Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryThe New York Times–bestselling authors of Miracle at Midway delve into the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor during WWII in “a superb work of history” (Albuquerque Journal Magazine). In the predawn hours of December 7, 1941, a Japanese carrier group sailed toward Hawaii. A few minutes before 8:00 a.m., they received the order to rain death on the American base at Pearl Harbor, sinking dozens of ships, destroying hundreds of airplanes, and taking the lives of over two thousand servicemen. The carnage lasted only two hours, but more than seventy years later, terrible questions remain unanswered. How did the Japanese slip past the American radar? Why were the Hawaiian defense forces so woefully underprepared? What, if anything, did American intelligence know before the first Japanese pilot shouted “Tora! Tora! Tora!”? In this incomparable volume, Pearl Harbor experts Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon tackle dozens of thorny issues in an attempt to determine who was at fault for one of the most shocking military disasters in history. |
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Page
Another financial area was much more obvious and of more direct interest. After
Pearl Harbor, the American public had been particularly angry when they
reflected upon the policy of shipping scrap iron and other strategic materials to
Japan.
Another financial area was much more obvious and of more direct interest. After
Pearl Harbor, the American public had been particularly angry when they
reflected upon the policy of shipping scrap iron and other strategic materials to
Japan.
Page
Shocked, for once Marshall spoke to a congressman with anger in his voice: “You
are going to let plain hatred of the personality dictate to you to do something that
you realize is very harmful to the interest of the country.” On the other hand, ...
Shocked, for once Marshall spoke to a congressman with anger in his voice: “You
are going to let plain hatred of the personality dictate to you to do something that
you realize is very harmful to the interest of the country.” On the other hand, ...
Page
And many of those were tempered by three concepts: first, that Japan threatened
American interests, not United States' soil (except perhaps the Philippines);
second, that Germany was behind Japan's unfriendly moves toward the United ...
And many of those were tempered by three concepts: first, that Japan threatened
American interests, not United States' soil (except perhaps the Philippines);
second, that Germany was behind Japan's unfriendly moves toward the United ...
Page
Against the United States; have no doubt about it. ... See what the Japanese are
doing. Every sensible man knows that our vital interests are menaced....” 60
Representative Bertrand W. Gearhart of California usually voted with the
Republicans ...
Against the United States; have no doubt about it. ... See what the Japanese are
doing. Every sensible man knows that our vital interests are menaced....” 60
Representative Bertrand W. Gearhart of California usually voted with the
Republicans ...
Page
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Contents
Alerted to Prevent Sabotage | iii |
The Failure to Comprehend | iii |
An Important Man in an Important Post | iii |
Peculiar Complicated and Tense | iii |
Always Striving for Perfection | iii |
His Most Grievous Failure | iii |
The Last Critical Stages | iii |
It Is Inexplicable | iii |
Bait for a Japanese Attack | |
To Avoid War with Japan | |
He Had Supreme Responsibility | |
On Lines of National Policy | |
Looking in the Wrong Direction | |
ADVISERS PLANNERS AND CHIEFS | ii |
With Knives and Hatchets | ii |
Unsurmountable Obstacles | ii |
Crimination and Recrimination | ii |
To Help and Serve | ii |
Faults of Omission | ii |
Outside of Effective Contact | ii |
A Finger of Blame | ii |
Primarily a Failure of Men | ii |
The Pitfalls of Divided Responsibility | ii |
A Lack of Imagination | ii |
East Wind Rain | ii |
FIELD COMMANDERS AND OPERATORS | iii |
A Sentinel on Duty | iii |
THE VIEW FROM THE CROWS NEST | iv |
Blessed by the War God | v |
A Strategic Imbecility | xv |
A Mental Attitude | xxv |
In the Wake of the Pearl Harbor Disaster | xxxiv |
Remember Pearl Harbor | xliii |
Notes | liv |
Appendices | 46 |
The Pearl Harbor Investigations | 47 |
Japanese Proposals of November 20 1941 | 49 |
War Warning Messages of November 27 1941 | 50 |
Proposed Modus Vivendi | 51 |
Japans Bomb Plot Message | 54 |
The Hull Note of November 26 1941 | 55 |
Popov Questionnaire | 57 |
Selected Bibliography | 59 |
Index | 70 |
Image Gallery | 571 |
About the Authors | 598 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action Admiral alert American appeared armed Army asked attack August Barnes base believed Bloch Board British called carriers Chapter Chief command concerning congressional committee considered course danger December defense Department Diary direct dispatch East effect execute expected fact failure Fleet force going Government Hawaii Hawaiian hereafter cited Hull Ibid important intelligence interest Interview Islands January Japan Japanese Kimmel knew later letter major Marshall matter means military move Naval Navy Navy Department never November Oahu officer operation opinion Pacific Pacific Fleet peace Pearl Harbor Philippines planes position possible prepared President question ready reason received reconnaissance Record relations replied Representative responsibility Roosevelt Secretary Senator sent ships Short situation staff Stark Stimson surprise task thing thought told took United wanted warning Washington winds wrote York