December last, instructing them to inquire into the expediency of occupying the mouth of the Oregon or Columbia River, have had the same under consideration, and ask leave further to report: That they have considered the subject referred to them, and are persuaded, that, both in a military and commercial point of view, the occupation of that Territory is of great importance to the Republic; but, as much has been submitted to the House on these points, by former committees, they have now deemed it necessary only to present a view of the difficulties which would probably present themselves in accomplishing that object, and the manner in which they can be overcome. To obtain information, a letter to this end was addressed to an officer of the Army, whose integrity in the public service is well known to the House, and whose military knowledge is entitled to the highest respect; that officer, Brigadier General Thomas S. Jesup, answered so satisfactorily to the committee, that they have presented the answer, in its entire form, to the House, and adopt it as a part of this report. QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, April 26, 1824. SIR: In reply to your letter, dated the 30th ultimo, requesting me to communicate "any facts, views, or opinions, which may have presented themselves to me, relative to the probable difficulty of making an establishment at the mouth of Columbia River, and the military advantages of that establishment," I have the honor to remark, that, ever since my attention was first directed to the subject, I have considered the possession and military command of the Columbia necessary not only to the protection of the trade, but to the security of our Western frontier. That flank of our country, extending from the Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico, is everywhere in contact with numerous, powerful, and warlike Indian nations; who, alto the other hand, if such measures be adopted as to secure a proper influence over them, and, in the event aid of a few small garrisons, would not only afford of war, to command their co-operation, they, with the ample protection for that entire line, but would become the scourge of our enemies. The dangers to be apprehended, can only be averted post at the mouth of Columbia be intended to secure by proper military establishments; and whether the our territory, protect our traders, or to cut off all communication between the Indians and foreigners, Council Bluffs entirely across the continent necessary. I should consider a line of posts extending from the Those posts should be situated, as well with a view to command the avenues through which the Indians pass from the north to the south, as to keep open communication with the establishment at the mouth of the Columbia, A post should be established at the Mandan villages, because, there the Missouri approaches within a short distance of the British territory, and it would have the effect of holding in check the Hudson's Bay and Northwest Companies, and controlling the RickaIndians, who either reside or range on the territory rees, Mandans, Minnatarees, Assiniboins, and other east, north, and west of that point. A post at, or near, the head of navigation on the. Missouri, would control the Blackfoot Indians, protect our traders, enable us to remove those of the British companies from our territory, and serve as a depot, at which detachments moved towards the Columbia might either be supplied, or leave such stores as they should find it difficult to carry with them through the mountains. It might also be made a depot of trade, and of the Indian Department. To keep open the communication through the mountains, there should be at least one small post at some convenient point between the Missouri and the Columbia, and on the latter river and its tributaries there should be at least three posts. They would afford present protection to our traders, and, on the ex H. OF R.] Indian Reservations in Georgia. piration of the privilege granted to British subjects to trade on the waters of the Columbia, would enable us to remove them from our territory, and to secure the whole to our own citizens. They would also enable us to preserve peace among the Indians, and, in the event of foreign war, to command their neutrality or their assistance, as we might think most advisable. The posts designated, might be established and maintained, at an additional annual expense not exceeding forty thousand dollars. By extending to those posts the system of cultivation, now in operation at the Council Bluffs, the expense of supplying them would, in a. few years, be greatly diminished. Mills might be erected at all the posts at a trifling expense, and, the whole country abounding in grass, all the domestic animals necessary, either for labor or subsistence, might be supported. This would render the establishments more secure, and, consequently, more formidable to the Indian nations in their vicinity. rate. As to the proposed posts on the Columbia, it is believed they might be supplied immediately at a low Wheat may be obtained at New California, at about twenty-five cents per bushel, and beef cattle at three or four dollars each. Salt, in any quantity required, may be had at an island near the Peninsula of California. Should transportation not be readily obtained for those articles, vessels might be constructed by the troops. To obtain the desired advantages, it is important, not only that we occupy the posts designated, but that we commence our operations without delay. The British companies are wealthy and powerful; their establishments extend from Hudson's Bay and Lake Superior to the Pacific; many of them within our territory. It is not to be supposed they would surrender those advantages without a struggle, and, though they should not engage in hostilities themselves, they might render all the Indians, in that extensive region, hostile. The detachment intended to occupy the mouth of Columbia might leave the Council Bluffs in June, and one hundred and fifty men proceed with the boats and stores; and, as the country is open, and abounds with grass, the remaining fifty might proceed by land, with the horses intended for the transportation across the mountains, and might drive three or four hundred beeves to the Mandan villages or to the falls of Missouri; at one of those places the parties should unite and spend the winter. The latter would be preferable, because there they might be able to establish a friendly intercourse with the Blackfoot Indians, or, at all events, by impressing them with an idea of the power of the nation, restrain their depredations upon the neighboring tribes, and deter them from acts of outrage upon our traders. They might, also, during the winter, reconnoitre the several passes through the mountains, prepare provisions necessary to support them on the march, and down the Columbia; and, if authorized to do so, remove from our territories all British traders on the waters of the Missouri. They would necessarily remain at, or in the vicinity of, their wintering ground, until June, but might be occupied during the months of April and May, in opening a road to the mountains, and constructing bridges over the numerous streams on the [APRIL, 1824, tination, where, after every necessary allowance for accidents and delays, they would certainly arrive by the month of August. The vessels employed to transport the stores by sea, might leave the United States in the month of November, and would arrive at the mouth of Columbia in April, at least four months before the detachment from the Council Bluffs could reach that point; and, unless the ships should be detained during that time, which could not be expected, the stores would be exposed to damage and depredation, and perhaps, by the time the troops should arrive, would be entirely destroyed. It would, therefore, seem to be a measure of prudence, that at least one company of artillery be transported with the stores. That description of force would be found necessary at the post, and the ships would afford them ample accommodation. That the route from the Council Bluffs to the mouth of Columbia is practicable, has been proved by the enterprise of more than one of our citizens. It, no doubt, presents difficulties; but difficulties are not impossibilities. We have only to refer to the pages of our history to learn that many operations, infinitely more arduous, have been accomplished by Americans. The march of Arnold to Quebec, or of General Clark to Vincennes, during the Revolutionary war, exceeded greatly in fatigue, privation, difficulty, and danger, the proposed operation; and I believe I may say without fear of contradiction, that the detachment might be supplied, during the whole route, with less difficulty than in the war of 1756 was experienced in supplying the forces operating under General Washington, and General Braddock, against the French and Indians, on the Ohio. A post at the mouth of Columbia is important, not only in relation to the interior trade, and the military defence of the western section of the Union, but, also, in relation to the naval power of the nation. Naval power consists, not in ships, but in seamen; and, to be efficient, the force must always be available. The northwest coast of America is an admirable nursery for seamen--many of our best sailors are formed there; without a naval station, however, on the Pacific, the force employed in the whale fishery, as well as in sealing, and the northwest trade, would, in the event of war with a great maritime power, be, in some measure, lost to the nation. But, that establishment made, it would afford a secure retreat to all our ships and seamen in that section of the globe; and the force, thus concentrated, might be used with effect against the trade, if not the fleets or possessions of the enemy, in place of being driven to the Atlantic, or perhaps captured on their way. The establishment might be considered as a great bastion, commanding the whole line of coast to the North and South; and it would have the same influence on that line which the bastions of a work have on its curtains; for the principles of defence are the same, whether applied to a small fortress, or to a line of frontier, or even an entire section of the globe. In the one case, the missiles used are bullets and cannon shot; in the other, ships and fleets. I have the honor to be, &c., TH. S. JESUP. Indian Reservations in Georgia. Mr. FORSYTH, from the select committee to which was referred the President's Message of the 30th of March, 1824, relating to the execution of so much of the compact of 1802 between the United States and the State of Georgia, as relates to the extinguishment of the Indian title to lands within that State; also, a memorial of the Legislature of the said State; made a report thereon; which was read, as follows: The select committee, to whom was referred the President's Message, of the 30th of March, with the documents accompanying it, relating to the compact of 1802, between the United States and the State of Georgia, submit to the House, on that Message, and on the memorial of the Legislature of the State of Georgia, also referred to them, the following report: The State of Georgia claimed, on the establishment of the independence of the United States, all the lands now forming the States of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, with the exception of those portions of the two last States which formed a part of Florida and Louisiana. This claim was founded upon the charter of incorporation of the proprietary government; on the Royal commissions issued to the Governors of the State, after the proprietors had surrendered their charter to the Crown. The claim was disputed by South Carolina and by the United States. The conflicting claims of South Carolina and Georgia were adjusted by a convention between them, in 1787. The United States recognized, by the treaty with Spain of the year 1795, the claim of Georgia, having refused, in 1788, a cession from the State, on account of the remoteness of the lands, and of the terms proposed by Georgia. In April, 1798, Congress passed a law in relation to the western part of the territory of Georgia, with a reservation of the rights of Georgia to the jurisdiction and soil. In May, 1800, another act was passed, containing a similar reservation. In December, 1800, Georgia remonstrated against these acts, as a violation of her right of sovereignty and soil. The compact of 1802 put an end to the disputes which were likely to arise out of this collision between the General and State Governments. By this compact, the United States obtained a surrender of the right of Georgia to the sovereignty and soil of two States, containing, by estimate, eighty-six millions of acres of land, for the paltry consideration of the payment of $1,280,000 out of the proceeds of that land, and of a promise to extinguish the Indian title to the land within the territorial limits not ceded to the United States, as soon as it could be done peaceably, and on reasonable terms. The execution of this compact produced no change in the right of Georgia to the sovereignty and soil of the land within her newly-defined boundaries. Its only effect was to throw upon the United States the expense which might attend the extinguishment of the Indian title, an expense which, but for this compact, must have been borne by the State. Nor did this compact, in the slightest circumstance, add to the title of the Indians; it recognized only the claim which they, as Indians, were allowed to have, according to the usages of the States, and the liberal policy adopted towards them by the General Gov ernment. In relation to the Cherokees, the principal topic of the President's Message, it would appear that new doctrines are permitted to be entertained of them, in the opinion of the committee neither consistent with the opinions heretofore entertained, with [H. OF R. the practices of the Government, nor with the interests of the Union. The Cherokees claim to be The President avows the an independent tribe. belief that the articles of the cession of 1802 is a full proof that the Indians had a right to the territory, in the disposal of which they were to be regarded as free agents. The acts of the General Government, in 1814, in relation to the Creeks; the language of the President of the United States, in 1817; the language of the Secretary of War, in 1818; of the agent of the Government in that year, in treating with the Cherokees; of the agent treating with them in 1823, does not correspond with the opinions now expressed. In 1814, General Jackson, acting under the authority of the Government, took from the Creek Indians, for an equivalent named by himself, all the land the United States chose to require, to effect a great object of national policy in regard to Indian tribes. It cannot be alleged that this was done by virtue of conquest. The letter of the late Indian agent, Colonel Hawkins, of the 11th of August, 1815, laid before the House of Representatives on the 5th of April, 1824, shows that nearly eight millions of acres were taken from the friendly Indians, (our allies in the war,) over and above all the hunting grounds of the upper friendly Creeks, for what was called an equivalent, but which the Indians did not deem such. In 1817, in his Message at the opening of Congress, the President says, "the hunter state can exist only in the vast uncultivated desert. It yields to the more dense and compact form, and greater force of civilized population; and, of right, it ought to yield, for the earth was given to mankind to support the greatest number of which it was capable, and no tribe or people have a right to withhold, from the wants of others, more than is necessary for their own support and comfort." In a letter of the 29th of July, 1818, the Secretary of War says to Mr. McMinn, speaking of the attempts to prevent the Cherokees from going to Arkansas, "The United States will not permit the treaty to be defeated by such means. Those who choose to remain are permitted to do so in quiet-those who choose to emigrate, must be equally free." And further: "It is vain for the Cherokees to hold the high tone which they do, as to their independence as a nation, for daily proof is exhibited that, were it not for the protecting arm of the United States, they would become the victims of fraud and violence." Mr McMinn tells the Cherokees, in conformity with this declaration, in his talk to the chiefs, of the 23d of November, 1818, "It must surely be, my brothers, that you view me as an impostor, acting upon my own authority, with a view to deceive the nation, or that you flatter yourselves with the empty expectation that the United States cannot execute a measure of general defence for the safety of her citizens, which shall, in the slightest degree, affect your interest or your wishes." The agents of 1823 assert an unqualified right in the United States to take from the Indians any of their lands for public use. It is asserted, however, by the Secretary of War, that there were treaties existing with the Cherokees, in 1802, which guaranteed their lands. These guarantees were only of the Indian title, as understood by all at the date of the execution of these treaties -a title of mere occupancy, for the purposes of hunting. |
