The political logic of economic reform in China
This study analyzes policy-making in a non-democratic authoritarian country, explaining the history of Chinese market reforms from 1979 to the present. Drawing on interviews with high-level Chinese officials, it pieces together detailed histories of economic reform policy decisions.
1 online resource (x, 399 pages) : illustrations
9780520912212, 9780585108230, 0520912217, 0585108234
44957445
Formal Authority Relations Among Central Communist Party and Government Institutions in the People's Republic of China
pt. 1. Introduction. 1. The Political Logic of Economic Reform. 2. The Prereform Chinese Economy and the Decision to Initiate Market Reforms
pt. 2. Chinese Political Institutions. 3. Authority Relations: The Communist Party and the Government. 4. Leadership Incentives: Political Succession and Reciprocal Accountability. 5. Bargaining Arena: The Government Bureaucracy. 6. Who Is Enfranchised in the Policy-making Process? 7. Decision Rules: Delegation by Consensus. 8. Chinese Political Institutions and the Path of Economic Reforms
pt. 3. Economic Reform Policy-Making. 9. Playing to the Provinces: Fiscal Decentralization and the Politics of Reform. 10. Creating Vested Interests in Reform: Industrial Reform Takeoff, 1978-81. 11. Leadership Succession and Policy Conflict: The Choice Between Profit Contracting and Substituting Tax-for-Profit, 1982-83. 12. Building Bureaucratic Consensus: Formulating the Tax-for-Profit Policy, 1983-84. 13. The Power of Particularism: Abortive Price Reform and the Revival of Profit Contracting, 1985-88
pt. 4. Conclusion. 14. The Political Lessons of Economic Reform in China
English