Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryThe New York Times–bestselling authors of Miracle at Midway delve into the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor during WWII in “a superb work of history” (Albuquerque Journal Magazine). In the predawn hours of December 7, 1941, a Japanese carrier group sailed toward Hawaii. A few minutes before 8:00 a.m., they received the order to rain death on the American base at Pearl Harbor, sinking dozens of ships, destroying hundreds of airplanes, and taking the lives of over two thousand servicemen. The carnage lasted only two hours, but more than seventy years later, terrible questions remain unanswered. How did the Japanese slip past the American radar? Why were the Hawaiian defense forces so woefully underprepared? What, if anything, did American intelligence know before the first Japanese pilot shouted “Tora! Tora! Tora!”? In this incomparable volume, Pearl Harbor experts Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon tackle dozens of thorny issues in an attempt to determine who was at fault for one of the most shocking military disasters in history. |
From inside the book
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... records will show that the charge is not tenable . ... The facts will also show that the surprise attack on Hawaii was in no respect due to the unwillingness of Congress to pass a law authorizing wire tapping .... 34 Truman explained ...
... records will show that the charge is not tenable . ... The facts will also show that the surprise attack on Hawaii was in no respect due to the unwillingness of Congress to pass a law authorizing wire tapping .... 34 Truman explained ...
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... Record for 1941 it is the almost total absence of debate or comment about the Far East . Page after page slips by without so much as mention of the word Japan . In the foreign policy field , these lawmakers were obsessively preoccupied ...
... Record for 1941 it is the almost total absence of debate or comment about the Far East . Page after page slips by without so much as mention of the word Japan . In the foreign policy field , these lawmakers were obsessively preoccupied ...
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... record against militarism . ” 46 The War Department , and subsequently Baker , may have given the House undue credit . A reading of the debate concerning the strength of the military academy leaves the impression that the lawmakers were ...
... record against militarism . ” 46 The War Department , and subsequently Baker , may have given the House undue credit . A reading of the debate concerning the strength of the military academy leaves the impression that the lawmakers were ...
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... record . Nevertheless , there was evidence that the Navy unofficially identified with Kimmel . Rear Admiral Dundas P. Tucker wrote to Lieutenant Commander Charles C. Hiles on June 2 , 1968 , “ I am glad to learn you are going ahead on ...
... record . Nevertheless , there was evidence that the Navy unofficially identified with Kimmel . Rear Admiral Dundas P. Tucker wrote to Lieutenant Commander Charles C. Hiles on June 2 , 1968 , “ I am glad to learn you are going ahead on ...
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... record - keeping and information center concerning ship locations ; Brainard “ was not in on questions of broad ... records do not indicate whether or not the Navy informed the Army of this mission . Marshall testified that he had no ...
... record - keeping and information center concerning ship locations ; Brainard “ was not in on questions of broad ... records do not indicate whether or not the Navy informed the Army of this mission . Marshall testified that he had no ...
Contents
Alerted to Prevent Sabotage | |
The Failure to Comprehend | |
An Important Man in an Important Post | |
Peculiar Complicated and Tense | |
Always Striving for Perfection | |
His Most Grievous Failure | |
The Last Critical Stages | |
It Is Inexplicable | |
He Had Supreme Responsibility | |
On Lines of National Policy | |
Looking in the Wrong Direction | |
ADVISERS PLANNERS AND CHIEFS | |
With Knives and Hatchets | |
Unsurmountable Obstacles | |
Crimination and Recrimination | |
To Help and Serve | |
Faults of Omission | |
Outside of Effective Contact | |
A Finger of Blame | |
Primarily a Failure of Men | |
The Pitfalls of Divided Responsibility | |
A Lack of Imagination | |
East Wind Rain | |
CONTENTS | |
FIELD COMMANDERS AND OPERATORS | |
A Sentinel on Duty | |
THE VIEW FROM THE CROWS NEST | |
Blessed by the War God | |
A Strategic Imbecility | |
A Mental Attitude | |
In the Wake of the Pearl Harbor Disaster | |
Remember Pearl Harbor | |
Image Gallery | |
Notes | |
Appendices | |
The Pearl Harbor Investigations | |
Japanese Proposals of November 20 1941 | |
War Warning Messages of November 27 1941 | |
Proposed Modus Vivendi | |
Japans Bomb Plot Message | |
The Hull Note of November 26 1941 | |
Popov Questionnaire | |
Selected Bibliography | |
Index | |
About the Authors | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action Admiral Kimmel air attack Air Force aircraft alert American Army and Navy Army Board asked August Barnes believed Bloch bomb plot British carriers Chapter Chief of Staff China Commander in Chief Congress congressional committee considered danger Dawn We Slept December declared defense Diary diplomatic dispatch East enemy fact failure Gerow going Government Hart Hawaii Hawaiian Department hereafter cited Honolulu Ibid intelligence intercepts Interview January Japan Japanese Japanese attack Kimmel and Short knew Knox Konoye MacArthur Marshall military Morgan Nagumo nation Naval District Navy Department Nomura November 27 Oahu officer operation Pearl Harbor attack Philippines planes position possible President radar RADM reason reconnaissance replied responsibility Roberts Commission Roosevelt sabotage Safford Secretary Senator ships situation Stark Stimson strategy submarine surprise task force testified thought Tokyo told Turner U.S. Navy U.S. Pacific Fleet United War Department warning Washington winds execute wrote Yamamoto